Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors by Barrett, Ryan
University of Missouri, St. Louis
IRL @ UMSL
Dissertations UMSL Graduate Works
1-20-2018
Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist
Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign
Actors
Ryan Barrett
ryan.barrett@umsl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the UMSL Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barrett, Ryan, "Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors" (2018).
Dissertations. 725.
https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation/725
Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of 
Foreign Actors 
Ryan Barrett 
M.A. Political Science, The University of Missouri - Saint Louis, 2015 
M.A. International Relations, Webster University, 2010 
B.A. International Studies, 2006 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School at the  
The University of Missouri - Saint Louis 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
Doctor Philosophy in Political Science  
May 2018 
Advisory Committee: 
Joyce Mushaben, Ph.D. 
Jeanne Wilson, PhD. 
Kenny Thomas, Ph.D. 
David Kimball, Ph.D. 
Contents 
Introduction           1 
Chapter I. Policy Formulation        30 
Chapter II. Reform Initiatives        84 
Chapter III. Economic Policy        122 
Chapter IV. Energy Policy         169 
Chapter V. Security and Defense Policy       199 
Conclusion           237 
Appendix           246 
Bibliography           248 
To the Pat Tillman Foundation  
for graciously sponsoring  
this important research
Introduction: Ukraine at a Crossroads 
 Ukraine, like many European countries, has experienced a complex history 
and occupies a unique geographic position that places it in a peculiar situation be-
tween its liberal future and communist past; it also finds itself tugged in two opposing 
directions by the gravitational forces of Russia and the West. The ongoing political 
struggles in Kyiv over reform, democratization, energy and foreign policy represent a 
battle taking place on a path between two distinct periods and two different places. 
Two and a half decades after independence, Ukrainians have reached a fork in the 
road, where they must confront difficult choices about their future. 
 Dissident Ukrainians began disrupting the Yanukovych regime with an osten-
sibly innocuous event. What started as a celebratory gathering on Maidan Nezhalezh-
nosti (Maidan Independence Square), supporting closer ties with the European Union 
(EU), climaxed in a violent struggle for political power over the country. A few thou-
sand students first gathered on Maidan Square in downtown Kyiv on November 28th 
2013, just before the Vilnius Summit, to show their support for the EU Association 
Agreement (AA).  Days before the meeting, however, Viktor Yanukovych had abrupt1 -
ly announced that he would not sign the accord, effectively suspending the negotia-
tions. A small crowd soon protested Yanukovych’s decision while evermore Ukraini-
ans gathered in central Kyiv to demonstrate their displeasure. The government steadi-
ly increased pressure, to force the protesters to disperse, eventually resorting to vio-
lence. The Berkut, a group of nondescript, mercenary police hired directly by 
Yanukovych, used force in an attempt to breakup the gathering. Civilians  
 Nadia Diuk, “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution,” World Affairs (March/April 1
2014), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/euromaidan-ukraine’s-self-organizing-revolution. 
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responded by appearing on the square in ever greater numbers, swelling to hundreds 
of thousands by December 1st.  2
 Russian officials used not only sticks but also carrots in persuading 
Yanukovych not to sign the AA. On December 17, 2013, the Russian government 
agreed to buy $15 billion worth of Ukrainian bonds and reduced the price of natural 
gas shipped to Ukraine.  This infusion of cash came at a critical time when roughly 3
$10 billion in bonds would mature in the coming months with little certainty that 
creditors would get paid.  Moscow’s lifeline acted as another instrument in deterring 4
Yanukovych from signing the AA. Meanwhile, the violence in downtown Kyiv cli-
maxed on February 20th when snipers on rooftops opened fired on protesters, killing 
fifty people.  Two years later, pedestrians walking along Institustka Street still stop by 5
small, makeshift memorials to those who died. 
 By February 22, 2014, Viktor Yanukovych had buckled under public pressure 
and fled the country.  As the situation in Kyiv deteriorated, Russian soldiers and ac6 -
tivists slowly and stealthily took over the Crimean Peninsula starting on February 
28th.  Nondescript Russian troops, many transported from the mainland to their base 7
 Diuk, “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution.”2
 Diuk, “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution.”3
 Vladimir Isachenkov and Maria Danilova, "Putin: Russia to buy $15 billion in Ukraine bonds,” US4 -
AToday (December 17, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/12/17/russia-ukraine-
bonds-putin/4058059/. 
 Damien Sharkov, “Ukraine has Found the Weapon Used in the ‘Maidan Massacre.’” Newsweek (July 5
14, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-claims-find-sniper-maidan-massacre-480406. 
 Alexander Baunov, Balazs Jarabik and Alexander Golubov, “A Year After Maidan: Why did Viktor 6
Yanukovych Flee After Signing the Agreement with the Opposition?” Carnegie Moscow Center (Feb-
ruary 25, 2015), http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=59172. 
 John Simpson, “Russia’s Crimea Plan Detailed, Secret and Successful,” BBC News (March 19, 7
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082. 
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at Sevastopol, began seizing control of key transportation points. By March the Russ-
ian government had wrestled control of the peninsula away from Ukraine. Meanwhile, 
anti-government protests erupted in eastern Ukraine, condemning the EuroMaidan 
movement. Supported by Russian operatives and resources, eastern Ukrainians in the 
Donbas region formed a separatist movement, causing a civil war that is still frozen.  8
Since independence in 1991, many Ukrainians have adopted a set of untenable goals: 
they want to seek prosperity through growing economic cooperation with western Eu-
rope, as well as to maintain stable relations with Russia, along with protecting the 
country’s sovereignty against excessive foreign influence. By 2014 the Ukrainian 
government could no longer reconcile these conflicting goals. The disillusionment 
with the lack of economic prosperity, and the massive inequality between oligarchs 
and all other citizens, and the cultural divisions between Russian and Ukrainian iden-
tities, led to the political upheaval on the Maidan.  9
 Ukraine currently features as the main target of Russia’s foreign policy calcu-
lus. Kyiv stands at the crossroad in post-communist Europe, at a critical point in space 
and time: its fate as a member of the West or Eurasia hangs in the balance. The Maid-
an Revolution, or EuroMaidan, highlights many concurrent processes in post-Soviet 
Europe, which include post-communist development, democratization and the 
reemergence of mercantilist energy politics. The conflict caused by EuroMaidan also 
signals a wider tension between Russia and the West, and Ukraine’s role of a proxy 
battle space.  
 Damien Sharkov, “Putin Claims Russia ‘Forced to Defend’ Ukraine Separatists,” Newsweek (October 8
12, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/putin-claims-russia-forced-defend-ukraine-separatists-509281. 
 Leonid Grigoriev, Eugenia Buryak, and Alexander Golyashev, “The Transition of Ukraine’s Econo9 -
my: A Second Start?” Problems of Economic Transition, 58, 3 (2016): 256.
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 An examination of Ukraine’s relationship with Western countries and Russia is 
significant for four core reasons. First, understanding the clash between these two 
countries can help to mitigate a much wider conflict on the European continent. No 
country has undertaken military intervention into a European country since the Soviet 
Union last invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. Europeans have not witnessed a major 
conflict on their soil since the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Russia’s invasion 
and occupation of Crimea, along with its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, 
signals a new era of instability in Europe.  
 Second, because most European states are also members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), any potential conflict between Russia and the EU 
would involve the US and further exacerbate the conflict. Despite attempting to “re-
set” US-Russian relations in 2009 to reconcile their respective conflicting security 
interests, any partnership seems more unlikely than since 1991.  From disagreements 10
over how to handle the civil war in Syria, to American accusations of Russian inter-
ference in the 2016 presidential election, US-Russian relations have moved to their 
lowest point since the end of the Cold War.  
 Third, analyzing Ukraine’s democratization progress and the role that Russia 
has played thus far may hold answers for other post-Soviet states and countries transi-
tioning from authoritarian regimes to democracies. Fifteen states emerged from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while seven other member states outside the 
USSR withdrew from the Warsaw Pact; their paths to democracy and economic pros-
 For an explanation of the “reset” in relations, see an interview with one of its architects Michael 10
McFaul, in Jason Breslow, “The Putin Factor: Russia, America and the Geopolitics of Ukraine.” Front-
line, Public Broadcasting Corporation (May 27, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/for-
eign-affairs-defense/battle-for-ukraine/the-putin-factor-russia-america-and-the-geopolitics-of-ukraine/ 
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perity have been dramatically uneven. For example, Poland’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2014 was $25,500, accompanied by a democracy ranking of #40 out of 167 
countries; Ukraine registered a GDP per capita of $8,300 and was ranked #92 in the 
same year.   11
 Finally, a better understanding of Ukraine’s post-1990 political development 
can hold answers as to how countries heavily dependent on foreign sources of energy 
might better manage their security and sovereignty issues. Ukraine remained reliant 
on Russian oil and natural gas imports until 2014. In 2013 Ukraine was importing 
over 50% of its natural gas for consumption.  By 2016, however, Ukraine was no 12
longer receiving any oil or natural gas directly from Russia due to the conflict.  If 13
Ukraine achieves an independent energy future, other countries will be able to learn 
from this case to better secure their own needs. Energy independence mitigates the 
prospects of foreign powers using petroleum products as a weapon. 
 Although there is an extensive literature on post-Communist transition, little 
effort has been made to understand how foreign actors can spur or hinder democrati-
 Poland and Ukraine in the CIA WorldFactbook; “Democracy 2014,” The Economist (2014), http://11
www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-
2014.pdf; For a thorough analysis of transition in eastern Europe see Problems of Post Communism, 
with articles addressing specific issues and countries. 
 The US Energy Information Administration, “Ukraine,” https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/12
analysis.cfm?iso=UKR.
 Dmitry Zaks, “Ukraine Slashes Gas Use as Subsidies Phased Out,” Yahoo News (January 2, 2017), 13
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-slashes-gas-subsidies-phased-140817954.html
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zation.  Recognizing the importance of energy politics in the region and the ways in 14
which this might hinder democratization will provide scholars and policy-makers with 
insights into how growing competition over natural resources is likely to affect many 
political transitions throughout the world. The countries of Eastern Europe, for exam-
ple, find themselves caught between the cultural and commercial interests of the West 
and the resurgent gravitational pull of the Russian Federation. 
 My core research question is: How do foreign powers, Western and Russian, 
influence Ukrainian politics? I contend that the ways in which the US and EU coun-
tries compete with Russian influence, affects Ukrainian political decisions greatly, 
depending on the policy area at stake. The core difference between Western and Russ-
ian approaches concerns their respective applications of hard versus soft power. As 
originally defined by Joseph Nye, “hard power” entails the use of military or econom-
ic instruments to influence foreign nation-states; “soft power,” in turn utilizes cultural 
and ideological sources to shape the policies of foreign countries.  Western states use 15
both hard power, funneling money to institutions, and various forms of soft power to 
promote democratic values; Russia utilizes hard power, targeting people, territory, en-
 For a primer on Russia post-Soviet transition, see: Stephen Blank, Pavel Baev, and Ariel Cohen, 14
Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War 
College, 2012); Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative 
Perspective,” World Politics 44 (1991): 113–138; Steven Burg, War or Peace? Nationalism, Democra-
cy, and American Foreign Policy in Post-Communist Europe (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 
1996); M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005); Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia 
(Oxford University Press, 2008); Jeffery Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power 
Politics, Second Edition  (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2012); Nicolai Petro and 
Alvin Rubinstein, Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State  (New York: Longman, 1997); 
Richard Rose, “Is Russia Becoming a Normal Society?” Demokratizatsiya 16, (2008): 75-86; Richard 
Rose, “Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust,” Journal of Democracy 5, 4 (1994): 18-30; Richard 
Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990 (New Jersey: Simon and Schuster, 1991); Richard 
Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Stephen White, Russia’s New Politics. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics (Public Affairs, 2004): 5.15
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ergy sources and infrastructure, along with various soft power tools to influence a 
cynical political culture and to promote ethno-historical ties. The West targets institu-
tions, both governmental and nongovernmental, by helping Ukraine to develop struc-
tures intended to produce sustainable, demonstrative results. Despite the gradual na-
ture of this strategy, the effects are longer-term, securing the future. Russian officials, 
by contrast, target informal networks and specific agents, along with focusing on their 
historical and cultural ties to Ukraine from the past.  
 Since 2008 Russian foreign policy has continued to employ a “hard power” 
approach but with a slightly different twist than seen in previous decades. Rather than 
rely entirely on  military forces that had deteriorated rapidly after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union to influence foreign powers, Russia began to capitalize on its oil re-
serves to chart a second path in power politics. By 2000 government and business 
leaders alike had come to recognize the utility of this national resource and the in-
creasing role it played in foreign affairs. Vladimir Putin has harnessed its value for the 
needs of the state. Russia’s attitude towards Ukraine and its potential affiliation with 
the EU clearly mirrors this new approach.   
 As of 2014 Russia nonetheless appeared willing to use its military once again, 
albeit only in limited ways. The 2008 invasion of Georgia amounted to a brief incur-
sion; since 2014 its intervention in Ukraine has thus far been limited to Crimea, 
Luhansk and Donetsk. Putin has little desire to instigate a large-scale war, but he does 
want to send a clear message to Western powers about his desire to maintain a strong, 
export-driven economy. What Western officials might conclude is that this economic 
strategy simultaneously represents his government’s greatest strength and its greatest 
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weakness.  US policy-makers can do little to prevent further Russian aggression; but 
EU policy-makers, using economic instruments, can counter Putin’s actions to a de-
gree. Russia is engaging in certain areas and disengaging in other areas in order to 
maximize its benefits at the least cost.  
 As Moscow’s instruments of hard power dull, it is forced to refocus its sights 
on soft power tactics. For example, many Russian-speaking media outlets in Ukraine 
are being used to actively campaign against the current government and its reforms. 
In this case, however, “its soft power is strongly associated with discourses of a 
shared past and with the common values, culture and history that arise from it.”  This 16
soft power approach contrasts starkly with Western tactics in that both the EU and the 
US promote liberal values wedded to a potential future path for Ukraine. 
 I show that the distinct approaches used by foreign actors produces different 
policy policy outcomes. I interviewed Ukrainian policymakers, experts and activists, 
and provide extensive data concerning a wide range of policy areas. My conclusions 
reflect the current political situation in Ukraine, as a result of developments since in-
dependence in 1991. 
Scope of the Study 
 This research project started as what I thought would be a straightforward ef-
fort to analyze how third party states are influenced by foreign entities. Once I laid 
out my plan for conducting fieldwork on this subject, I found myself aiming at “a 
moving target” in focusing on current public policy in Ukraine. My journey has taken 
many unexpected turns, although I still adhere to some of the basic notions I outlined 
 Alexander Bogomolov and Oleksandr Lytvynenko, “A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in 16
Ukraine,” The Aims and Means of Russian Influence Abroad Series (Chatham House, January 2012): 3.
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initially; however over time I have developed a renewed appreciation for the Ukrain-
ian perspective. For example, I assumed early on that energy politics was the underly-
ing source of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and therefore its main motivation for its 
foreign intervention. Though energy remains an important aspect of national politics, 
the most important issue for Ukrainians is whether to follow the strategies of the past 
or to take risks in pursuing a new path towards the future. While the war over territory 
and energy plugs along, a more prominent war of ideas rages in the streets, halls and 
rooms of Ukrainians. 
 By the time I submit my dissertation, some of the information found herein 
may be obsolete. However, my hope is that such an investigation has not been under-
taken in vain. One important aspect of my approach is to investigate what kind of 
processes have been at work and how they function within the international system. 
The following analysis is not so much about specific people and places but rather 
about the path dependency of policy inputs and outputs. Ultimately I am concerned 
with how political elites make decisions.  
Research Dynamics 
 In this section I lay out a rough framework for studying foreign influences in 
modern Ukraine. This research is exploratory in nature, attempting to construct a 
framework for analyzing external influences on a third actor, in this case a post-Soviet 
country. I compare Western versus Russian approaches to influencing the policymak-
ing process in Ukraine and the  variable outcomes over three broad time periods. The 
“West,” for purposes of this discussion, is defined as the United States (US) and Eu-
ropean Union (EU) member states as well as their constituent international organiza-
 !  9
tions (IGOs). This work stands as a case study, concerning Western institutions, 
agents and culture, contrasted with Russian approaches, in relation to Ukrainian for-
eign policy. Though I use the “West” as a unit of measurement, I fully acknowledge 
the complicated nature of such a unit, considering the disparate tools and policy goals 
deployed not only by the US and Europe but also among the various EU member 
states. The US tends to be more aggressive and often uses negative reinforcement, 
while the collective EU approach is more accommodating, using positive reinforce-
ment.  
 In each chapter I briefly address Western versus Russian influence for the first 
two  broad political time periods, including the crucial post-independence period from 
1991 to 2004, and the critical post-Orange Revolution period from 2004 to the Maid-
an Revolution of 2013. My main focus in each chapter will center on the period from 
2014 to the present, however. This last stage is marked by major political changes 
that, as I illustrate, redefined policymaking in Ukraine in various ways and altered 
how foreign countries attempted to influence the policy process. 
 My study does not attempt to determine the specific motivations of foreign 
institutions influencing Ukraine, which lie beyond the scope of this work. Under-
standing the foreign policy aims of the principle actors requires extensive fieldwork in 
particular countries, as well as interviews those policymakers to collect data on do-
mestics sources of foreign policymaking. The focus here remains on how and at what 
level foreign influence attempts to shape specific policy outcomes in the country at 
issue here.  
 !  10
 Two other important transitional processes in Ukraine indirectly addressed 
here include democratization and efforts to combat corruption. The politics behind 
these processes are only considered as they relate to broader policy process in 
Ukraine. Such concepts provide the context in which foreign actors seek to influence 
policy formulation in Kyiv but are not directly studied as a matter of primary analysis. 
Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology 
 To investigate Russia’s role in post-communist Europe and the motivations 
behind its aggressive actions involving Ukraine, I initially planned to apply and eval-
uate the usefulness of four different theoretical frameworks (or a combination thereof) 
that might best explain the Kremlin’s goals: realism, new mercantilism, grand strate-
gy, and diversionary policy. A core theory of international relations, realism assumes 
that power is finite and thus predicts that nation-states act in their own interests to ac-
quire as much power as possible. In a zero-sum world, the more power one polity 
possesses, the less another entity can exercise. It is therefore the duty of any national 
leaders to constantly seek out opportunities to reduce the power of others. Realism 
can be applied at both the domestic and international levels of analysis. As one 
Ukrainian scholar told me, when I questioned him about his contacts in the govern-
ment, “I do not deal with the current government. I will get involved again when the 
next government takes power.” I discuss realism as a recurring theme, that is as an 
underlying motivation for Russian actions and thus as a fundamental contributor to 
cultural misunderstanding between the West and Russia. 
  Economic realism, mercantilism, or imperialism was initially posited but dis-
credited by British  philosopher Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations. Mercantilism 
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proposes that imperial states can secure economic advantage by possessing and ex-
ploiting client states. Although Smith did not develop the theory of mercantilism as it 
is understood today, his strong critique of national economic systems in which states 
protect certain industries best explains the inherent advantages of government inter-
vention in protecting markets.  I posit that Moscow is protecting its foreign energy 17
consumer market in Eastern Europe to benefit both the Russian economy and state 
revenues, insofar as the Russian state owns many of the country’s oil and natural gas 
companies. 
 Some distinctions must be made, however, regarding the ways in which Rus-
sia’s new mercantilism has been applied in the past and how the Kremlin is using it 
today. “Core states” such as Imperial Britain exploited peripheral states to “harvest” 
natural resources, then utilized their own manufacturing base to “add value” to finish-
ing goods. This theory presumes that, over time, central states would benefit from the 
disadvantaged position of their clients. Russia’s current strategy does not exclusively 
embrace this approach, because it is not directly extracting resources from Ukraine. 
Moscow does, however, view Ukraine as a client state, given its consumer market and 
geographic position, allowing it to serve as a conveyor belt for the delivery of Russian 
energy products to the wider European market. This arrangement usually affords a 
more stable security situation for the central state, insofar as it does not have to rely 
on independent countries for its resource needs. New mercantilism is important to 
Russian policy-makers because it provides the Kremlin with another “hard power” 
tactic for exerting influence beyond its use of military resources. I discuss mercantilist 
 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, 2000): 481.17
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motivations in greater detail in chapters three and four, addressing the economy and 
energy. 
 Another theory centers on the idea of a grand strategy. Before Mikhail Gor-
bachev came to power in 1985, international relations scholar Edward Luttwak had 
asserted that the chief aim of the Soviet leadership in intervening around the world at 
the time included a futile attempt to quickly stimulate the deteriorating economy.  18
Invasions, such as Afghanistan in 1979, was militaristic approach, based on hard 
power principles. Luttwak hypothesized that there was an inverse relationship be-
tween ideology, on the one hand, and policing or standard of living, on the other.   As 19
Soviet ideology started to lose its relevance, the state began promising economic 
prosperity to the Russian public in order to maintain power. Putin has sought to revive 
this approach to stimulate economic growth.  
 Moscow's ultimate goal in invading Ukraine has been to raise the standard of 
living for average Russians. By securing higher living standards, Putin has successful-
ly acquired broad popular support, which has allowed him to pursue a whole range of 
policies, from re-nationalizing important industries to jailing political opponents. Us-
ing foreign policy, specifically as an expansionary approach to secure better living 
conditions for Russian citizens, Putin aims to maintain his personal power. I address 
grand strategy framing primarily in chapters four and five. 
 Finally, a fourth theoretical school posits that Russian officials have adopted a 
diversionary approach to foreign policy. This approach, outlined by Lewis Coser and 
 Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (St. Martin’s Press, 1984).18
 Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union, 68.19
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Georg Simmel in The Functions of Social Conflict, stresses the wider incentives that 
leaders, in particular, have for engaging in aggressive behaviors.  Political elites will 20
execute military operations abroad in order to divert attention away from problems at 
home. Worried about the political backlash that could emerge from security chal-
lenges or economic recession, Russian policymakers seek to benefit by manufacturing 
conflict in the Near Abroad. Under this model of decision-making, President Putin is 
behaving aggressively towards a common enemy, identified as “the West,” in order to 
maintain popular support at home and to shift attention to issues that may not be as 
politically damaging to his own power base. I discuss the role of diversionary foreign 
policy in chapters two and five, addressing security and reform issues. 
 Having prepared to investigate these theories through interviews and sec-
ondary research, I recognized that reemerging conflict in Ukraine and tensions be-
tween the US and Russia would thwart my plans. Because of rising US-Russian ten-
sions, conducting fieldwork in Russia seemed risky; indeed, it was made more diffi-
cult due to the Kremlin’s tightening policies on foreign research. Conditions in 
Ukraine also presented new problems, due to the unsettled conflict in Donbas. I was 
awarded a Boren Fellowship in 2015, but the Institute for International Education 
barred me from traveling to Russia or Ukraine. I was sent to Belarus  for ten months 
instead for intensive Russian language training. Although I did not conduct formal 
research during that period, my experiences in Minsk reshaped my perceptions of 
post-communist Europe, causing me to re-adjust the thrust of my dissertation, from 
investigating the motives behind Russia’s foreign policy towards Ukraine, to explor-
 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (The Free Press, 1956).20
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ing the role of  competing Western and Russian influences across post-communist Eu-
rope. I witnessed firsthand the tremendous influences exerted by foreign countries, 
such as American movies and Russian music, on Belarus and its people. After com-
pleting my language training in Minsk in June 2016 and aided with a generous grant 
from the Tillman Foundation, I set-out to examine how Western powers and Russia 
shape policies in Ukraine in September of that year.  
 The variables I sought to operationalize for my analysis of the policy process 
in Ukraine included institutions, agents, policies and culture. In the words of H. Rom 
Harre, institutions are, “…defined as an interlocking double-structure of persons-as-
role-holders or office-bearers and the like, and of social practices involving both ex-
pressive and practical aims and outcomes.”  Institutions provide the structure in 21
which political actors operate; these include but are not limited to the various offices 
of the Ukrainian state, political associations, non-governmental organizations, civil 
society groups and the media. I address the way in which policy is created, through 
both de jure and de facto bodies, as well as through formal and informal networks that 
define the Ukrainian policy process. I include the development of institutions since 
independence in 1991 and their basic composition since the EuroMaidan protests in 
2014. These institutions include both governmental and nongovernmental bodies that 
influence mainstream politics. 
 Agency describes the relative strength of individuals within the political realm 
who are making decisions. Regardless of Ukrainian institutions or culture, persons 
possess a free will to act within the system and influence policy. In the words of soci-
 H. Rom Harre, Social being: A Theory for Social Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979): 98.21
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ologist Georg Simmel, “Every social occurrence as such, consists of an interaction 
between individuals. In other words, each individual is at the same time an active and 
a passive agent in a transaction.”  Among the important agents involved in policy22 -
making, there are two broadly define groups, reflecting a generational divide. Ukraine 
is currently a battleground for the war of ideas between a conservative old guard, 
symbolized by politicians and civil servants who came of age during the Soviet Period 
and the Euro-Optimists, those who came of age in the post-Soviet Period.  
 Policies refer to the possible outcomes of decision-making, including laws, 
regulations, and agreements devised by both state and no-state actors. Although visi-
ble political actors in Ukraine may not always execute policies, their intended purpose 
can convey what the state desires, or what the state thinks its citizens or foreign states 
want from the Ukrainian government. I discuss, in particular, Western and Russian-
backed policies that are directed towards Ukraine and the ways in which they influ-
ence national policymakers. I present a more detailed examination of the respective 
policies in each chapter devoted to the four core spheres. 
 The most diffuse variable but arguably the most influential one centers on the 
role of  culture in the policy process, entailing knowledge, values and behaviors 
passed down to succeeding generations, which continue to shape policymaking. Polit-
ical culture embodies and perpetuates a “particular pattern of orientations to political 
action.”  I specifically reference history, language, religion and ideology throughout 23
 Georg Simmel, “Superiority and Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology,” American Journal 22
of Sociology 2, 2 (1986): 169.
 Gabriel Almond, “Comparative Political Systems,” The Journal of Politics 18, 3 (1956): 396.23
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this dissertation to illustrate their influence not only within Ukraine but in the compet-
ing value systems of the West and Russia.  
Interviewing and Sampling  
 Although I employ a mixed-methods approach in analyzing national policy-
making, the methods that will best allow me to assess the dynamics of the Russian-
Ukraine relationship are primarily qualitative in nature. Investigating the ways in 
which agents influence policy processes requires questioning representatives who are 
or have been directly involved in the policymaking process; they are well informed 
regarding specific issues, and thus best able to answer questions requiring open-ended 
responses. Mass opinion, as captured by surveys, allows for too much speculation, 
without providing sophisticated answers as to how the process is being influenced. 
Such scholars as Richard Rose conducted a great deal of survey research in Post-So-
viet countries but these generally focused on mass attitudes regarding trust in political 
systems.  While elite responses do not always provide conclusive causal links be24 -
tween attempts at influence and policy outcomes, such answers do help researchers to 
target which foreign institutions or agents are active and which issues they are target-
ing to maximize their influence.  
 I approach the current political landscape in Ukraine as a case study, showing 
how foreign actors can influence a nation-state, particularly in post-communist Eu-
rope. In the words of John Gerring, “…the case study [is] an intensive study of a sin-
 For example, see: Richard Rose, “Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust,” Journal of Democra24 -
cy 5, 4 (1994): 18-30; Richard Rose, “Getting by without government: Everyday life in Russia,” 
Daedalus 123, 3 (1994): 41-62. 
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gle unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units.”  Developing 25
a case study requires an in-depth examination of specific events, as opposed to draw-
ing on a large set of broader observations. Although a study limited to 31 interviews 
in a country of roughly 45 million citizens makes generalizing difficult, it does shed 
light on particular conditions at work in modern Ukraine. Case study methodology 
defines the parameters of certain cases but does not necessarily determine causation.  26
The case study identifies phenomena at the micro-level, often overlooked when 
scholars relentlessly pursue evidence of universally applicable theories. This modus 
operandi inherently focuses research projects on macro-level trends and relationships 
that might obscure a nuanced understanding of specific events or decisions. 
 Despite some skepticism towards case study methodology, authors such as 
Graham Allison, Robert Dahl and Aaron Wildavsky offer prominent examples, defin-
ing many political science phenomena.  Allison’s famous work, Essence of Decision, 27
compares the decision-making processes in the US and the Soviet Union during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. Dahl’s work, examining pluralism in Who Gov-
erns?, documented the policy process in New Haven, Connecticut. Wildavsky used 
interviews to analyze the dynamics of fiscal policy in The Politics of the Budgetary 
Process. All of these cases highlighted the inner workings of policymaking in particu-
lar settings, challenging conventional wisdom of the time. Interviews with my re-
 John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?” American Political Science Review 25
98, 2 (May 2004): 342.
 Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?”26
 Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?” 341.27
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spondents provide rich illustrations of policy influences at work in Ukraine that other 
forms of data cannot. 
 Elite interview responses also highlight specific interpretations concerning 
policy decisions, which are naturally shaped by language, thought processes and emo-
tions that influence decisions.  In-depth, elite interviewing provides an ideal platform 28
for extracting important observations and rationalizations from those involved in de-
cision-making. My respondents highlighted the reasons why they had either em-
braced, accepted or rejected various policies. Regardless of the outcome, my inter-
view partners were able to explain the reasoning behind their own decisions and in-
terpretations. 
 My core methodology in this study is, to a degree, interpretivist in nature. In 
contrast to a positivist approach, which claims that all political events can be verified 
through scientific inquiry, interpretivism acknowledges that the political environment 
has been socially constructed and therefore, cannot be completely understood by ap-
plying methods common to the natural sciences.  The interpretive method used here 29
is unique to Ukraine, in that my questions relate to ongoing political events which 
cannot be “retested.”  Whether discussing the formal policymaking processes, ad30 -
dressing the ideas that motivate various decision-makers, or analyzing how language 
shapes thought, I have allowed my respondents to summarize their own accounts of 
political events, in order to interpret the political landscape. I interviewed elites re-
 Irving Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and 28
the Social Sciences, Fourth Edition (New York: Teachers College Columbia University, 2013): 26.
 Lisa Wedeen, Interview Research in Political Science, ed. Layna Mosley (New York: Cornell Uni29 -
versity Press, 2013): 17.
 Julia Lynch, Interview Research in Political Science, 40.30
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garding their experiences with foreign influences, allowing me to better understand 
underlying features of the Ukrainian political landscape. My point in interviewing 
core actors was to evaluate, not test hypotheses.  Here, I identify the current influ31 -
ences on the Ukrainian policymaking process, focusing on how external factors shape 
internal dynamics.  
 Interviewing separates itself from other forms of inquiry in that it can more 
accurately identify variables in a political environment devoid of readily available 
datasets or shaped by opaque processes that an uninformed public cannot accurately 
identify. The interview questions revolve around the interviewees’ personal knowl-
edge of policy processes, allowing one to gather information based upon their experi-
ences and the meaning they ascribe to their individual decisions.  When my respon32 -
dents strayed from their personal experiences into speculation, I guided them back to 
speaking in the first person. 
 Many respondents in my study readily recalled recent events, shedding light 
on certain policy outcomes and various ways in which foreign agents had influenced 
those policies. I sought to capture behaviors concerning specific actions, in the recent 
past.  Rather than amass data-sets or conduct major surveys with large numbers of 33
observations, I pinpointed individual behaviors, enabling me to zoom in on particular 
 Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the So31 -
cial Sciences, Fourth Edition, 27.
 Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the So32 -
cial Sciences, Fourth Edition, 38.
 Matthew Beckmann and Richard Hall, Interview Research in Political Science, 184.33
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cases and deeper process dynamics.  I wanted to understand Ukraine’s place in post-34
communist Europe beyond the news headlines, both Western and Russian. 
 Because policymaking involves many direct and indirect variables (known and 
unknown), interviews with elites helps one to more accurately identify the most rele-
vant factors. The problem of unknown variables plagues most survey research. With-
out working knowledge of the specific political culture, even a well designed survey 
can ask the wrong questions.  Interviewing Ukrainians, highly familiar with the polit35 -
ical scene gave me a chance to discover new policy issues through discussion. I tried 
to avoid specific reform initiatives as a topic of conversation as other dissertations 
could treat this theme. I nonetheless quickly realized that anti-corruption, privatiza-
tion and democratization processes affect all policy arenas. Foreign actors are playing 
an outsized role in shaping reform measures, directly influencing current policies. I 
therefore discuss reform initiatives at length in Chapter Two. 
 Interviews can also be used to determine causal directions more accurately. In 
this study I evaluate cause and effect relationships, as well as conditions in Ukrainian 
politics.  Although I followed countless media reports on the world-wide web and 36
television airwaves, digested books and academic articles on current events prior to 
arriving in Ukraine, these shed little light on the day-to-day significance of such de-
velopments in the eyes of citizens living there. Scholars moreover use interviews for 
“process-tracing,” which tracks the development of a policy.  Policy processes rarely 37
 Beckmann and Hall, Interview Research in Political Science,185.34
 Beth Leech, Frank Baumgartner, Jeffrey Berry, Marie Hojnacki and David Kimball, Interview Re35 -
search in Political Science, 197.
 Mosley, Interview Research in Political Science, 10.36
 Erik Bleich and Robert Pekkanen, Interview Research in Political Science, 95.37
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involve neat, linear, or analogous patterns across policy domains, nor are they treated 
equally by different institutions. Each policy is its own case and develops a dynamic 
of its own.  
 One of the greatest assets resulting from in-depth interviewing includes the 
ability to discover “privileged” information. Analysts often use this technique to gath-
er background on the activities of government and non-governmental agencies that 
cannot be found in the public record.  This is a particularly acute problem in Ukraine, 38
where the policy process is relatively opaque, due to a long history of authoritarian 
rule. Policymaking in Kyiv relies heavily on informal networks, consisting of  mem-
bers of the oligarchy (oligarkhiya). One respondent, a presidential aide, was able to 
recite specific phone conversations involving past Ukrainian presidents and prime 
ministers. In these conversations the formal power brokers were keenly aware of the 
various interests of the oligarchs.  Interviewing elites also is the best method for ex-
amining the dynamics of lobbying.  Seventeen of my interviewees operated outside 39
the Ukrainian government, advocating for various initiatives. These respondents elab-
orated on how they were able to influence government decisions, or how foreign ac-
tors, in turn shaped their lobbying efforts; no one maintained a comprehensive record 
of such activities. 
 To corroborate information gathered from my respondents, I utilize supple-
mentary data from various sources, including media reports, academic literature, sta-
tistics from leading international agencies and think-tank papers. Because I  am  ad-
 Leech, Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki and Kimball. Interview Research in Political Science, 198.38
 Leech, Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki and Kimball, Interview Research in Political Science, 200.39
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dressing  four broad policy topics, a mixed-method approach is most appropriate.  I 40
triangulate information by combining interview responses with publicly available 
data. This is particularly important with political elites who might have incentives to 
lie or evade directly answering questions.  41
 My sample included 31 political elites, who appeared to have intimate knowl-
edge of policymaking in their respective policy spheres. Although not representative, 
this sample provides detailed information on specific policy issues, from experts or 
officials with personal experience.  Many of my respondents had either lobbied the 42
state themselves or had worked for the government and could therefore discuss how 
lobbying affected them. Analyzing lobbying and its effects requires a non-random 
sample.  Only those involved in the process can provide information valuable for de43 -
ciphering the dynamics of influence at this level of analysis. 
 I selected a diverse group of potential discussion partners with regard to policy 
domains and in relation to governmental versus non-governmental experience. The 
diversity of the sample was intended to meliorate the problems associated with the 
small sample size.  My 31 interviewees included experts in the fields of defense, 44
economics, education, energy, and anti-corruption initiatives (see Table 1). Among 
their ranks were eleven civil servants, three members of parliament, ten lobbyists, 
four policy analysts, two academics and one journalist. All but one of my respondents 
 Cathie Jo Martin, Interview Research in Political Science, 104.40
 Mary Gallagher, Interview Research in Political Science, 181.41
 Mosley, Interview Research in Political Science, 26.42
 Leech, Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki and Kimball, Interview Research in Political Science, 201.43
 Mosley, Interview Research in Political Science, 34.44
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was a Ukrainian citizen. My strategy for recruiting potential interviewees relied on the 
“snowball” method approach, using the networks of respondents to connect to new 
interviewees. One advantage to non-random sampling is that  experts can be selected 
on an ongoing basis, given the recommendations I collected after each interview, 
along with more information and a better understanding of the social landscape.  45
During my three months in Kyiv, from September to December 2016, I was able to 
acquire contact information for the next potential interviewee.  
 One drawback to this method is that recommendations of this nature can lead 
to an imbalance in the sample, saturating it with respondents who share similar expe-
riences.  I was careful not to speak to the same type of respondent, in terms of orga46 -
nization, political party or other positional category. Many of the respondents self-
identified as “Euro-Optimists,” the loosely defined group of policymakers, but not all, 
who rushed to power in 2014, pushing for closer relations with the EU. 
 Lynch, Interview Research in Political Science, 49.45
 Bleich and Pekkanen, Interview Research in Political Science, 94.46
 !  24
Table 1: Respondent Demographics 
 I also spoke with interview respondents situated at different levels in each or-
ganization. Interviewing respondents involved different stages of the decision-making 
process helps to provide a more comprehensive picture of the policy process.  For 47
example, some interviewees were activists who had been directly involved in the 
2014 protests on Maidan Square, while others had advised former Ukrainian presi-
dents. In the words of Cathie Jo Martin, a political actor’s “experience is more mul-
tifaceted, casual relations are less easily revealed, and investigators may go up blind 
alleys…”.  Some of my respondents were able to discuss broader policy decisions at 48
Civil Servants/
Politicians
Lobbyists/
Advocacy Groups
Academics/
Analysts/Journalists
14 10 7
11 CSs / 3MPs — 2ACs / 4PAs / 1 J
3 - Economics
4 - Security
1 - Education
1 - Energy
5 - Other
2 - Anti-Corruption
3 - Democratization
3 - Humanitarian
2 - Environment
1 - Economics
1 - Education
1 - Security
4 - Other
Deputy Vice Speaker 
of the Rada, Former 
Aide to Yuschenko, 
Strategist for NISS, 
EU Oﬃcial
Reanimation Package of 
Reforms, EuroMaidan SOS, 
GIZ, DixiGroup
Razumkov Center, 
Gromadskye, 
World Policy 
Institute
 Martin, Interview Research in Political Science, 107.47
 Martin, Interview Research in Political Science, 103.48
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the macro level, while others were able to elaborate on specific issues at the micro 
level. 
 I used a semi-structured approach to interviewing to allow for a degree of con-
sistency and continuity in my conversations with each expert; this required a set of 
core questions to allow for a better comparison of their respective responses. Granting 
my discussion partners a wide degree of latitude in answering yielded two key results: 
1) Their responses raised  issues that I had not originally thought to examine; and 2) 
they could describe their experiences in greater detail, based upon different kinds of 
policy expertise and levels of responsibility within their respective organizations. The 
semi-structured approach to interviews allows one to extract a fair amount of informa-
tion during a limited period of time. Because I tried to secure meetings with persons 
in responsible positions, many of whom had hectic schedules, I asked for a meeting, 
which lasted, on average, one hour. Semi-structured interviews are the most appropri-
ate for political elites with limited time.  49
 The purpose of elite interviews is to address questions about behavior, not 
preferences or attitudes.  Asking about concrete experiences offers a more precise 50
measure of influence as it is not speculative. Though public opinion polling can shed 
light on the causes of political outcomes, it is a poor measure of how agents influence 
the policy process. My main purpose in interviewing is to understand motivation and 
rationality, not just from the insiders’ perspective (politicians and civil servants) but 
also from outsiders (lobbyists and advocacy groups), assuming that outsiders possess 
 Gallagher, Interview Research in Political Science, 179.49
 Martin, Interview Research in Political Science, 110.50
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experiences that can shed light on how principle actors made decisions.  I pushed my 51
respondents to answer questions in terms of what they had observed and the rationale 
behind their decisions. Focusing questions on rationale fits well with semi-structured 
interviews, in that it is easier for most to answer open-ended questions as to  why they 
behaved in a particular manner.  
 I developed five core questions involving Russia’s shifting “security” priori-
ties in Ukraine. These security interests, broadly defined, covered economic, strategic, 
cultural, ethnic, and ideological arenas. My study of Russian-Ukrainian relations was 
initially built on five research questions: 1) To what extent do Russia’s interests in 
Ukraine rest with the protection of ethnic Russians? 2) Is Kyiv most concerned with 
Russian elements ensuring cultural identity in Eastern Ukraine? 3) What factors do 
Ukrainian officials see as vital to their security network in post-Communist Europe? 
4) How do Ukrainians view their role in Russia’s wider ideological foreign policy 
framework? 5) How does Kyiv envision its role in the Russian energy market, influ-
encing its politics? 
 As my focus shifted from studying Russian motivations to analyzing ways in 
which Russia and the West influence Ukraine, I modified the five core questions to 
focus more on Ukrainian policies and a comparison of Russian versus Western influ-
ences and tactics. I moved from asking about multiple policy areas to focusing solely 
on the representative’s area of expertise. Many of the respondents could speak to only 
one issue with authority, but their detailed knowledge based on personal experiences, 
revealed many issues that I had not thought to address. 
 Gallagher, Interview Research in Political Science, 173.51
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 These questions allowed the respondent to speak from experience, rather than 
speculating about Moscow’s aims. I wanted to maintain distinctions among policy 
areas while injecting language comparing foreign actors. I compare the approaches of 
Western and Russian actors in each major policy sphere: reform, the economy, energy, 
and security. I compiled a list of opening questions regarding these four main policy 
areas, comparing the Western versus Russian approaches (Appendix). I did not pose 
all of these questions in discussions, but I added more explicit questions during the 
meeting, based upon the respondents’ answers. 
Structure of this Dissertation 
 To demonstrate how Western states and Russian officials influence policymak-
ing in Ukraine, I outline the basic principles in developing public policy (Chapter 1) 
in Kyiv, then divide the dissertation into four substantive chapters centering on: re-
form, the economy, energy, and defense, respectively. Within each chapter, I lay out 
the ways in which indirect forms of influence (for example, culture, public opinion 
and ideology) have influenced each policy sphere since Ukrainian independence.  
 Understanding policy formulation requires a discussion of Ukrainian institu-
tions, basic policy processes and formal versus informal political networks. I initially 
hoped to avoid addressing specific reform measures, like democratization, privatiza-
tion and anti-corruption activities, which amount to major topics in and of themselves. 
After starting my fieldwork I quickly realized that reform initiatives have infiltrated 
all aspects of the policy process and that foreign institutions remain highly influential 
in these areas of Ukrainian politics.  
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 Within the economy and energy section I discuss how Ukraine developed an 
overwhelming dependence on Russian trade, particularly for oil and natural gas, al-
lowing foreign actors to shape important energy policies. Since independence in 1991, 
policymakers have moreover struggled to privatize the various economic sectors, es-
pecially the banking sector. The chapter on trade analyzes the ways in which Western 
and Russian agents influence private and public organizations in banking. 
 The chapter on defense addresses military intervention and military support to 
particular groups, the role of cyber warfare and the ways in which Western and Russ-
ian actors are using current conflict in Ukraine to conduct a proxy war. Using pub-
lished statistics and documentation of historical events from news outlets, I triangu-
late the data from my interviews to supplement the case study. When discussing cul-
ture I include policies addressing ethnicity, history, language and education. I talk 
about the ways in which foreign actors have altered the ideological war through in-
formation and ideas. This includes a discussion of the media, framing, socialization 
and the social construction of identity. 
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Chapter I - Policy Formulation 
 In order to understand the ways in which foreign actors influence the policy 
process in Kyiv, I present a cursory examination of modern Ukrainian politics. In the 
realm of domestic politics, scholars discuss Ukrainian political development, charac-
terizing the state as weak, relying on a strong executive, weak institutions as a result 
of frequent constitutional changes, a lack of stable political parties, and a relatively 
strong judiciary that slowly weakened due to executive-legislative divisions. Mykola 
Riabchuk contends that the Soviet legacy maintained the informal politics among 
elites, a prevalent patronage system, and corruption, which undermined the state. 
These factors, coupled with a weak sense of national identity, prevented strong insti-
tutional structures from forming.  As a result of weak institutional development and 52
the oligarkiya’s desire to consolidate their lobbying efforts on one office, Ukraine 
adopted a strong presidential system. According to Serhiy Kudelia successive presi-
dents, starting with Leonid Kuchma in 1994, reinforced a system of “dysfunctional 
equilibrium” between the presidency and powerful oligarchs.   53
 The lack of constitutional stability also contributed to institutional weakness, 
further encouraging presidents to assert their power over the legislature. As Oleh Prot-
syk posits, the country operated off of the 1978 Soviet Constitution until 1996, even-
tually settling on a semi-presidential system in order to vest power in a single office, 
versus relying on the Verkhovna Rada.  Within the Rada sustainable political parties 54
 Taras Kuzio, “The Ukrainian Immobile State Two Decades After the Disintegration of the USSR,” 52
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 45 (2012): 413.
 Kuzio, “The Ukrainian Immobile State Two Decades After the Disintegration of the USSR,” 413.53
 Oleh Protsyk, “Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in 54
Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies, 55, 7 (2003): 1077.
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failed to form, dissolving, merging, and developing primitive platforms in favor of 
supporting individual politicians. This lack of party development hindered democrati-
zation.  All of these features of Ukraine’s early political development yielded a weak 55
state, vis-a-vis the oligarch class, and complicated democratic reform. 
 The judiciary remained relatively strong throughout the 1990s but gradually 
weakened as executive-legislative disputes increased. After independence officials 
generally respected the rulings of the Constitutional Court but by the Orange Revolu-
tion in 2004 confidence in the court waned.   I address the lack of prosecuting 56
crimes, particularly corruption, in the next chapter.  
 In the realm of foreign policy the principle question policymakers have dealt 
with centers on whether to pursue a Russian-friendly or Western-friendly approach. 
As Paul D’Anieri outlines, Kyiv has grappled with this binary question of a Russian 
versus a Western focused foreign policy since independence in 1991.  Initially, offi57 -
cials pursued a balanced approach, tending to favor Western cooperation on strategic 
issues while maintaining close economic ties to Russia. As Ukraine developed closer 
ties to the EU, this dual-track policy became untenable as economic interests of for-
 Kostyantyn Fedorenko, Olena Rybiy and Andreas Umland, “The Ukrainian Party System Before and 55
After the 2013-2014 EuroMaidan,” Europe-Asia Studies, 68, 4 (June 2016): 609-630; Lucan Way, “Au-
thoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases 
of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine,” World Politics, 57, 2 (January 2005): 231-261. 
 Trevor Brown and Charles Wise, “Constitutional Courts and Legislative-Executive Relations: The 56
Case of Ukraine,” Political Science Quarterly, 119, 1 (Spring 2004); Alexei Trochev, “Meddling with 
Justice Competitive Politics, Impunity, and Distrusted Courts in Post-Orange Ukraine,” Demokratizat-
siya (2010): 122-147. 
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eign actors clashed and moving away from Moscow inflamed cultural tensions within 
the country along the East-West axis.   58
 To best illustrate these developments I elaborate on four broad periods: First I 
outline the development of policy formulation process in Ukraine covering these 
stages: 1) from the collapse of the Soviet Union to independence in 1991; 2) from in-
dependence to the Orange Revolution in 2004 and; 3) from the Orange Revolution to 
the EuroMaidan protests in 2014. These three periods correspond with events, which 
altered Ukraine’s path, both in terms of reform and its relations with foreign countries. 
After outlining domestic and international factors that shaped these time periods, I 
then describe the current political landscape in Kyiv, viewing policy formulation 
through the lens of four distinct variables: institutions, agents, policy and culture. 
Each shapes the policy process in different arenas, with foreign actors influencing 
these variables in different ways. This introduction to current events helps one to bet-
ter understand the ways in which foreign actors influence policymaking. Ukraine has 
gradually democratized and moved away from Russia. Although this process has pro-
gressed in fits in starts, reform and building closer relations with Western countries 
have occurred in tandem. 
The Collapse of the USSR and Ukrainian Independence:1985 - 1991  
 I begin with how Ukraine transitioned from its status as a republic of the 
USSR to an independent state. By 1985 the USSR still appeared strong militarily but 
beneath this facade government officials managed an internally weak state. Although 
it remained a formidable foe to the US and western Europe, economic stagnation in 
 Paul D’Anieri, “Ukrainian Foreign Policy from Independence to Inertia,” Communist and Post-58
Communist Studies, 45 (2012): 447.  
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the early 1980s forced Soviet leaders to reexamine their policies. Between 1980-1985 
average GDP growth stood at 0% and the standard of living for citizens declined, 
ranking 70th in the world by 1982.  Compared to the cyclical recessions, that free 59
market economies often experience, the economic situation in the Soviet Union had 
been continuously deteriorating for decades; poor policies had created an unsustain-
able system. Edward Luttwak attributes the declining economy and mounting budget 
deficits to ambitious social welfare programs, like the generous pensions granted, un-
der Leonid Brezhnev that Gorbachev inherited.  Unable to confront Soviet citizens, 60
detailing the unfortunate situation, the state simply allowed the national budget to de-
velop unchecked. 
 Key indicators like life expectancy and personal consumption showed that the 
Soviet living conditions for average citizens decreased during this period. Life ex-
pectancy at birth did not increase despite advancements in medical technology and 
universal healthcare. While male life expectancy in the US rose from 67 years to 71, 
and from 74 to 78 for females between 1970 and 1989, Russian life expectancy re-
mained at 64 years for males and 73 for females during the same period.  Soviet con61 -
sumers were further deprived of modern convenience items. Between 1980 and 1987 
the percentage of Americans owning a color television rose from 82 to 92, while in 
the USSR ownership rose from 10% in 1980 to 44% in 1989.  Medical advances and 62
 Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 22.59
 Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union, 69.60
 M. R. Darby, “U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.,”  Economics and Statistics Administration State Committee on 61
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information technology innovations seen in other parts of the world did not penetrate 
the Soviet Union's rigid economic system. 
 The Soviet state had enjoyed large revenues from extraction of petroleum 
products, especially oil, which buoyed spending on both domestic and foreign 
projects. Scholars such as Terry Karl investigated the relationship between highly oil 
dependent states and regime type. Coined the resource curse, she posited that 
economies relying on petroleum for a large portion of wealth creation, led to greater 
authoritarianism as political elites captured those resources to provide public goods 
without taxation and consolidate their power.  Brezhnev was able to ignore the bud63 -
get imbalances of the Soviet Union as oil prices climbed from $23 per barrel (adjusted 
for inflation according to the consumer price index) in 1964 to $120 in 1980.   64
 Scholars such as James Brown hypothesize that growing oil revenues also 
contributed to a more aggressive foreign policy. Termed petromania, Brown details 
how the Politburo abruptly changed course in its approach towards Afghanistan and 
decided to invade the country as prices climbed.  In 1979 prices jumped from $54 65
per barrel to $94, helping to fuel an aggressive foreign policy against the Afghan gov-
ernment.  By relying on a valuable natural resource, untethering expansionary poli66 -
cies from the constraints of labor productivity, the Soviet state wedded initiatives to 
the value of a single commodity. 
 Mary Kaldor, Terry Karl, and Yahia Said, Oil Wars (London: Pluto Press, 2007): 2-3.63
 Macrotrends, “Crude Oil Prices - 70 Year Historical Chart,” (2018), http://www.macrotrends.net/64
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 The high costs of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan eventually weighed 
heavily on the state budget. Soviet forces had invaded Afghanistan in 1979 in an at-
tempt to support a puppet communist government. Edward Luttwak estimates that the 
cost of keeping the Soviet military in Afghanistan for 1983 alone amounted to one-
seventh of the USSR’s entire GDP.  Policymakers in Moscow pursued a prolonged 67
occupation strategy, not withdrawing the military until 1989, despite the prohibitive 
costs. The collapse of oil prices also forced the Politburo to reconsider spending prior-
ities. By March, 1986 a barrel of oil sold for $23, cutting  deeply into the Soviet 
Union’s revenue streams.  The nexus of unsustainable social programs and an ag68 -
gressive foreign policy built upon the economic benefits of state-controlled natural 
resources collapsed, undermining the legitimacy of the post-1985 Soviet government. 
Later, Vladimir Putin would resurrect the “petro-state” model in the Russian Federa-
tion to consolidate his own power after 1999.   69
 One reason for prolonging the costly occupation in Afghanistan was the im-
portance of supporting communist regimes for maintaining the idea of spreading so-
cialism. Though scholars acknowledge a decline in the ideological motivations behind 
Soviet policies by 1980, spreading communism still factored into the calculus of for-
eign policy planning.  The ideological component of Soviet foreign policy later 70
shifted under the post-1991 Russian Federation to a focus on cultural and economic 
nationalism.  
 Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union, 111.67
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 Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party in 
1985 and entered a personality driven state, with weak political institutions. Accord-
ing to Richard Sakwa, Soviet leaders did not hold a clear position within Moscow and 
had to wrestle power from other potential leaders, even after ascending to the highest 
office of the USSR. He contends, for example, that it took Leonid Brezhnev ten years 
after becoming General Secretary in 1964 to consolidate power.  Gorbachev strug71 -
gled to legitimize his authority while attempting to reform the economy. The lack of a 
stable institutional structure produced ineffective policies and perpetuated the need for 
authoritarian rule built around a small group of old party leaders. Highly centralized 
decision-making stifled dissenting views on how to fix systemic problems. 
 One factor that allowed the central government in Moscow to maintain power 
was the nature of mandated general trade among the USSR and its satellites involving 
raw materials.  Reliance on fraternal states for certain natural resources and indus72 -
tries was vital to maintaining government budgets and the standard of living for aver-
age citizens. The Russian Republic provided vital energy resources while republics 
like Ukraine provided finished products for defense and chemicals. Moscow planted 
the seeds of new mercantilism before the collapse of the Union in 1991.  
 Gorbachev's initiatives, glasnost and perestroika, were intended not only to 
relax restrictions for all Soviet citizens but also on the various nationalities. As Alvin 
Rubenstein asserts, Gorbachev repealed previous "Russification" policies instituted 
under the Brezhnev Doctrine.  Glasnost, allowing greater individual freedoms and 73
 Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 11.71
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freer flow of information, led to Soviet republics like Ukraine resurrecting a dormant 
cultural identity. Gorbachev hoped that perestroika, restructuring of the economy to 
adopt some free market principles, would increase productivity.  
 Economic stagnation in the Ukrainian Soviet Federalist Socialist Republic 
(USFSR) coincided with an emerging nationalist movement. The head of the USFSR 
was Vladimir Shcherbitskii, known as an oppressive leader who had ruled Ukraine 
with an iron fist. When Gorbachev assumed power in the Kremlin Shcherbitskii only 
half-heartedly implemented Moscow's reforms as he desired to maintain his power 
base.  His refusal to fully implement economic reforms in Ukraine inhibited its abili74 -
ty to adapt commercially; at the same time it did nothing to mitigate nationalism un-
der the new policies. 
 One of the first organizations to advocate nationalism after the advent of glas-
nost was the Ukrainian Writer’s Union. This entity began publishing its own history 
under Soviet rule. From the purges of 1937-8 to the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, 
writers exposed oppressive policies in a flood of publications through 1988.  In 1989 75
Russian historian Roy Medvedev published a book that exposed the devastation re-
sulting from Soviet totalitarianism, including the government-sanctioned policies 
leading to the starvation of roughly five million Ukrainians between 1932-1933, dur-
ing the Holodomor (Golodomor) under Stalin.  Revelations along these lines fueled 76
the Ukrainian nationalist movement, as well as the discontent concerning Soviet citi-
zens’ material well-being. Public polls confirmed the growing dissatisfaction among 
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ethnic Ukrainians. The All Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion of Socio-
Economic Problems found in 1989 that 63% of Russians felt that preserving the Sovi-
et Union was essential, while only 30% of Ukrainians felt the same.  Russians, as the 77
dominant ethnicity in the USSR supported maintaining union, while the Ukrainian 
minority did not. 
 Gorbachev shifted the Soviet Union’s foreign policy approach along with his 
domestic reforms in 1985. Moscow’s leaders began adopting a soft power strategy to 
maintain power abroad without relying on an expensive military to achieve its objec-
tives. As Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Mickiewicz asserted in 1986, a "peace offen-
sive" of the late 1980s sought to obtain foreign policy goals with a lighter hand.  The 78
effectiveness of this approach is debatable as was the extent to which the Kremlin uti-
lized it. The USSR proposed agreements with the US on nuclear arms reductions but 
remained embroiled in the Afghan civil war. Seeing no end in sight to the Afghanistan 
conflict and looking to promote its image abroad, Soviet troops withdrew Afghanistan 
in 1989.  
 Despite the deteriorating economic situation in the wider USSR during this 
period, Ukraine possessed certain economic advantages. In the 1980s Ukraine had 
been a net exporter of energy, and also produced one-third of all military goods for the 
Union.  Moscow had designated Ukraine the industrial and agricultural powerhouse 79
of the USSR; many decades of central planning had secured a robust infrastructure 
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and skilled abor force. By 1989 Ukraine accounted for 40% of all industrial output 
and 30% of all agricultural output in the Soviet Union.  Ukrainians had reason to be 80
confident in their ability to become economically sustainable without the Russian So-
viet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). 
 One important obstacle to secession was its growing energy dependence on 
Russia, which became clear by 1989. The RSFSR’s production of fossil fuel products 
was exponentially greater than Ukraine’s. In 1989 the RSFSR produced 552 million 
metric tons of crude oil and 573 billion cubic meters of natural gas, compared to only 
five million metric tons and 28 billion cubic meters in Ukraine, respectively.  The 81
implications of their unequal energy relationship were not immediately evident, but 
two decades after independence this would lead to a reassertion of Russian influence 
over Ukraine. 
 The USSR was also experimenting with more “democratic” institutions. In 
March 1989 the first “competitive” elections were held for the Congress of People's 
Deputies (CPD).  Not subject to democratic election, the Supreme Soviet retained 82
most of the policy-making power, but the elections signaled the first step toward 
democracy.  Russian officials turned their attention inward as the domestic economic 83
situation rapidly deteriorated, the Warsaw Pact disbanded, and Soviet republics began 
demanding more autonomy. 
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 The dissolution of the Soviet Union progressed at a rapid pace after 1990. The 
Ukrainian nationalist organization, Rukh, brokered a deal with domestic Russian 
groups and Communists in Ukraine to form a united separatist front in 1990, with the 
understanding between Moscow and Kyiv that Kharkiv and Don’etsk, regions in 
Eastern Ukraine, would remain autonomous in a new Ukrainian state.  These two 84
oblasts (provinces) fell within the natural boundaries of Ukraine but possessed large 
ethnic Russian populations. The dominant ethnicity remained Ukrainian, however. 
From 1988 to 1990, ethnic Ukrainians comprised 72% of the population, compared to 
20% ethnic Russians.  By 1991 the Politburo in Moscow found it impossible to exert 85
absolute power throughout the country; Russia and Ukraine became two separate 
states. Soviet citizens elected Boris Yeltsin to the newly created office of president in 
June 1991, effectively sharing power with Gorbachev. This dual power structure fur-
ther destabilized political institutions and generated questions of legitimacy between 
the two leaders. The political and economic integration Russia and Ukraine had expe-
rienced during the Soviet period would persist into the 21st century.  
 Despite Gorbachev’s litany of reforms, ranging from perestroika to glasnost, 
the USSR rapidly imploded so that by 1991 the political structure, the Communist 
Party, that had united the fifteen republics unraveled. Having only briefly existed 
from 1917 to 1921, Ukraine became an independent state again in 1991. On Decem-
ber 8, 1991 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine signed the Belavezha Accords, effectively 
granting Ukraine independence.  Its political and economic ties with Russia re86 -
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mained tight. As Russia rebuilt itself economically, its political influence over 
Ukraine would reemerge. Trade and domestic issues like “Shock Therapy” are dis-
cussed in more detail in chapter three. 
 Ukraine’s popular independence movement masked other cultural divisions 
within the country that persist today. The typical geographic division within the coun-
try includes a west versus east dimension. This division is rooted in cultural and his-
torical institutional patterns left over from the European imperial era. As part of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, Western Ukraine had been given more autonomy, protect-
ing some of its own political institutions and cultural traditions while experiencing the 
Enlightenment.  Under the yoke of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, 87
Eastern Ukraine had struggled to maintain some semblance of independence. This his-
torical split intensified during the Russification of Ukraine under Brezhnev in the 
1970s, shaping political attitudes within the country to this day. Kudelia contends that 
Moscow continues to leverage this division by convincing Ukrainians who identify as 
Russian to not embrace Western values and policies, particularly strategic agreements, 
that might bring Ukraine closer to Western countries.  88
“Power and Money are Their Ideology”: 1991 - 2004  
 Immediately following the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian and 
Ukrainian leaders began negotiating an institutionalized friendship that gave rise to 
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the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  This arrangement recognized the 89
close historical and cultural ties between the two countries. Despite its independence, 
the Russian Federation considered Ukraine one of its “Near Abroad” neighbors, a 
concept loosely defined as a nation-state geographically, culturally and ethnically 
close to Russia, as codified in the Belavezha Accords.   Russian policy-makers de90 -
voted considerable time and resources to influencing these “Near Abroad” states to 
ensure that Moscow could maintain some level of control over their policies. The first 
Russian foreign minister under Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev, remarked that eighty 
percent of his time was spent on CIS issues in 1991.   As a CIS member, Ukraine 91
figured prominently in foreign affairs as the largest post-Soviet state outside of Rus-
sia. What started as a security concern in keeping Ukraine as a buffer zone along its 
border, however, gradually evolved into an economic one that Russia would strongly 
protect. 
 Despite the tight institutional ties the two countries shared, Ukrainians started 
to resurrect their national identity, developing a sense of cultural identity, breaking 
through the legacy of Russification. Mykola Riabchuk sees the “Slavic unity” narra-
tives as less entrenched in Ukraine, compared to Belarus, as Russian cultural tradi-
tions have had to compete more with Ukrainian identity.  Experiencing brief nation92 -
alists movements, like the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) formed in 
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1929, Ukrainians had struggled to exercise their cultural traditions, namely the use of 
the Ukrainian language, with complete autonomy.  Ukraine is essentially a bilingual 93
country, having developed over centuries. The indigenous language was used in the 
more autonomous western region, while Russian enjoyed wide usage in eastern re-
gions, due to centuries of promotion first under the Russian Empire then later under 
the Soviet Union. The widespread use of Russian in Ukraine provides Moscow a spe-
cial avenue for influencing public opinion. According to a 2012 survey, 50% of those 
polled considered Ukrainian their native tongue while 29% for Russian and 20% re-
ported that Ukrainian and Russian were equally their mother language.  A legacy of 94
Soviet times, many newspapers and broadcast television outlets remained Russian-
speaking after independence.   
 The language issue is complex but there are two general dimensions of its use 
that are influential in analyzing its effect on politics. First is its importance in relation 
to the political culture and, second, its relevance to debates about culture and educa-
tion policies. Though language itself is an important component of national identity, 
policies concerning the status of Russian and whether the central government supports 
Russian instruction are highly politicized. Many of my interview partners preferred to 
speak in English, as opposed to Russian, since I do not know Ukrainian. When I 
asked my first interviewee if they would like to speak Russian, their response was: 
“My native language is Ukrainian.” The use of one language or the other is a salient 
issue for some Ukrainians. As a current member of the Rada noted, Ukraine had be-
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gun re-establishing its own identity only in the last 25 years.  The revival of Ukrain95 -
ian identity took many forms, including a focus on ethnicity, using the national lan-
guage, reviving religion, rediscovering their own history and deciding whether 
Ukraine should align itself with either Europe or Eurasia. 
 The main focus of cultural division lies with language and religion. Before the 
collapse of the USSR, only 12% of Ukrainian schools taught the Ukrainian 
language.  After 1991, however, the government attempted to reverse this trend by 96
reintroducing language instruction in schools. Russian separatists in the east now 
claim that such policies are impeding their right to use Russian. Furthermore, various 
religious denominations continually vied for influence. The Soviet government had 
forcibly merged the Ukrainian Catholic, or Uniate Church, with the Ukrainian Ortho-
dox Church in 1946.  Ethnic Russians in the east predominantly adhere to Russian 97
Orthodoxy, led by the Moscow Patriarchate, while Ukrainians in the west profess 
Catholicism.  These divisions continue to persist as the proportion of adherents for 98
each runs along geographic lines. 
 Political elites hoped to develop the organs of government by reforming for-
mer Soviet institutions. Ukraine’s main legislative body, the Verkhovna Rada 
(Supreme Council), consists of a parliament with proportional representation; the 
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number of Peoples’ Deputies, has fluctuated from 400 to 450.  Since Ukraine’s inde99 -
pendence political parties have emerged to represent various interests within the Rada 
but have not been sustainable and they have lacked a clear, ideological platform. 
Kostyantyn Fedorenko, Olena Rybiy and Andreas Umland attribute this issue to 
politicians’ inability to represent broad social interests and lack of transparency in 
campaign financing, leading to fleeting commitments and allowing for oligarchs to 
“buy” candidates.  100
 In his comparative study of post-Communist countries, Lucan Way observed 
that Ukraine did possess important democratic features during the 1990s, but a weak 
state. Despite a lack of civil society, strong state institutions, and democratic leader-
ship, the political system maintained a competitive party environment, but the causes 
were a political culture of “anti-incumbency” and a fragmented oligarchy, which 
forced political elites to compete.   101
 The Rada also experienced several changes by way of constitutional amend-
ments. Between 1991 and 2007 citizens voted for Peoples’ Deputies under a majori-
tarian representation system based on regions, to a mixed system, then to a propor-
tional representation system by a party’s percentage of the popular vote. These consti-
tutional changes did little to stabilize the number parties nor their platforms.   102
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 Finally, the judicial branch started developing as an independent institution, 
similar to that of other democracies. These included the Supreme Court of Ukraine, 
the highest court of appeal, as well as the Constitutional Court, specifically tasked 
with resolving disputes between the branches of government, and various lower 
courts.  Throughout the 1990s the Constitutional Court helped to resolve dispute 103
between the legislative and executive branches. The Court ruled in favor of both 
branches in various cases, generally devoid of outside interference and obtaining re-
spect for their rulings.  104
 Ukraine’s new state apparatus intitally relied on a highly centralized, vertical 
power structure. Although weak in certain respects, the central government in Kyiv 
controlled many aspects of local governance, most importantly tax collection.  105
Ukrainians democratic reform efforts slowed as progressive, formal measures began 
to clash with the entrenched interests of informal decision-making networks. Informal 
networks of oligarchs continued to exert disproportionate influence over the policy 
process.  106
 A powerful legacy of the USSR state apparatus in Ukraine assumed the form 
of an elite class, highly resistant to change. During the Soviet period, a loosely de-
fined  group of well-connected Communist Party members, known as the nomen-
klatura, led the country. These prominent party officials ran the machinery of gov-
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ernment not as an official body but as an informal group of elites.  Members of this 107
informal group enjoyed special privileges, including luxury goods and unrestricted 
travel to Western countries, which average citizens did not enjoy. The locus of power 
shifted not according to office but by the agent. After Ukrainian independence, the 
actors who had once belonged to this group transferred their authority to the highest 
levels of the new “democratic” regime and business posts. As one of my respondents 
(an academic and policy consultant) noted, in the post-Soviet space there exists a 
wide gap between, “formal versus informal institutions.”  The Soviet nomenklatura 108
transformed itself into the oligarkhiya that still dominates public and private policy-
making. 
 One of the defining characteristics of the oligarkhiya is its lack of a guiding 
ideology since the discrediting of socialism. As the earlier respondent continued, 
“power and money are their [oligarchs’] ideology.”  Communism had guided previ109 -
ous generations of political elites in Ukraine, even if at times only half-heartedly, but-
tressing consensus and providing a sense of mission. In the newly independent 
Ukraine the lack of a founding economic narrative left the ruling class with little to 
navigate their interests. As sectors rapidly privatized, crony capitalism quickly devel-
oped as the new oligarchs had the means to bribe and buy the largest firms. The oli-
garchs squabbled over the country’s natural resources and industries, securing as 
much political authority as possible to compete against one another with little interest 
in promoting economic prosperity for the nation. 
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 The influence of the oligarchs poisoned the development of purposeful politi-
cal parties. A defining trait of any democracy includes the existence of parties, with 
clear platforms, capable of aggregating the diverging interests of voters. Economic 
elites in Ukraine stunted the growth of viable political factions by buying off candi-
dates and sitting members of the Rada.  One of my interviewees, a current member 110
of parliament (MP), recalled how oligarchs funded campaigns of Communist Party 
members, holdovers from the Soviet regime, in order to implement their personal 
agendas.  As long as political factions serve the narrow interests of only the super-111
rich, they can not present citizens with clear policy alternatives, undermining democ-
ratic processes.  
 Ukraine’s efforts to democratize also faced the challenges of maintaining its 
sovereignty against its “Big Brother,” the Russian Federation. Moscow persistently 
pushed for a more integrated economy among the CIS members through trade agree-
ments. Political elites in Russia attempted to maintain hegemony over Ukraine. 
Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s second president, initially pursued a foreign policy of neu-
trality; in 1994, he attempted to strengthen relations with both the US and Russia con-
currently by denuclearizing the country with the help of Washington, while maintain-
ing close trade relations with Moscow.  Nuclear disarmament and US interest in us112 -
ing Ukraine as a bulwark against Russia in the region convinced Kyiv to gradually 
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prefer American influence from far away, over Moscow’s domination from nearby.  113
Reacting to Ukraine’s success in charting a divergent path on security policy, Russian 
leaders lobbied extensively to form a free trade area.  This strategy proved unten114 -
able: Ukraine consistently found itself having to choose between Western overtures 
on strategic issues or coordinating with Russia on economic issues, particularly ener-
gy. Although certain CIS accords relaxed trade restrictions on energy, agricultural, 
defense, and chemical products, Ukrainians sought greater distance between them-
selves and the much larger, overbearing Russian Federation. 
 Russia’s failure to retain full control over Ukraine coincided with its own drift 
back towards authoritarianism. The initial enthusiasm that had accompanied the 
break-up of the USSR and the prospect of a democratic regime in 1991 soon faded. 
As Nicholai Petro and Alvin Rubenstein observed, the movement towards greater 
democracy after 1991 started to stall in 1993 with Yeltsin’s storming of the Russian 
White House, then again in 1995 as foreign policy decision-making was centralized. 
In March 1995 his presidential decree shifted a considerable amount of power to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Part of the explanation for Russia’s return to authoritar115 -
ianism owes to the chaotic situation in which many communities found themselves. In 
1995 crime hit its highest levels since accurate record keeping.  Average citizens 116
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wanted order and politicians took advantage by intervening more in everyday life. Po-
litical events in Ukraine mirrored those in Russia as reform efforts stalled. 
 Violent and organized crime ballooned in the midst of transition, affecting av-
erage citizens and the power game among oligarchs. Although reliable statistics are 
scant, Ukraine’s Deputy Chief of National Police, Viacheslav Abroskin, claimed in 
January 2018 that authorities recorded 4,529 murders in 1997, one of the most violent 
years on record.  Corruption also spiked in the form of economic crimes: One study 117
found that all forms of theft climbed from 35,723 recorded cases in 1990 to 65,724 in 
1999.  The crime throughout the country added to the instability from economic de118 -
cline. 
 During the early 1990s, Western countries remained supportive of reforms, 
and protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty but engaged little with Kyiv or Moscow con-
cerning security or economic integration. After Ukrainian independence, the US ap-
proached the post-Soviet space with lukewarm resolve. In 1991, President George 
W.H. Bush delivered his now infamous “Chicken Kyiv Speech,” (a reference to a 
popular Ukrainian dish) promoting Ukrainian independence but cautioning against 
extreme nationalism, which many saw as a weak American response to nationalist 
movements.  In December 1991 Ukraine held a nation-wide referendum on the 119
question of independence. A majority of voters supported independence in every re-
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gion, although the Eastern oblasts and Crimea had weaker support.  The US quickly 120
recognized the results of the December referendum that confirmed independence.  
 Western Europe also supported independence and democratization of the for-
mer communist countries. However, countries like Germany and France did not de-
vise a unified policy towards countries like Ukraine until the formation of the EU. 
Ukrainian policymakers quickly indicated a desire to join the EU. Although the EU 
did not consider Ukrainian admission at the time, the Rada issued a proclamation in 
1993, declaring its intention to join the EU eventually.  Ukrainian officials then ex121 -
plored policies to bring its economy into line with European standards. 
 One important agent who pursued a Western-friendly foreign policy was Vik-
tor Yushchenko, who was at the time the Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU). One of my interviewees, a long-time aid to Yushchenko and later an MP, re-
called how they had both worked on Ukrainian accession to the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Central Bank estab-
lished offices to devise policies that complied with Western finance norms in an at-
tempt to reform Ukraine and leverage international influence.  Reform-minded poli122 -
cymakers thought conforming to Western institutions would be a way to further their 
own progressive agenda. 
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 The US and the EU started adopting diverging roles in dealing with Ukraine 
during this period. The US tended to exert more influence when addressing security 
issues, whereas the EU focused on economic policies. The US government worked to 
help former Soviet states secure their nuclear arsenals after 1991, for example, to mit-
igate the prospect of unprotected nuclear weapons on the black market. By 1994 US 
officials had successfully negotiated with Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom, Belarus and Kazakhstan to have Ukraine relinquish its nuclear weapons, 
codified in the Budapest Memorandum.  Though hailed as a diplomatic victory in 123
reducing the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, the agreement proved 
difficult to enforce as the signatories of the Budapest Memorandum gradually broke 
their promises.  
 One core element of the accord included assurances from Moscow that it 
would recognize and respect the territorial boundaries of Ukraine. Russia reneged on 
this promise in 2014 with the invasion of Crimea. Russian officials, and even some 
Westerners, note that the Budapest Memo was not binding. At one conference I at-
tended in Kyiv, the British Ambassador to Ukraine, Judith Gough, stressed that the 
Budapest Memo had not been a legally binding document; Russia refused to attend 
subsequent meetings concerning its implementation.  The lack of engagement on the 124
part of both the US and Russia led to the breakdown of security assurances for 
Ukraine. 
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 The EU, alternatively, worked to affiliate former Soviet states into its econom-
ic union. Ukrainian and EU officials agreed to a Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment (PCA) in 1994, outlining a special relationship to promote political and econom-
ic reforms. A key feature of the PCA included provisions for easing trade and invest-
ment terms between the two entities.  This division of labor between the EU and US 125
persisted, as described in more detail in chapters three and five, respectively. 
 Attempting to balance relations with the Russian Federation and Western gov-
ernments, Ukrainian policymakers addressed issues concerning domestic state institu-
tions, namely the division of powers between the President, Cabinet of Ministers and 
the Rada. In 1996 the Rada ratified a new constitution, better defining the main organs 
of the state and clarifying many jurisdictional issues. The first president of Ukraine, 
Leonid Kravchuk, managed a dual executive structure, whereby he and the prime 
minster oversaw the various ministries, which were not well-defined.  Kravchuk’s 126
successor, Leonid Kuchma, who was elected in 1994, consolidated power specifically 
asserting more direct control over the ministries. Chief among them was the nature of 
power sharing between the Rada and the President, often obscured by contradictory 
legal principles. Policymakers ratified a “semi-strong presidential” system whereby a 
popularly elected president directed the ministers. Kuchma’s efforts were codified in 
the 1996 constitution, which made the cabinet accountable to both the President and 
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the Rada.  To ensure greater loyalty, he also secured the authority to appoint all cab127 -
inet heads and deputy ministers.  128
 Before President Kuchma, the executive had little power to direct economic 
policy, a vital area that was still transforming from a centrally planned system to a 
privatized one. Kuchma took advantage of his new authority over ministries related to 
economic activity and began issuing policies directly to cabinet officials.  The oli129 -
garchs welcomed consolidation of power within the presidency. For them a stronger 
president could stem the chaos of a fragmented Rada and allow them to concentrate 
their lobbying efforts on one office as opposed to hundreds of Peoples’ Deputies.  130
 Kuchma also strengthened the presidency by bypassing the legislative process 
entirely and enacting decrees, a practice first implemented by precedent under 
Kravchuk and formalized as a constitutional power of the president in 1996. Leonid 
Kravchuk issued roughly 600 presidential decrees in 1992, rising to greater than 1,500 
by 1999 under Kuchma, with a decreasing proportion representing ceremonial acts.  131
The constitutional reforms went beyond drawing clear lines between the branches by 
significantly strengthening the presidency. This enhanced power directly benefited 
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President Kuchma, a former nomenklatura insider.  The growing frequency of de132 -
crees also pointed to the dysfunction of the Rada as a legislative body. 
 In the late 1990s Ukraine slowly moved away from Russia and towards the 
West concerning its national security policies. Since independence Kyiv and Moscow 
had disputed who should exercise control over the Black Sea Fleet and its surrounding 
port. In 1997, Ukrainian officials struck a deal with the Kremlin, dividing the fleet 
and establishing a leasing agreement over Sevastopol port access. In the same year 
Ukrainian leaders started negotiations with NATO over closer strategic relations.  133
By clearly dividing assets with Russia and opening discussions with the Atlantic al-
liance, Ukraine strengthened its position against Moscow and signaled a desire to 
align its security interests with the West.  
 From 1991 to 2000 Ukraine struggled to strengthen a political system inde-
pendent of Russia. Its first two leaders, Leonid Kravchuk, then Leonid Kuchma, oper-
ated semi-authoritarian regimes but pursued inconsistent foreign policies, siding with 
either the Russian Federation or the West whenever the situation proved advanta-
geous.   Generally, Ukrainian leaders followed Moscow’s lead due to the economic 134
benefits inherent in their relationship, particularly the trade in energy, which Ukraine 
depended. Eventually Ukrainian leaders found that they could no longer pursue a 
“dual foreign policy track,” leveraging Russian and Western support at opportune 
times. 
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 Despite constitutional reforms, Ukraine began sliding back into authoritarian-
ism by the late 1990s. Because of weak institutions and a political culture less experi-
enced with representative democracy, a small group of powerful elites, many connect-
ed to the former Soviet regime, reasserted dominance. A prime target for the Kuchma 
regime centered on controlling independent media. One journalist recollected that be-
ginning in 2000, the government started monitoring media and curbed “alternative 
points of view.”  President Kuchma attempted to steer public attention away from 135
corruption by controlling the narrative of political events. For example, Kuchma used 
intelligence services to spy on MPs in order to blackmail them, demanding their loy-
alty on crucial votes in the Rada.  Ukrainian citizens struggled with many of the 136
same regressive policies as their counterparts in Russia under Vladimir Putin.  
 During the 1990s Ukrainians continued to develop their sense of identity. 
Without the pressure of Russification policies pushed from Moscow, a renewed inter-
est in Ukrainian culture produced a wave of literature in the national language, 
amounting to roughly half of all consumed print media by 1997.  By 2001, 77% of 137
Ukrainian citizens identified themselves as Ukrainian, while 17% identified as Russ-
ian.  Though not a major change from 1991, five percent more Ukrainians defined 138
themselves in terms of national origin than had been the case ten years earlier.  The 139
division between Ukrainian and Russian cultures, however, remained hazy. The 
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blurred lines between these two Slavic identities is rooted not only in their close his-
torical connections but also in Ukraine’s decision to embrace a multicultural society, 
compared to an exclusionary identity.  Being Ukrainian did not require completely 140
rejecting elements of Russian identity, or visa versa. Roughly two thirds of Ukrainians 
fluently speak both languages, using both in conversation.  Eventually Kyiv’s ap141 -
proach to identity and culture would clash with Moscow’s foreign policy of leverag-
ing Russian identity abroad. 
 Ukraine’s relations with Russia chilled considerably following the turmoil of 
the Orange Revolution. Beginning in 2000 Moscow started losing an avenue of influ-
ence over Kyiv as Leonid Kuchma faced growing criticism from the media and oppo-
sition leaders for his role in the murder of a journalist, Georgiy Gongadze. The 
Gongadze scandal convinced Kuchma not to seek reelection as president, leaving the 
2004 election open to a wide range of contenders.  With 24 candidates competing in 142
the first round, two prominent politicians, Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko, 
led the popular vote, but neither secured a majority.  Many considered Yanukovych 143
the more conservative, Russian-oriented politician, while Yushchenko was seen as 
more progressive and Western-oriented. The inability of either to attain a majority 
forced a run-off election the following month. By the time polls closed on November 
21, 2004 Yanukovych had been declared the winner, but many Yuschchenko support-
 Kuzio, Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption and the New Russian Imperialism, 49.140
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ers began questioning the validity of the election results.  Rioting ensued across the 144
country, with the largest protests occurring in Kyiv. Eventually Viktor Yanukovych, 
supported by Russian officials, conceded and the Rada initiated a second election. 
Within eighteen days of the initial run-off, a new election took place: Yushchenko was 
declared the winner, with 52% of the vote.  As a pro-Western politician seeking to 145
strengthen ties with the EU and NATO, Yushchenko, overtly shifted Ukraine’s foreign 
policy away from Russia. 
 The Orange Revolution signaled a definitive break with the Kremlin, reassert-
ing an independent Ukrainian foreign policy and refocusing reform measures on cor-
ruption. Larive and Kanet note that elites in Russia viewed the revolution in Ukraine 
as a sign of significant decline in its own influence.   While 1998 witnessed an 146
abrupt shift in Russia’s foreign policy strategy away from cooperating with the West, 
2004 provided Ukraine an opportunity to shake off Russian domination. 
“Break with the Soviet Past”: 2004 - 2014 
 An interviewee, who had worked closely with Viktor Yushchenko, had asked 
the new president a typical question about what his administration’s mission entailed: 
“What would you like to achieve?” President Yushchenko’s response defined both his 
domestic and foreign affairs agenda: “Break with the Soviet Past.”  This statement 147
meant that domestically Ukraine needed to reform its institutions to root out the cor-
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rupt agents who had maintained power since the collapse of communism. Breaking 
with the past also meant carving out a new path internationally, away from Russia. 
 After Yushchenko assumed the presidency in 2005, the key players included 
Yulia Tymoshenko, of the party Fatherland (Batkivschyna), confirmed as Prime Min-
ister, and Petro Poroshenko, appointed as Secretary of the Security and Defense 
Council. Although Orange Revolution activists were hopeful that these agents gen-
uinely wanted reform, they all hailed from the ruling class and thus derived their 
power and wealth from the oligarkhiya. This alliance soon collapsed, due to infighting 
and corruption. In 2006 Yushchenko dismissed his government and appointed his 
former rival, Viktor Yanukovych, as Prime Minister.  By allying with Yanukovych 148
and the Party of the Regions (Partiya Regionov), Yushchenko brought a pro-Russian 
politician into the government. This move made breaking with the Soviet past all the 
more difficult. 
 Plans for economic integration with the West continued, however. Starting in 
2007, the EU and Ukrainian officials began discussions on tightening their relation-
ship, eventually leading to a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) 
agreement.  Despite the media focus on the evolving security relationship between 149
Ukraine and the West involving NATO, economic relationships proved the ultimate 
 “Ukraine: Yanukovych Confirmed As Prime Minister,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (August 148
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threat to the Kremlin. NATO members floated the idea of Ukrainian membership, but 
neither side made a serious attempt at strategic integration.  150
 Yuschenko and his party, Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukrayina) were plagued by 
constant turmoil and infighting among the oligarchs hindering reform initiatives. One 
respondent claimed that President Putin pushed for a government divided between 
Yushchenko and her, pitting the two against each other through side deals. Although 
there is no clear evidence of this, he noted that around this time the Russian govern-
ment had abruptly dismissed a legal case against Tymoshenko, after which Putin fi-
nalized an agreement with Tymoshenko concerning Russian energy imports.  Lever151 -
aging Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy imports and informal connections 
outside the formal public policy channels, the Kremlin continued to exert tremendous 
influence on Kyiv. 
 Yushchenko’s frustration with the ruling class continued; between 2007 and 
2010 he tried multiple times to dissolve the Rada and force general elections. In 2007 
he once again appointed Tymoshenko prime minister.  By 2009 the ruling coalition 152
was gridlocked once more; the government called for new elections in 2010. The 
three main contenders for the presidency were Yuschenko, Yanukovych and Ty-
moshenko. 
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 Yushchenko and Yanukovych remained pro-Western and pro-Russian, respec-
tively, but Tymoshenko was the wild card. She professed neutrality concerning for-
eign policy while colluding with the Party of the Regions to amend the constitution 
and limit presidential power. As a Yushchenko insider noted, Tymoshenko betted 
against Yushchenko and allied with Yanukovych in order to gain a supermajority in 
the Rada and to amend the Constitution, so that the president would be elected by 
Rada.  Tymoshenko and Yanukovych presumed that this would not only get them 153
elected but also secure their reelections in the future. Both drew on Kremlin support; 
Tymoshenko cited Putin’s popularity among Russians to bolster her image on the 
campaign trail.  154
 Yanukovych became the “anti-Orange” movement candidate, blasting 
Yushchenko for the slow pace of reforms, allowing for too much Western influence. 
As one interviewee stated, Yanukovych used Russian speaking news media and the 
Moscow Patriarchate to appeal to eastern Ukrainians.  His two-pronged strategy, 155
blaming the country’s political and economic difficulties on Yushchenko, while ap-
pealing to a Russian nationalism, secured his victory. Ukrainian voters wanted an al-
ternative, and Yanukovych represented something different. 
 Another major factor contributing to political turmoil was party instability. Af-
ter Ukrainian independence, political parties offered vague platforms and rapidly 
shifting allegiances; they emerged and collapsed, or merged with other parties that 
rarely presented a clear set of choices to voters. From 2002 to 2012, the Rada includ-
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ed eleven different parties. Some changed names by dropping generic titles to em-
brace personalities; Batkivschyna became “Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko,” for example. 
Others collapsed, like the once popular Our Ukraine, declining from 24% to 1% of the 
popular vote, along with many unaffiliated MPs.  Highlighting Yanukovych’s 2010 156
presidential victory, one respondent observed that the parties opposing him had no 
discernible platforms.  Oligarchs, ambitious politicians and Russian officials took 157
advantage of weak, confusing party identifications to promote more personality-cen-
tered factions. 
 The Yanukovych regime reverted to former policies and strategies, pursuing a 
dual-track foreign policy and tightening trade relations with Russia. He returned to 
using more informal networks, relying on oligarchs for guidance and approval.  158
Some of these networks led to the Kremlin, given Russia’s economic stake in 
Ukraine. One political consultant contended that Russia had directly supported 
Yanukovych financially, funneling money and his political campaign in return for ad-
vantageous trade policies.  Russian officials also worked to influence Ukrainian oli159 -
garchs by offering favorable credit terms, backed by an economic boom fueled by 
high energy demand. The EU and US, on the other hand, made statements denouncing 
what they saw in Ukraine, proving a weak weapon against Putin’s strategy.  160
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 Yanukovych’s foreign policy refocused efforts to move back towards Moscow. 
A respondent working on EU integration recalled how when Yanukovych assumed 
office, he and his party lacked foreign policy experience and did not build profession-
al ties with EU members.  The president and his cadre of civil servants in the min161 -
istries often sent mixed messages regarding relations towards the West and Russia. 
Officials in Kyiv continued to work on EU integration, implementing requirements in 
the Association Agreement (AA) while working on separate economic trade agree-
ments with Russia. Yankovich thought he could pursue a Kuchma-style, dual-track 
foreign policy.  Ukrainian policymakers professed strong but ambiguous cultural 162
ties to Russia during this period, while desiring the economic benefits of integrating 
more closely with the EU. In the words of one respondent, “Before [Maidan], it was 
difficult to understand our relations with Russia.”  Policymakers’ last attempt at a 163
dual-track foreign policy met the reality that the policy alternatives were now mutual-
ly exclusive as the AA and DCFTA directly threatened the economic interests of Rus-
sia and Ukrainian oligarchs. 
 During Yanukovych’s tenure as president, Western capitals noted Kyiv’s 
movement back towards Russia but did little to stop the regression as they had little 
political will to intervene. A media expert remarked that before the EuroMaidan 
protests, the West had “little to no interest in Ukraine.”  When asked to compare the 164
Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan protests ten years later, he noted that Western 
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states had not been “as committed” to the Orange Revolution, since the former had 
only been an election.  By contrast, the latter led to more fundamental changes in 165
Ukraine’s institutional framework. Ironically, the EuroMaidan protests resembled 
more of a revolution than the former. The second revolt caught the attention of the EU 
and US, and resulted in a more sustained effort to influence policies in Kyiv.  
 The EuroMaidan protests followed an anti-climatic path. In hindsight, ob-
servers saw Ukraine’s move towards greater cooperation with the EU as a clear threat 
to Russia’s influence, but at the time many policymakers did not recognize Moscow’s 
potential reaction. Kremlin officials working on economic policy initially expressed 
no concern over the AA but their position shifted dramatically in 2013 once Ukrainian 
and EU officials expected Yanukovych to sign the agreement at the Vilnius Summit. 
One of my interviewees suspected that Russian officials had not thought much about 
the agreement’s potential implications as they did not seriously consider that Ukraine 
would meet the requirements of the two agreements.  When President Yanukovych 166
appeared ready to sign the AA, Kremlin officials panicked. 
 Russia took swift action against Ukraine in order to convince policymakers in 
Kyiv that aligning more closely with the EU in an economic pact would incur major 
costs. Kremlin officials threatened to impose thirteen trade restrictions, while promis-
ing more favorable energy prices and loan forgiveness.  Although Putin’s exact de167 -
mands were not made public, sanctions on certain imports from Ukraine leading up to 
Vilnius shed light on what Yanukovych confronted. Starting in August, 2013 Russia 
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began barring imports of steel and agricultural products, which directly affected 
Ukrainian oligarchs.  Moscow employed a confusing foreign policy strategy con168 -
sisting of both “carrots and sticks.” According to an EU official working in Kyiv, 
Russia’s abrupt policy shift and aggressive behavior towards economic sectors sensi-
tive to oligarchs, caught EU representatives completely off-guard.  Brussels quickly 169
scrambled to provide compensatory economic measures to counter Russia. Once 
again playing Western countries against Russia to extract economic advantages, the 
Yanukovych regime asked for more financial aid from the EU. Ukrainian officials ex-
aggerated the projected economic losses of Russian sanctions to gain the most favor-
able terms.  Meanwhile, tensions rose in Kyiv as average Ukrainians awaited the 170
Vilnius Summit.  
 President Yanukovych decided at the eleventh hour not to sign the AA at the 
Vilnius Summit on November 27, 2013. When Chancellor Angela Merkel scolded 
Yanukovych for unexpectedly abandoning the deal, he claimed that Putin’s pressures 
on Ukraine had been too great to resist.  Ukraines’s retreat surprised the EU delega171 -
tion in Kyiv. As one EU official recounted, relations with Yanukovych chilled dramat-
ically after he refused to sign the AA, then worsened when violence erupted on the 
Maidan.   172
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 Yanukovych began ordering law enforcement and Berkut mercenaries to dis-
perse the protestors on November 31, which further enflamed tensions and caused 
demonstrators to call for his resignation.  Before this point activist leaders had de173 -
manded only that the Prime Minster, Mykola Azarov, and his government resign. Nei-
ther side relented and on January 16, 2014 the Verkhovna Rada passed a measure re-
stricting freedom of assembly, further inciting protestors.  An activist working on 174
human rights issues, recalled that during EuroMaidan, the government used the prohi-
bition on assembly to arrest people. Potentially a target for its liberal agenda, her or-
ganization used a flag in the window of her office building everyday to signal to 
workers whether the building was safe to enter.  175
 Relations between Brussels and Moscow deteriorated further as the 
Yanukovych administration battled Ukrainian protesters in the streets. Officers in both 
camps began to distrust one another, unlike any previous cooling of relations. One EU 
press officer had maintained some direct contact with his counterpart at the Russian 
embassy before EuroMaidan, but their communications ended during the renewed 
protests; he suspects this was because the Kremlin had directed Russian representa-
tives to cut their ties.  This blackout continued: my respondent no longer knows 176
anyone personally at the Russian embassy.  
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 Media institutions also played a crucial role in raising awareness of events in 
Kyiv, to Western audiences. The Vilnius Summit triggered more interest among EU 
elites, but it was the eruption of EuroMaidan in 2013 and the use of force against pro-
testers that sparked greater interest among the Western public.  From February 18 to 177
21, state forces killed at least 88 protestors, solidifying the dissidents’ cause against 
the ruling government.  President Yanukovych’s unwillingness to relent, even after 178
security forces employed violence, increased protestors anger, forcing him to flee to 
Russia without an official resignation. Once again, a revolution presented Ukrainians 
with an opportunity to reorient their society. Kyiv’s relations with the West and Russia 
changed dramatically, however. The following section describes the political land-
scape after EuroMaidan and the ways in which Ukrainian policymakers have reorient-
ed their foreign relations. 
Hope and Disillusionment Post-EuroMaidan: 2014 - Present 
 By February 2014 Ukrainians found themselves in a leaderless state, con-
fronting a civil war pitting predominantly pro-Yanukovych, pro-Russian areas of 
Eastern Ukraine, opposed to the EuroMaidan movement against pro-Western activists. 
On February 28, 2014 Russian troops began capturing strategic points in Crimea from 
their base in Sevastopol in order to secure the peninsula. By March 2014 Russia had 
occupied and claimed the entire territory as part of its sovereign domain.  Facing 179
great internal and external pressures, Ukrainian policymakers scrambled to reform a 
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functioning government with popular support, while trying to devise policies to wage 
war. 
Russian Invasion of Crimea 
Source: “Ukraine Crisis in Maps,” BBC News (February 18, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-27308526. 
 This section addresses the ways in which culture, institutions, and agents have 
affected polices. With regard to culture, I discuss the role of language, religion, Eu-
ropean versus Eurasian identity, and generational effects. Institutions center on state 
organs, political parties, the media, civil society associations, and educational bodies. 
When discussing agency, I highlight key players inside and outside government, 
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namely, current politicians and oligarchs. I conclude with an outline of policy issues 
relevant to modern Ukrainian politics. 
 Here I illustrate the ways in which Russia and Western states have sought to 
influence the policy process. Foreign actors exert influence in two general ways: di-
rectly, typically through hard means, and indirectly, though soft means. Hard power 
includes the use of force, (i.e. Russia’s invasion of Crimea), as well as major econom-
ic levers, like trade sanctions. Soft power, on the other hand, seeks to influence actors 
through cultural factors and values. Russian officials refer to their shared Slavic histo-
ry and language to persuade Ukrainians, while the West promotes liberal democratic 
and economic values. 
Political Culture  
 The cultural aspects of Ukrainian life that influence’s politics and the connec-
tion to Russia extend back to the founding of Kyivan Rus, which exceeds the scope of 
my treatment here. Among the most relevant cultural factors shaping politics today in 
Ukraine is the role of language (Russian and Ukrainian) as vehicles for spreading 
ideas. I discuss religion, to a lesser extent, as another avenue for exerting power. Lan-
guage and religion fall into a broader identity debate for modern Ukrainians over 
whether to identify themselves as more European or Eurasian. Finally I discuss de-
mographics and the ways in which generational divides are fueling a new political 
culture. 
 Contemporary Ukraine is culturally divided along an East-West axis. Eastern 
Ukraine, including Donbas, is in open revolt against the current government, because 
it identifies with Russian culture. Russia has exerted influence over this area of 
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Ukraine since at least the 17th century, intensifying at times, as occurred during “rus-
sification” under the Brezhnev doctrine. The Western region identifies more closely 
with Ukraine, fostered by a degree of autonomy it experienced under the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire.  
 Language use roughly mirrors this geographic divide, but language does not 
directly translate into identity. Modern Ukraine has become a multicultural, multilin-
gual country. Some citizens speak exclusively Russian in Donbas but do not support 
the separatist movement. As my communications expert observed, language is “not a 
big problem,” but political opportunists have nonetheless politicized language. 
Ukrainians easily speak Russian but identify as Ukrainian and do not see “Putin as 
their protector.”  By September 2014, one poll found that 75% of Ukrainians held an 180
unfavorable view of Putin.  Some citizens in Donbas, however, contended that the 181
Ukrainian government has at times suppressed the Russian language. In particular, 
Eastern Ukrainians are concerned with the diminishing status of Russian in official 
correspondence and ensuring that Russian is taught in public schools. 
 Language use in Ukraine is a poor predictor of identity. Despite the fact that 
78% of citizens describe themselves as Ukrainian, roughly half of residents regularly 
use Russian.   Using Russian daily is not seen as incompatible with Ukrainian iden182 -
tity.  The Ukrainian language is enjoying a revival of sorts. One study from Sep183 -
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tember 2014 found that 35% of focus group respondents improved their view of the 
Ukrainian language while 4% in the same groups improved their views on Russian.  184
A common theme among my respondents was that language is still an important fea-
ture of Ukrainian culture. When asked how culture might have changed since Euro-
Maidan, interviewees stated that in many respects the Ukrainian “language [has be-
come] the most important aspect of culture.”  The use of Russian is not the main 185
issue but it does play a crucial role as an avenue for Kremlin efforts to exert its influ-
ence. 
 Religion plays a marginalized role in Ukrainian politics, but it nonetheless 
presents another channel for Russian influence. After 1991 the Russian government 
dropped atheism as the state ideology; since then Kremlin officials have endorsed the 
privileged role of the Russian Orthodox Church.  Many adherents live in parts of 186
Eastern Ukraine; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church shares a long history with the Mos-
cow Patriarchate, which fears that the current conflict could split adherents in eastern 
Ukraine from their congregation.   187
 Though different patriarchates exist within Eastern Orthodoxy, the Russian, 
Ukrainian and even to some extent the Ukrainian Catholic churches, are part of an 
indistinguishable family. Many Ukrainians do not see any difference between these 
groups for any practical purposes, but claim that Russian Orthodox priests are using 
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their moral authority to impose a pro-Russian position.  Clergy often advocate for 188
peace, essentially conceding the annexation of Crimea and the frozen conflict in Don-
bas. 
 Cultural tensions in Ukraine revolve around the competing notions of Eu-
ropean versus Eurasian identity. President Putin claims that the Russian Federation 
has intervened to protect ethnic Russians.  Moscow’s invasion of Crimea and sup189 -
port of separatism in Donbas created a Ukrainian “threat,” despite the fact that Russ-
ian officials concurrently claim to want stronger bonds with their Slavic neighbors. As 
one respondent put it, the invasion of Crimea was a “litmus test” for Ukrainian identi-
ty; as another stated, their identity, “was awakened.”  In one study self-described 190
identification with Ukrainian increased from 2012 to 2014, especially in the central 
and western regions.  191
 Gradually, “Ukrainian-ess” became synonymous with European identity.  192
Whether this feeling is tied to the two competing historical narratives along the West-
East axis, or stronger EU relations is at present up for debate, but the feeling among 
those I interviewed is that the EuroMaidan Revolution and Russian aggression solidi-
fied Ukraine’s ties to Europe’s identity. In one survey, those who claimed that 
“Ukraine’s future lies within the European Union,” 91% held a positive attitude to-
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wards the EuroMaidan protests.  When asked as to what had changed since inde193 -
pendence, a young Ukrainian stated that “a pro-Ukrainian and European identity is 
now formed.”  She personally always possessed such an identity but now considers 194
such an attitude more mainstream. 
Generational Effects 
 During my time in Kyiv, I observed a marked difference between the older 
generation, socialized during the Soviet Period, and younger citizens, socialized in, a 
more open Ukraine. The Soviet generation is patriotic but does not draw a clear dis-
tinction between Ukrainian and Russian identities, whereas the younger generation 
more strongly identifies with being Ukrainian. A poll conducted in 2014 among re-
spondents aged 14 to 35 found that 91% identified as Ukrainian, compared to only 6% 
who described themselves as Russian.  This generation has translated independence 195
as charting a new path, away from its former Soviet neighbor. 
 Many new Rada members from this generation see Ukraine as a European 
country. A common term used to describe these new leaders, “Euro-Optimists,” pits 
them against the older generation. A member of the Rada, a self-described Euro-Op-
timist, caucuses with young, reform-minded politicians with Western experience from 
many different political parties. This loosely defined group quickly coalesced after the 
EuroMaidan Revolution and generally conflicts with the older generation.  As a re196 -
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sult, some Ukrainians perceive the new government as less neo-Soviet and thus more 
Ukrainian.  197
Institutions   
 The Ukrainian state relies on three main branches of government: 1) the legis-
lature or the Verkhovna Rada, populated by Peoples’ Deputies; 2) a strong executive 
including the president, and a prime minister, who leads the Cabinet of Ministers; and 
3) the two highest courts: the Supreme and Constitutional Courts. The authority of 
state institutions remains relatively weak in comparison to the loosely defined oli-
garkhiya. There is an unwritten rule requiring the oligarchs to share power through 
official positions, maintaining a balance of power among competing factions.  For 198
example, President Poroshenko, an oligarch who made his fortune in the confec-
tionary industry, has consolidated power among a “presidential clan” that supports 
him.  These fragile alliances shift with moving political winds. 199
 Both the West and Russia understand these dynamics well but approach the 
various clans of the oligarkhiya in dramatically different ways. Russian officials want 
to maintain these informal power arrangements to extract pro-Kremlin policy out-
comes. The West wants to destroy such power structures because they undermine 
transparent policymaking. Realizing the slow pace of reforms, Western governments 
use various oligarchs, like supporting Petro Prorshenko, at different times to achieve 
short-term progress, while maintaining channels of communication with marginalized 
clans, like the “Family” of Viktor Yanukovych, who may retake power in the 
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 Interview with Respondent 28, October 5, 2016.198
 Interview with Respondent 28, October 5, 2016.199
 !  74
future.  After President Yanukovych fled, Western influence over the new govern200 -
ment produced tangible, institutional reforms as I discuss in the next chapter. For 
roughly 10 to 18 months afterwards, reformers and Western officials saw a window of 
opportunity for dismantling entrenched structures of corruption. However, the “hid-
den policy making structure” of the oligarkhiya is reemerging and, “institutions are 
not working.” The current policy process operates but it is “not ‘public’ policy.”   201
 The judiciary faces two main challenges: the weakening of the Constitutional 
Court to resolve intergovernmental disputes and the Prosecutor General’s lack of en-
forcement. As Alexei Trochev concluded, the Court’s power has eroded since the Or-
ange Revolution, primarily as a result of opposition parties supporting rulings.  Suc202 -
cessive Prosecutor Generals, an appointed position of the President, purposely let cas-
es against oligarchs and high-ranking officials die. Taras Kuzio attributes this behav-
ior to the privatization of the office, whereby prosecutors extract bribes for sitting on 
potential cases.  Chapter Two discusses corruption within the Prosecutor’s office in 203
more detail. 
Political Parties 
 Political parties in Ukraine have always possessed weak ideological platforms 
and remain highly unstable. As in other post-Soviet states, parties tend to revolve 
more around their leaders, using a personality driven approach rather than substantive 
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issues.  In Ukraine candidates generally appeal to voters through use of language, the 
region they are from and their stance on foreign policy, specifically whether they are 
pro-Russian or pro-Western.  The now defunct Party of the Regions, for example, 204
galvanized a segment of the Ukrainian population around a populist message and 
Russian identity. The party supported Yanukovych throughout his political career, 
deeply rooted in friendly ties to Moscow; it subsidized lower class workers (particu-
larly in Eastern Ukraine) and resisted democratic reforms.  With the Russian inva205 -
sion of Crimea and its continued support for rebels in Donbas, the Party of the Re-
gions’ position on relations with Russia proved untenable, and the party collapsed. 
 The current anti-reform faction includes many members from the defunct Par-
ty of the Regions. Reform opponents target poorer people who desire stability, em-
ploying populist rhetoric by advocating the “reasonable power” (razumniya sila) of 
government, claiming that little can be done to reform government, which is highly 
effective at attracting the disillusioned.  Rather than criticize specific reform mea206 -
sures, leaders primarily aligned with the Opposition Bloc (Opozitsiniy Blok) regard 
reforms as too stressful and lament the passing of a more “stable” past. Some scholars 
see the Party of the Regions as a direct descendent of the Communist Party, not ideo-
logically but as a vehicle for populist nostalgia of the past, while protecting the inter-
ests of oligarchs.  207
 Fedorenko, Rybiy and Andreas Umland, “The Ukrainian Party System Before and After the 204
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 Though a clear pro-Russian bloc in the Rada no longer exists, opposition 
members remain silent on foreign policy issues related to the Kremlin, despite contin-
ued military occupation. When the issue of Russia arises in the Rada, deputies remain 
mute or make unclear statements.  Some suspect that various oligarchs with Russian 208
business interests, like Dmytro Firtash, financially support their political 
operations.  Anti-reformers have adopted a strategy of “wait and see” until average 209
Ukrainians lose enthusiasm for reform, presenting an opportunity to retake power. 
Similar to the Party of the Regions’ strategy of waiting after the Orange Revolution to 
take power, the opposition has focused on exploiting criticism of the current govern-
ment, distracting public attention for its lack of progress.  210
 The instability of political parties have made it challenging for voters to 
choose candidates who will reliably represent their interests. Only one party, 
Batkivschyna, returned  to the Rada in 2014 from the 2012 election. The new parties 
included Popular Front (Popularniy Front), Poroshenko’s Bloc (Blok Poroshenka), 
Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (Ukraininskiy Demokratichniy Alyans za 
Reformi), the Opposition Bloc (Oppositsniy Blok), Self-Reliance (Samopovich), and 
the Radical Party (Radikalniya Partiya).  Without consistent choices, voters lack 211
trust in candidates’ party affiliation. 
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 The composition of the Rada has changed many times since independence but 
after EuroMaidan attitudes towards foreign policy changed significantly. Many camps 
in the Rada agree on certain policies and disagree on others, but no factions publicly 
support a pro-Russian foreign policy.  Whereas in previous periods deputies debated 212
the benefits of aligning either with Western countries or Russia, now members are ei-
ther pro-Western or silent on the issue. Most groups are publicly pro-EU, but many of 
my respondents fear that Moscow still secretly influences some MPs (“Trojan Hors-
es”).  Walking around the streets of Kyiv, one sight that struck me was the presence 213
of the EU flag alongside the Ukrainian flag in front of each government building, de-
spite Ukraine’s non-member status. 
Civil Society 
 EuroMaidan also reinvigorated civil society in Ukraine. The flight of many 
older politicians and renewed fear of popular discord led the government to concede 
to many NGO demands. These demands included transparency, anti-corruption initia-
tives, addressing inequality, foreign energy reliance, and environmentalism, which 
will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. Western governments rushed to provide 
support to civil society organizations (CSOs) and pressured the new government to 
consider CSO demands. Many of my interview partners joined the growing civil soci-
ety movement at this time. For example, one had been a commercial lawyer during 
the Yankovych period but joined the EuroMaidan protests, then switched to human 
rights law in order to work on civil liberty cases.  Another participated in the 214
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protests and helped to maintain a database of lawyers willing to provide legal advice 
and defense for activists.  215
 Among the hundreds of NGOs currently operating in Ukraine, the most pow-
erful group is the umbrella organization, Reanimation Package of Reforms (Rianimat-
siya Pakyet Reformiy - RPR), which united 66 CSOs and set legislative goals for the 
Rada.  Unlike the deterioration of civil society after the Orange Revolution in 2004, 216
the RPR coordinated efforts and laid out a coherent mission that leveraged Western 
influence to produce institutional reforms. The primary donors consist of four main 
sources: the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the EU, the United 
Nations Development Programs (UNDP) and the Open Society Foundation.  In con217 -
trast to the West’s brief, weak intervention in 2004, the EU and US sent a clear mes-
sage to both Ukrainian and the Russian governments after EuroMaidan that civil soci-
ety must be protected and developed. 
 Among the respondents who worked for NGOs, none could recall any major 
domestic donors, nor any money coming from Russia. This is a double-edged sword; 
Russia’s position has been weakened, as it possesses little leverage over Ukrainian 
NGOs; but these same NGOs are also at the mercy of Western funding. When asked if 
they worked with any Russian officials or private organizations, none could recall 
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even simple communications. The only exceptions involved cases where CSOs need-
ed to coordinate the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs) or to rescue 
Ukrainian prisoners from occupied territory. One interviewee’s organization was 
working with a Russian ombudsman to retrieve Nadiya Savchenko, a Ukrainian held 
captive by the Russian government.  Civil society  associations in Ukraine are ana218 -
lyzed more extensively in Chapter Two, regarding their role in democratic reforms 
and combating corruption. 
Agency   
 Although many pre-Maidan officials remain in power, the political landscape 
changed significantly after EuroMaidan. While some agents did not return to politics, 
many new leaders rose to prominence. The three key players in formal positions of 
authority who took power after EuroMaidan were President Petro Poroshenko, Prime 
Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk (replaced in 2016 by Volodymyr Groysman) and the Min-
ister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avakov. These three players not only hold the most 
powerful state offices but they also share power as leaders of their own clans, using 
their informal networks along with their offices to maintain a balance of power.  All 219
of these agents have sworn to taking a pro-Western position, at least publicly. 
 The current legislature also differs markedly from past convocations: Over 
50% of the 423 deputies elected to the Rada in 2014, were under 45 years old.  The 220
new, younger generation of politicians, less familiar with Soviet political culture, see 
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their future lying with European community who promote the distinctiveness of 
Ukrainian culture. Key reform leaders include Sergeiy Leshchenko, Anna Gopko, and 
Mustafa Nayyem. However, a few of my respondents suspect that Russia is support-
ing some members of the Opposition Bloc through personal contacts and funneling 
money.  221
 My interview partners included members of a new generation of civil servants, 
who were socialized in an independent Ukraine under more progressive institutions. 
Civil society groups have cut ties with Russians, using domestic and Western re-
sources for support.  I provide the professional background on each interviewee in 222
subsequent chapters. 
 The oligarkhiya, however, still maintains a tight grip on key politicians and 
institutions. Besides those who continue to hold office, another small group works 
outside government, constantly pushing its agendas and competing among itself for 
power and money. Observers do not fully know the inner workings of the oligarkhiya, 
and its history is complex, but for the purposes of this study I focus on the main busi-
ness players. Since 2014 the most influential oligarchs not holding political office in-
clude Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Dmytro Firtash (currently in exile in Austria) and Rinat 
Akhmetov.  Their allegiances to other oligarchs and politicians are unstable and 223
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changes with the political winds. As one respondent noted, there is an “unmanageabil-
ity of elites and it’s growing.”  224
Policies 
 Post-EuroMaidan developments forced policymakers to address a diverse slate 
of policy issues. This study highlights the issues subject to foreign-actor influence that 
were important to my respondents. In Chapter Two I discuss reform policies in 
Ukraine and the vastly different roles that Western states and Russia play. Most re-
form policies revolve around democratization and combating corruption. Chapter 
Three addresses economic policy, to include privatization, foreign trade, finance, sci-
ence and education. Chapter Four analyzes the paramount role of energy in Ukrainian 
politics. The legacy of Soviet energy interdependence, coupled with two further 
decades of heavy reliance on Russian fossil fuel imports, produced a readily available 
weapon for Moscow to exploit. War has led Ukrainian elites to reshape the energy-
industry landscape, as they deal with massive corruption, push for energy indepen-
dence and promote environmentally sound policies.  
 Chapter Five examines the most pressing issue facing Ukrainians: security and 
defense. The highest priority for political elites in Ukraine is their defense against 
Russian invasion and the frozen conflict in Donbas. Western and Russian leaders use 
various instruments to influence the conflict, which Ukraine sees as a new proxy war 
between the two sides. I also analyze how Kremlin officials exploit information tech-
nologies, opening up an unconventional war front, with which Ukrainian policymak-
 Interview with Respondent 28, October 5, 2016.224
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ers are scrambling to deal. The cyber and information wars occurring in Ukraine offer 
a preview of future conflicts for other nation-states.  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Chapter Two -  
Transforming the Soviet System: The Fight for Reform in Ukraine  
 As Ukraine struggled to separate its political system from that of the Kremlin, 
many activists inside and outside government realized the importance of achieving 
broader domestic reforms. Transitioning from a Soviet state to an independent, liberal 
democracy required undertaking major institutional reforms and rooting out corrupt 
agents, clinging to power based on their previous positions in the USSR. Reform was 
not limited to a specific policy arena, but has affected all policy spheres. Democrati-
zation and anti-corruption efforts throughout the country constitute domestic issues, 
yet foreign governments have played an outsized role in shaping the course of these 
reforms. 
 Balazs Jarabik and Mikhail Minakov see the fight against corruption as inter-
twined with the strength of the central government. Despite the growth of civil society 
and reform of institutions after EuroMaidan, corruption still “erodes state legitimacy” 
in Ukraine.  For policymakers to effectively govern, citizens must attain some level 225
of trust in the system. 
 A root of Ukraine’s corruption culture lies in political elites’ inability to bol-
ster their power against the corrupt oligarkhiya. Serhiy Kudelia contends that Ukrain-
ian politicians cannot provide enough patronage to citizens, nor a coherent ideology to 
maintain power, allowing oligarchs leverage to exploit the policy process.  Unlike 226
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Putin’s ability to use the vast energy resources of Russia to derive his power, the state 
has been unable to effectively protect the public interest against oligarchs. 
 The oligarkhiya is the main obstacle to reform as they leverage their informal 
networks in influencing policymaking to its advantage. Heiko Pleines states that a 
core group  of oligarchs emerged in the 1990s and has consistently exerted pressure 
since 2000.  Despite changes in the officeholders and constantly shifting political 227
parties, oligarchs have outlasted these formally elected agents to remain in power. 
 Another important element to reform is the revival of Ukrainian culture. Taras 
Kuzio sees the strengthening of Ukrainian nationalism as affecting democratization. 
He uses the case of the Orange Revolution in 2004, especially the activism in Western 
Ukraine against election fraud, as a case illustrating the positive correlation between a 
stronger sense of “civic nationalism” and democracy building.  As citizens more 228
clearly identify with a national, civic culture and utilize certain culture elements like 
language, they mobilize for protests against what they see as corrupt state actions. 
 One source of the corruption is the legacy of a high crime rate since the col-
lapse of the USSR. Although precise crime statistics do not exist, Taras Kuzio posits 
that high criminal activity during the early 1990s, particularly in Donbas and Crimea, 
helped lead to the culture of corruption today and that these two areas produced the 
most powerful oligarchs as a result.  By not addressing the crime wave of the 1990s, 229
policymakers allowed informal networks to exercise effective control over sectors of 
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the economy and geographic regions, a legacy that continued through the EuroMaidan 
period. 
 Another major element of corruption lies within the ranks of law enforcement. 
Bohdan Harasymiw posits that the legacy of the Soviet police force, and the inability 
to reform it, has led to persistent issues with corruption.  Holdover law enforcement 230
officials have resisted changes and a bribery culture continues to pose problems for 
effective policing. 
 The oligarkhiya is a direct target of foreign actors trying to influence events in 
Ukraine, as they are seen as key agents, generally blocking democratization. Western 
initiatives, building civil society and requiring reforms as conditions of financial as-
sistance, directly threaten Ukraine’s elites, members of what some scholars term the 
“neo-Soviet” class.  This class serves their own interests first, then the interests of 231
Moscow, and by extension resisting Western influence. 
 Western countries push the current Ukrainian government to adopt human 
rights’ reform, embodied in civil liberties and civil rights initiatives, in order to build 
state capacity. Russia focuses on security and economic issues, generally raising fears 
about adverse consequences of moving closer to the EU and US.  Moscow utilizes 232
the oligarchs to further its interests, concurrently maintaining corrupt networks to 
spread discontent among Ukrainian citizens. This two-pronged strategy undermines 
reform efforts from both the top and bottom of the political structure. 
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 The following chapter concentrates on the competing uses of hard and soft 
power in Ukraine’s reform movement, focusing on democratization and the role of 
specific anti-corruption initiatives. Democratization concerns the liberalization of pol-
itics, loosening restrictions on society and developing responsive institutions. Anti-
corruption efforts target illegal activities that undermine democratization efforts, 
propagated by an entrenched bribery culture. I contend that Moscow has used both 
hard power and soft power to undermine these reform efforts. The West has relied on 
financial aid to bolster civil society groups and a new generation, along with institu-
tional capacity, to further reform initiatives. I address privatization, i.e., the liberaliza-
tion of the economic sphere, in Chapters Three and Four. 
 First I outline the history of reforms in Ukraine from 1991 to 2014, then focus 
on reform initiatives from 2014 to 2016. I consider the ways in which the two com-
peting foreign actors, the West and Russia, influenced reform policies. Finally I con-
clude with some thoughts about Ukraine’s future and relations with the West and Rus-
sia. 
Ukrainian Reforms from 1991 - 2014 
 When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukrainians not only welcomed 
their independent state but also a chance to reform a stagnant political-economic order 
inherited from the USSR. The euphoria quickly dissipated as elites set about the actu-
al tasks of restructuring the economy. Ukrainian citizens experienced a hyper-inflating 
currency, high unemployment, work without pay and the loss of a protected, internal 
Soviet market. Among the many political and economic problems of this period, three 
broad reform trends stand out: 1) Contrary to expectations Ukrainian reform policies 
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barely changed the institutions, agents or culture; 2) political elites in Kyiv directed 
those reforms from the top-down; and 3) the Russian Federation maintained greater 
foreign influence over the policy process than in any other country. 
 From the outset, Ukrainian leaders struggled to build strong democratic insti-
tutions and an independent, market-based economy. The main constitutional debate 
centered on the centralization of power and the independence of the judiciary. 
Ukrainians had inherited a highly centralized political system as a result of their Sovi-
et subordination. Power emanated top-down from Kyiv, leaving little authority to 
states (oblasti) and districts (raionyi).  The high degree of centralization, particular233 -
ly regarding fiscal maters, precluded local governments from making decisions and 
allowed elites to maintain their privileged position in Kyiv. Another major constitu-
tional question concerned presidential powers, which would not be settled until the 
ratification of a new constitution in 1996, establishing a semi-presidential system.   234
 Another legacy of the system included the well-connected Communist Party 
members who quickly appropriated key industries, allowing them to acquire quasi-
monopolies. The main business sectors oligarchs targeted for take over were heavy 
industries, which relied on foreign export markets (metals, chemicals, and arms man-
ufacturing) and financial institutions.  In the process many oligarchs accumulated 235
immense wealth, and economic power over policymakers in Kyiv. They often main-
tained power by fostering “war, corruption and a black market” (“Voyna, koruptsiya, i 
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kontrobanda”).  By using their massive wealth and keeping their dealings hidden 236
away from public scrutiny, they could hold reform hostage. The first constitution took 
five years to promulgate, finally superseding the obsolete Soviet version. Democratic 
institutions were created only after appeasing the five major political parties, which 
were heavily supported by the oligarkhiya at the time.  237
 Ukrainians also sought to redefine their identity, separating themselves from 
Russian culture. The government implemented policies to promote the Ukrainian lan-
guage as the language of record for state activities and the main language of instruc-
tion in schools.  Activists met stiff resistance from a complex legacy of entrenched 238
and sometimes competing values.  According to Alexander Bogomolov: “As a newly 
independent state, Ukraine has relied on three key myths…the ethno-national one – a 
state that embodies the historical aspirations of the Ukrainian people; the liberal-de-
mocratic one – a state that protects the liberty of all citizens, irrespective of nationali-
ty; and the European one – a state that is an inalienable part of European 
civilization.”  In terms of “ethno-national” culture, Russia possessed a clear advan239 -
tage, influencing Ukrainians through references to a shared Slavic history and culture. 
Moscow’s soft power generally targets people who already identify as Russians to 
strengthen their sense of identity. This is in contrast to the Western mode of soft pow-
er, which promotes inclusion of various groups.   240
 Interview with Respondent 29, 27 October 2016.236
 Nadia Diuk, “Sovereignty and Uncertainty in Ukraine,” Journal of Democracy, 12, 4 (2001).237
 Kulyk, “The Age Factor in Language Practices and Attitudes: Continuity and    238
Change in Ukraine’s Bilingualism,” 284.
 Bogomolov and Lytvynenko, “A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine,” 3.239
 Bogomolov and Lytvynenko, “A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine,” 16.240
 !  89
 Western influence over democratization and anti-corruption measures re-
mained superficial in the 1990s. Various aid programs to help the transition also set 
reform conditions. One example was the 1992 US Freedom Support Act (FSA), which 
promoted free market and democratic reforms in former Soviet countries, extending 
$410 million in aid and a $12 billon increase in IMF funding.  Such initiatives 241
opened the door to influencing Ukrainian policymaking but did not ultimately change 
the corrupt political and economic environment. 
 Democratic and anticorruption reforms stalled during the 1990s as a result of 
the oligarchic resistance and supporting agents in Russia. The vast majority of agents 
occupying formal and informal positions, remained unscathed by anti-corruption 
probes.   By law, high ranking state officials (MPs, Ministers, and the President) were 
immune from criminal prosecution while few oligarchs were convicted of crimes in 
Ukraine before 2010.   The main vehicle for ensuring a pliant prosecutor’s office 242
was to place surrogates of oligarchs in key prosecutor positions.  Prosecutors and 243
judges, many of them Soviet holdovers, refused to charge and convict oligarchs. One 
successful case, however, includes the conviction of the former Prime Minsiter Pavlo 
Lazaryenko. The US government detained and  charged Lazaryenko with money 
laundering, wire fraud and extortion in 1999.  The Ukrainian government had been 244
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unable to arrest and charge him, due to corruption throughout the judicial system. 
Such efforts, however, did not fundamentally end endemic corruption in Kyiv.   
 In 2004 Ukrainians saw an opportunity to further reforms with the election of 
President Viktor Yushchenko. After his election Freedom House rated Ukraine as 
“Free,” in contrast to “Partly Free” under Kuchma.  A close aide of the newly elect245 -
ed President, noted that when he asked the new Ukrainian leader what he wanted to 
accomplish while in office, Yushchenko replied: “de-Sovietizing the government.”  246
His response highlighted the desire to reform politics and maintain distance from the 
Kremlin. 
 Another defining feature of the Orange Revolution included the reawakening 
of civil society groups. New non-governmental organizations (NGOs) aggregated the 
interests of average Ukrainians, who had previously possessed few forums to compete 
with the oligarkhiya. Groups like the Committee of Voters of Ukraine challenged the 
results of the 2004 election, forcing a second round of voting.  Another respondent 247
started working for the Center for Civil Liberties around this time, hoping to educate 
Ukrainians on their voting rights and freedom of expression rights. She often con-
ducted workshops in public forums to raise awareness concerning civil liberties with-
out interference from government officials.  Organizations like this in the past, be248 -
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fore the Orange Revolution, would have received far more scrutiny from government 
officials. 
 Western countries welcomed the new Yushchenko regime with open arms. A 
current member of the Rada claimed that policymakers in Kyiv noticed that the US 
government had a renewed interest in Ukraine, providing tremendous support to Pres-
ident Yushchenko.  Washington sought to push Kyiv’s foreign policy away from the 249
Kremlin. A principle initiative during this period was the Threshold Agreement, ap-
proved by the US government in December 2006, providing $45 million to aid anti-
corruption efforts.  American officials targeted Ukrainian civil society groups as the 250
main vehicle for producing reforms by funding those NGOs directly. 
 Ruling class members reasserted their influence and reverted to squabbling 
among themselves, vying for power. The main clans who ruled Ukraine were tied to 
four oligarchs: Yanukovych, Rinat Akhmentov, Dmitri Firtash, and Igor 
Kolomoyski.  Less powerful but still prominent oligarchs included Petro 251
Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. Yushchenko brought these two into his govern-
ment in an attempt to recruit powerful people who might also be amiable to reforms. 
In 2005 a tripartite ruling coalition emerged among President Yushchenko, Prime 
Minister Tymoshenko, and Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, 
Petro Poroshenko.    252
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 A former Yushchenko aide described how the US government had worked 
feverishly to maintain the fragile balance between the competing factions in Kyiv. 
Yushchenko became more frustrated over conflicts with the government of Prime 
Minsiter Yulia Tymoshenko concerning energy policy and anti-corruption initiatives. 
According to one interviewee, Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party (Batkivshchyna) 
played a major role in blocking reforms and undermining Western influence for vari-
ous reasons; chief among them privatizing the energy sector, a longtime ally of the 
“gas lobby.”  As their disagreements spilled over in public, their fragile alliance 253
crumbled. When President Yushchenko called for Tymoshenko’s resignation in 2005, 
the US Embassy called Yushchenko to apply pressure to not dissolve the government. 
Yushchenko informed the US Ambassador that an informal deal had been made be-
tween himself and Tymoshenko, staving off political chaos.  254
 Hoping to promote anti-corruption efforts by strengthening NGOs, the US 
government applied direct pressure to particularly corrupt officials. The aide claimed 
that the US government had possessed incriminating evidence against Yulia Ty-
moshenko, which it threatened to leak if she were not compliant.  American foreign 255
policy consisted of a two-pronged strategy: promoting reforms by bolstering civil so-
ciety, and acting as an international law enforcement agency by targeting specific, 
corrupt agents. 
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 When discussing the collapse of post-Orange Revolution reforms, one official 
lamented how the high hopes of Ukrainians had dwindled once Yushchenko started 
issuing more presidential decrees and reviving “dualism in executive power,” emulat-
ing his predecessor, President Kuchma.  As he called for more resignations and is256 -
sued more decrees, Yushchenko’s popular support waned. At one point he appointed 
Viktor Yanukovych as Prime Minister only to force his resignation and reappoint Ty-
moshenko.  257
 Reform optimism faded as elites fought over control of the government. Sur-
veys showed that civil society membership declined steadily by 2009.  By 2010 258
popular support for Yushchenko had deteriorated, so his chances of securing reelec-
tion that year appeared bleak. Again he faced Viktor Yanukovych, leading the Party of 
the Regions (Partiya Regionov), a pro-Russian faction with strong support from east-
ern Ukraine. Yanukovych won the 2010 election, while Yushchenko publicly admon-
ished Yulia Tymoshenko.  His term in office led to rampant corruption. For exam259 -
ple, some estimates claim that $70-100 billion was embezzled from the state treasury 
from 2010 to 2014.  260
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 Reform initiatives stalled again as the Kremlin reasserted influence over offi-
cials in Kyiv. Putin saw Yanukovych as a pliable agent in Kyiv, and helped the Party 
of the Regions to pursuade Ukrainians that Yushchenko and his policies were a tool of 
Western meddling.  By the end of 2012, the Yankukovych regime had jailed key po261 -
litical opponents, including Yulia Tymoshenko and the Minister of Internal Affairs, 
Yuriy Lutsenko, both for abuse of office.  Almost immediately the US government 262
began pressuring Yankukovych to release them, to encourage political competition. 
The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee even passed a resolution calling for the 
unconditional release of Tymoshenko.   263
 Foreign governments and private entities funneled money and providing tech-
nical expertise to such groups, in an attempt to further their own interests. The Russ-
ian government used some of these organizations, like Ukrainskyi Vybir (Ukrainian 
Choice), to cultivate more Russian-friendly attitudes among Ukrainian citizens.  The 264
Kremlin slowly  reasserted influence after the 2004 revolution that competed with 
other reform CSOs. 
 While President Yanukovych struggled to maintain power, he also faced a nar-
rowing foreign policy path. His “dual-track” strategy, pursuing friendlier relations 
with both the West and Russia (employed by former President Kuchma) cracked un-
der the competing interests of the two foreign actors. He also continued to use the 
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crime ring developed in eastern Ukraine to intimidate political opponents through 
2013-2014.  The November 29, 2013 deadline for reforms laid out in the EU’s AA 265
approached, and the timetable soon forced Yanukovych to decide on whether to 
choose a closer economic relationship with the EU or the Russian Federation. After he 
decided not to sign the AA at the Vilnius Summit, his support plummeted, leading 
him to flee the country. Ukrainian protesters set the stage for a new wave of reform-
ers, committed to breaking the vicious progression-regression cycle.  
A New Wave: Reforms from 2014 - 2016 
 After the EuroMaidan protests, average Ukrainians became far more involved 
in reforming the political landscape, adopting a grassroots approach to democratiza-
tion and rooting out corruption. Two defining characteristics of the post-EuroMaidan 
movement included a “bottom-up” strategy and more sustained engagement from the 
West. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine produced an unintended consequence: a common, 
foreign enemy galvanized Ukrainian society. Western governments made a concerted 
effort to penetrate Ukrainian society through sustained aid to civil society groups. Af-
ter many failed attempts at reforming the political system up to 2014, disparate groups 
among the fractious elite class coalesced to address reform out of necessity. 
 Before 2014, almost no political officials had talked to media outlets; some-
times they completely ignored journalists. With oligarchs owning many of the major 
television channels, news outlets avoided hard questions directed at friendly politi-
cians.  According to one study, oligarchs controlled 83% of Ukraine’s television 266
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market.  As one interviewee observed about the ruling elite before the protests, 267
“they thought they were safe.”  Politicians had little incentive to democratize insti268 -
tutions and enforce civil liberties, to avoid confrontation with corrupt oligarchs.  
 After EuroMaidan the ruling elites could no longer ignore citizens’ frustration 
and the markings of a stronger civil society. A critical vehicle for maintaining corrupt 
practices, an entrenched bribery culture weakened, while rent-seeking became decen-
tralized, forcing oligarchs to target lower levels of government (i.e. raioni and 
oblasti).  The reform movement has focused on increasing transparency, building an 269
independent judiciary, decentralizing power, promoting individual rights, and disman-
tling corrupt business networks, particularly in energy and heavy industry. The great-
est manifestation of grassroots demands for reform is the Reanimation Package of Re-
forms (Rianimatsiya Pakyet Ryeformi - RPR). RPR, formed in March 2014, consists 
of almost 66 different NGO’s, focused on governmental reforms, based on a pragmat-
ic legislative agenda.  This umbrella organization became a leading force for change 270
post-EuroMaidan. 
 Western powers took advantage of the new political landscape to further de-
mocratic and anti-corruption reforms. A diverse group of entities, consisting of the US 
government, the EU, individual EU members states, and various Western NGOs, 
viewed Ukrainian civil society as the main catalyst for achieving reform. The EU, for 
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example, has desired a “restoration of governance” in Ukraine, aiming to build re-
gional capacity, to combat the rebels (povstanski) in Donbas.  Rather than simply 271
use force against the insurgency, the EU saw strong reforms as an incentive for aver-
age citizens to pull their support from separatists. 
 US officials also took a keen interest in Kyiv, devoting time and resources to 
keeping pressure on policymakers to adopt reforms. One interviewee with intimate 
knowledge of the current Ukrainian administration maintained that former Vice Presi-
dent Joe Biden was very influential in pushing President Poroshenko on anti-corrup-
tion measures, placing calls a few times a week.  Western countries have used 272
Kyiv’s reliance on many aid programs to push for lasting reforms in the judiciary, law 
enforcement agencies, and the civil service. 
 The reform movement in Ukraine has met many obstacles, however. The 
greatest threat to progress is the ongoing conflict with Russia over Crimea and the 
separatists in Donbas. Balazs Jarabik writes:  
As Russia reacted to the EuroMaidan Revolution with the drastic step of an-
nexing Crimea and aiding the armed resistance in Donbas, Ukraine was 
stretched between reforms and war. Key political and judicial reforms were 
hijacked with the emergence of the Donbas war, which has become the unfor-
tunate legacy of the protracted Maidan saga. Thus, the reforms have suffered 
from half-hearted measures…   273
 Western leaders recognize the importance of reform as the main guarantee of 
Ukrainian independence. As the former US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt told one of 
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my respondents when discussing a plan on how to combat foreign intervention: “It’s 
not Russian tanks but corruption,” which threatens their sovereignty.  274
 The following paragraphs detail my conversations with Ukrainian policymak-
ers and advocates in Kyiv concerning the reform movement and the ways in which 
foreign actors   have influenced those efforts. First, I discuss the grassroots nature of 
most recent reforms; next I focus on election policies, decentralization, rule-making, 
human rights and transparency initiatives. Each respondent illustrates the ways in 
which the policy process works in  their respective arenas, and the extent to which 
foreign entities influence their work. 
Grassroots Reform  
 One policy analyst working at a private think tank that produced progress re-
ports on the criminal justice system and election reforms expressed moderate opti-
mism; he claimed that the Ukrainian government was making serious progress but 
that the reforms are slow and sometimes cause negative, unintended consequences.  275
A few initiatives he highlighted concerned law enforcement, more transparent elec-
tions and a decentralization of power, away from Kyiv. Since the 1990s many 
Ukrainians saw the police as helping the rise of “gangster capitalism,” by taking 
bribes and oligarchic patronage.  A US government’s program to reform the police 276
department in Kyiv, received positive feedback from the public, in his experience. 
Many felt that law enforcement had become more professional and less corrupt with 
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the aid of American funding and technical expertise.  A 2016 poll found that 60% of 277
Kyiv residents approved of the job local police were doing.  278
 Another area in which corruption was rampant involved voter manipulation. 
Oligarchs and their subordinates often bought party members and paid voters. Though 
specific data is difficult ascertain, the oligarch’s practice of buying candidates has ex-
isted since the 1990s and continued throughout the 2000s.  Increased enforcement 279
has now reduced the impact of such practices.  This respondent’s NGO pushed for 280
better election monitoring, and had secured funding from Western governments for 
more election monitors by lobbying their diplomats. During the 2014 general election, 
foreign, independent election monitors reported that no candidates misused public 
funds for their campaigns.  281
 Discussing the general ways in which civil society is now different after Eu-
roMaidan, he noted the direct role of NGO pressure on government. Many advocacy 
groups stress to policymakers the importance of public buy-in and not serving the nar-
row interest of oligarchs.  These groups have used the requirements of international 282
agreements to their advantage. As civil society groups started to lose influence over 
the national government in 2015, activists directly alerted EU and US officials, 
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prompting Western governments to threaten policymakers. When President 
Poroshenko appointed a prosecutor general, Viktor Shokin, in 2015, Western govern-
ments applied pressure, and Shokin resigned within a few months of serving.  283
 A more contentious issue centers on decentralization. Reformers wanted to 
dismantle Ukraine’s strict vertical power structure in order to distribute authority 
more equally among the oblasts and raions.  Western countries have encouraged 284
such measures, but the concepts of “decentralization” and “federalization” are often 
misunderstood, and sometimes used by critics to block progress. Opposition and pro-
Russian groups sometimes manipulate the definition of decentralization to mean that 
certain “autonomous” regions such as Crimea should be independent.  285
 Citing remaining obstacles to reform, the analyst mentioned a growing feeling 
of public fatigue and lack of consensus. By 2014, the government and the RPR speci-
fied 62 areas for reform, but only 16 reform spheres have seen serious progress.  286
Some of these initiatives include the creation of NABU, a transparent procurement 
system (Prozorro), and ensuring consumers pay the market price for gas.  Draft laws 287
are still fought over within parties, among old rivals from past regimes; the govern-
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ment has moreover failed to effectively articulate reforms to the public.  By not 288
properly understanding decentralization reforms, citizens do not pressure their 
deputies to pass such measures. These shortcomings feed a growing skepticism to-
wards the political system, feeding populism.  According to one poll, Ukrainian re289 -
spondents gave the government an average of 1.99 on a scale of 1 through 10, making 
it the least trusted government on the European continent.  290
 This respondent concluded on a positive note, however. He felt that fellow 
Ukrainians were optimistic about overall security, institutional reform, and the promo-
tion of Western values.  When asked about effective tools for combating a possible 291
slide back towards corruption, he mentioned public demand through voting, the 
strength of civil society, and international pressure.  He reiterated a recurring theme 292
in many of my conversations: the sentiment that Ukraine’s independence depends ul-
timately on Ukrainians, but that Western pressure is welcome, as long as it bolsters 
democratic institutions. The specific instruments Western entities use the most effec-
tively are NGO funding and providing technical advice.  
 Another interview with an NGO representative involved discussing changes in 
election law. She had started her career in the early 2000s by working with the Re-
forms and Order Party (Partiya Reformy  i Poryadok), focusing mainly on market lib-
eralization. The political party landscape in Ukraine is notoriously unstable; when her 
 Interview with Respondent 26, 29 September 2016.288
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party merged with Batkivshchyna, she left to work for an advocacy group. Now she 
pushes for legislative initiatives concerning party financing and stabilizing election 
rules. Election laws in Ukraine have frequently changed since 1991 and government 
officials have only once (in 2003) reviewed their own enforcement of election pro-
cesses.  Her group has advocated for election reform e.g., the strengthening of mon293 -
itoring, while raising awareness about corruption in the Central Election Commission. 
The Commissioners have not been reelected, which should occur every three years as 
required by law, nor were there always external observers to oversee elections.  294
 Shifting to the influence of foreign entities on her work, she addressed both 
Russian and Western initiatives. Public organizations like the US Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID) fund many of her group’s projects; she likewise 
receives technical advice from EU member states on how to better formulate party 
platforms and discourse on reforms.  Western interest in such organizations re295 -
mained low until 2014, before EuroMaidan when the government had ignored many 
NGOs. Beginning in 2014 through 2016, US aid totaled $373 million, whereas be-
tween 2014 and 2017 the EU granted 1.1 billion euros in assistance, not to include 
loans.  296
 During the protests, the Yanukovych administration targeted the main organiz-
ers and characterized key leaders as “civic activists” and placing their names on a list 
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as enemies of  both Ukraine and Russia. My respondent personally knew many work-
ers from the protests who had been put on this list; they were subsequently denied the 
right to travel to Russia and Belarus.  Russian officials still target Ukrainians active 297
in civil society groups, seen as a threat to the Kremlin’s influence. 
 Turning to obstacles to reform, she mentioned problems with the judiciary and 
decentralization. Reformers see the courts as the most difficult sphere to improve, in 
so far as many judges are holdovers of a corrupt system. Since independence presi-
dents, MPs and oligarchs frequently bribed judges to sway their decisions.  Judge298 -
ships are also often used as a way to reward political loyalists after each election. One 
initiative attempted to create a “head advisory board” to monitor the decisions of 
judges, but so far the board members have been fairly unresponsive to corruption 
charges.  Russian officials and oligarchs subvert decentralization reform, albeit in 299
different ways. President Putin has condemned decentralization through the Russian-
speaking media, which is still consumed by many Ukrainians.  300
 We concluded our conversation with a discussion of the most important tools 
used by Western groups to influence NGOs in her policy sphere. She contended that 
Western funding remained the most vital instrument but criticized Western govern-
ments for not imposing enough requirements on the Ukrainian government, in order 
to receive financial assistance. She believes that Western attention to corruption has 
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forced the Ukrainian government to become accountable. Furthermore, she hopes to 
see more educational exchange programs between Ukrainians and the West, particu-
larly within the EU; these help to advance a more liberal political culture through per-
sonal interactions.  301
 Another interviewee worked for a civil society group which tracks the finan-
cial activities of politicians, in an effort to stem corruption. Sometimes her organiza-
tion investigates and sends evidence directly to lawyers and media outlets that are 
looking into potential abuses of power.  Her NGO, in coordination with others, has 302
developed a database for tracking the assets, both domestic and foreign, of elected 
officials and ensuring that their information matches their respective asset filings, 
formally known as an “eDeclaration.”  An eDeclaration states the wealth of each 303
deputy, with an itemization of assets, which they are required to file by law. The sys-
tem applied to roughly 300,000 government officials and was required for Ukraine to 
receive $1.6 billion in loans from the IMF and visa-free travel privileges to the EU.  304
Her organization also tracks government procurement contracts to prevent fraud and 
embezzlement of public funds. Various politicians since independence have used in-
frastructure projects as a prime target for embezzling public funds.  Her group 305
worked with Western governments and IGOs on medicine procurement, which by 
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2016 saved the government 40%, totaling $12.6 million, from before the program ex-
isted.  306
 Activists had created this group in 2012 and lobbied MPs during the 
Yanukovych years for anti-corruption measures, but they had made little progress by 
2014. Since EuroMaidan, they have helped to push 21 anti-corruption bills through 
the Rada; one created the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).  307
Her organization also uses the media to publicize regressive bills that may undermine 
reforms. One campaign worked with television news, KyivPost and Ukrainian Prav-
da, to expose draft legislation that had proposed to end the eDeclaration system. The 
group had activists protest and wear shirts that read: “What the F**K.”  308
 Her organization relied on Western support for funding, and lobbying. The 
Dutch government, USAID, and private donors are their chief  financial 
contributors.  Some funds go directly towards specific programs to strengthen anti-309
corruption investigations. For example, the US funded a polygraph system in Kyiv to 
screen local police detectives, which the US had supported since 1999.  When a 310
Ukrainian prosecutor threatened her group, after it  had started investigating specific 
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politicians, the US Embassy pressured officials to drop the charges.  Western agen311 -
cies often act as a third party between the state and NGOs in order to ensure the en-
forcement of reforms. 
Decentralization  
 Another NGO representative works for an organization that serves the German 
government in Ukraine, ensuring the implementation of decentralization measures. 
Her NGO provides a nation-wide training program, educating local politicians and 
civil servants on how to run their state and local governments. Her group deals mostly 
with the Ukrainian  central government and the EU in order to coordinate planning for 
empowering oblasts and raions.  The most important feature of decentralization 312
concerns taxation. In 2015 the Rada passed a law allowing lower-lever governments 
the ability to collect taxes and develop their own budgets.  Prior to 2015 small vil313 -
lages (gromadi) would have to lobby the Rada to secure funds for simple public 
works projects, such as road maintenance.  Some local governments attained the 314
authority to tax and spend by meeting certain provisions, namely consolidating with 
other villages in order to reach sustainability (spramozhniy).  These towns now use 315
a competitive bidding process for contracts, undermining corrupt officials and busi-
nesses.  
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 My interviewee’s organization moreover targets the entrenched bribery culture 
in public finance. Her colleagues push local government officials to adopt transparent 
fiscal policies through training sessions on public accounting.  This NGO also has to 316
communicate properly what decentralization means for citizens. As mentioned earlier, 
opposition groups often manipulate the concept of decentralization. Ukrainian Choice 
advocates the establishment of redundant institutions (new institutions with the same 
mission as existing bodies) as a way to “decentralize” the current political system 
while other groups raise fears that the President’s ability to choose prefects is further 
centralization.  An oligarch, Viktor Medvedchuk, primarily funded this group. The 317
language that Ukrainian Choice uses promotes duplicative institutions that are more 
“accountable to the people,” and that current officials are “all corrupt!”  318
 As to the ways in which foreign countries influence her policy area, she noted 
the stark differences between the Western and Russian approaches. She mentioned, 
first, that Russian-speaking television is more popular than Ukrainian media, particu-
larly entertainment. Because many Ukrainians maintain personal ties to Russians, the 
Kremlin emphasizes the concept of a common culture between the two countries and 
that EuroMaidan was a Western-orchestrated coup.  Western countries employ a 319
hard power approach, using military support and channeling money through the IMF, 
USAID, the World Bank and the EU Delegation; but there are soft power elements as 
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well. The EU has established a visa-free regime with Ukraine, likely to increase the 
cultural influence of Western Europe. It also sends technical experts from both the EU 
and US to advise the decentralization process.  When pressed on why visa-free trav320 -
el was so important, she observed that Ukrainians want access to the West. 
 A different respondent who worked on decentralization, helped communities 
to amalgamate: a process by which towns and villages consolidate in order to gain 
more autonomy from the central government. Traversing the country and visiting var-
ious towns to hold workshops, she had noticed the difference between eastern and 
western groups. While most west Ukrainian towns responded well to the idea of de-
centralization, cities like Odessa, Kherson, Donyetsk and Luhansk were not 
receptive.  Many residents of these areas were cynical towards disseminating more 321
power to the local level, after decades of experiencing a highly vertical power struc-
ture under the Soviet system. They suspected that such a change, would lead to Kyiv 
abandoning their interests. As Taras Kuzio has hypothesized, Russian identity is a 
continuation of Soviet identity, which the Kremlin leverages for its agenda.  Though 322
Moscow played little direct role in these negative attitudes, she suspected that the 
Russian-speaking media had shaped the population’s attitudes. According to one sur-
vey, residents in eastern oblasts consumed Russian television news sources between 
11-29%, depending on the oblast versus 4-7% in Western/Central Ukraine.  The 323
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Western raions, however, directly supported her organization’s democratization ef-
forts. Its funding came almost exclusively from the US and European governments.  324
Rule-Making 
 Members of the Rada were also inclined to see foreign agents as trying to cor-
rupt the rule-making process. One MP reported that the Kremlin invests in roughly 
100 pro-Russian politicians, many of whom serve in the Opposition Bloc (Opozitsniy 
Blok) and Fatherland.  These politicians, in turn, support a pro-Russian agenda (al325 -
though they do not state this publicly) and oligarchic business interests. Complement-
ing direct funding to MPs, Russian money finances “experts” and NGOs who broad-
cast their views through various media outlets as part of Moscow’s “hybrid war” with 
Kyiv, calling nationalist groups “fascist.”  326
 Another MP accused her peers of similar tactics. She suspected many former 
members of the Party of the Regions, marginalized after 2014, of taking Russian 
money and copying laws from the Russian Duma in drafting Ukrainian legislation.  327
This contrasts with the Western approach, whose money and support is not funneled 
directly to politicians. She emphasized that European and American officials provide 
technical advice to NABU and specific programs like the eDeclaration system, which 
requires public officials to disclose their finances. Most important for reform, howev-
er, are the talks “behind closed doors,” as when Vice President Joe Biden pushed 
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President Poroshenko to fire Viktor Shokin, with the support of many reformist 
MPs.  328
 Starting in 2014 Western governments also helped to reform the Ukrainian 
civil service. Kyiv has hired and trained a new generation of government workers, for 
which the EU provided 104 million euros, both for supplementary pay and to hire ex-
perts providing technical advice.  One requirement for European aid bars civil ser329 -
vants from being official members of a political party. Such measures ensure the apo-
litical nature of institutions. A former civil servant who now works for an NGO advis-
ing the government stressed the ways in which Moscow tries to undermine reform 
efforts. Typically, agents and pro-Russian media outlets target reform politicians and 
try to expose their potentially unethical behavior.  By undermining their credibility, 330
the Kremlin hoped to taint their policy positions. A recent case involves a reform-
minded deputy, Sergei Leshchenko. Media outlets tried to portray Leshchenko as a 
corrupt, wealthy politician because he bought a high-rise apartment in downtown 
Kyiv.  Leshchenko acquired the apartment by way of his wife, but the story persists 331
as a “scandal” despite the fact that oligarchs ruling the country live in far greater luxu-
ry.  
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Human Rights 
 The domain experiencing the greatest increase in activity since 2014 centers 
on human rights. During the Yanukovych period, the government either discouraged 
NGOs from working on civil rights and liberties issues. Following Moscow’s agenda, 
Ukrainian officials focused on economic issues, ignoring social issues.  Although all 332
of the respondents who worked in this field described many challenges in liberalizing 
political institutions and culture, they reported significant progress over the past two 
years. One Ukrainian, with whom I spoke, advocates for people with disabilities, the 
LGBT community, women’s rights, children and internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
Before EuroMaidan, her organization met with government officials for symbolic 
photo opportunity sessions, along with other civil society groups. She lamented that 
many rights issues were ignored by the Yanukovych regime, with one official from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly admitting in 2011: “I don’t care about human 
rights.”  After 2014, however, the government became more responsive to her group 333
and others in the human rights arena. She engaged in little direct lobbying with one 
notable exception - her involvement in policies concerning employment anti-discrim-
ination. Her organization reviews current labor laws (trudoviy kodeks) and draft legis-
lation to ensure that provisions meet the requirements mandated by the AA.   334
 Human rights groups advocate for legislation that meets the conditions of 
Western governments because they receive much of their funding from Western enti-
ties. Some funds come from the US government and EU member states but there are 
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also private donors, like Elton John, who is active in LGBT issues.  My respondent 335
believes that EU civil society groups  are particularly influential in aiding Ukrainian 
groups, while similar Russian groups have no influence.  She draws on EU financial 336
support to pressure politicians in Kyiv. When certain human rights standards in the 
AA are not met, her group and others notify EU officials, what one report termed an 
“NGO-cracy.”  In December 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held another 337
meeting with civil society groups but under new leadership; this time officials were 
responsive to their demands.  338
 One major obstacle to human rights reform centers on the implementation of 
the Rome Statute (1998), the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court of 
which Ukraine is not a member. The main point of contention for policymakers is Ar-
ticle 9, Section 3, which addresses jurisdiction, and whether human rights provisions 
apply to the conflict areas in Ukraine. My respondent suspects that the current gov-
ernment is concerned that foreign prosecutors will try potential Ukrainian war crimi-
nals in Donbas and Crimea.  In her estimation, the biggest obstacles to reform in339 -
clude the entrenched oligarkhiya and a lack of “stability” throughout the country.  
 Another representative from the human rights advocacy community offered 
measured responses. Although she claimed that the political environment was “better 
than [under] Yanukovych,” the environment was “still part of the old order,” and 
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“still, the same elites are in power.”  Her organization’s main focus lies with civil 340
liberty protection and monitoring law enforcement agencies to ensure they do not 
abuse their power. Developing a more professional and less corrupt police force has 
been an issue since independence.  Although she does not directly defend citizens in 341
court, her NGO maintains a list of human rights’ lawyers, documents human rights 
violations, monitors court cases, analyzes legislation and lobbies policymakers for 
greater citizen protection. Unfortunately, her relations with the government since the 
organization’s founding in 2007 have been inconsistent, in that at times law enforce-
ment agents have been responsive while at other times unresponsive.  Civil society 342
groups had been more influential after EuroMaidan; they were able to leverage a 
weak government and develop strong cooperation among similar interest groups. 
Since the government has regrouped her organization has leveraged Western 
support.  343
 EU member states and private individuals like George Soros provide funding 
to her organization, but it has been infrequent. She contends that civil society groups 
remain too reliant on foreign donors and Ukrainian volunteers; the groups “need insti-
tutional support” from sustainable sources.  When asked which tools had proved 344
most effective in influencing reform measures, she repeated the sentiment of others: 
Western countries should continue to focus on Ukraine’s political reforms, garner 
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public support through local programs, and show Ukrainians how countries can tran-
sition to liberal democracy.  Most importantly, she cited Ukraine’s failure to ratify 345
the Rome statute as a major block to human rights reform.  She chided France and 346
Germany for considering amnesty for potential human rights violators in Crimea and 
Donbas as a negotiated element of the Minsk II agreement (the latest ceasefire agree-
ment for the conflict in Donbas, signed by Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany in 
2015).  
 This discussion partner outlined the tactics employed by the Kremlin, in order 
to block reforms. She has seen some MPs introduce draft laws from Russia, who she 
suspected of receiving money from Kremlin officials.  There is evidence to show 347
that financial institutions have funneled money directly to politicians (in violation of 
Ukrainian law) to sway their decisions.  Besides their influence on rule-making, she 348
noted that Ukrainians have even elected some Russian agents to local offices. In 2015 
two anti-reform candidates and former members of the security services closely tied 
to Russia (Siliya Lyudye) won seats in the city of Mariupol, possibly supported by a 
pro-Russian oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov.  349
 Ukrainian policymakers have had to deal with a large number of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) who moved after the invasion of Crimea and rebellion in 
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Donbas. One activist who now works on veterans’ issues first became involved by 
helping IDPs. She helped link human rights lawyers to possible defendants and en-
sured that public officials followed the Rome Statute.  When questioned regarding 350
foreign actors influence on her operations, she noted that she sometimes grants inter-
views with Western media to pressure Ukrainian politicians. Since September 2014, 
Western countries have provided financial support for her NGO’s operations.  Rus351 -
sia, however, seems to ignore the issue of human rights altogether. 
 Yet another civil society leader has consulted for many different NGOs, rang-
ing from military volunteers to environmental activists, helping to connect similar 
groups and secure funding. She sees NGOs as relying primarily on domestic funding 
but encourages international donations as well from the US, EU, UN and Russia.  352
She repeated the claim that the current government is somewhat afraid of NGOs and 
their ability to leverage Western pressure.  353
 Overall, she reports that the Ukrainian government does not constrain NGOs, 
but it is also true that many policymakers do not enthusiastically support their efforts. 
Her assessment is that since many of her groups possess little financial benefits for 
elected officials, most MPs do not invest much time with such organizations. Minis-
ters and MPs will demonstrate symbolic support through speeches and public events, 
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for example picking up trash with volunteers; so far they have not provided direct 
funding.  354
 Western organizations had helped her network of NGOs in three key ways. 
First the US and EU governments managed to convince policymakers that NGOs do 
conduct important work and that social projects are not simply “volunteer” work. 
Second, average Ukrainians are “exhausted from the Maidan protests and the war, so 
they are willing to work for very little.”  To make these initiatives sustainable, how355 -
ever, civil society groups need to secure stable sources of funding and to provide liv-
able salaries. The West also aids in providing NGOs infrastructure, such as free work 
space, phone, and internet services.  Most importantly, she notes Ukrainian NGOs 356
borrow ideas from the US and EU. She elaborated on how Ukrainian environmental 
groups have modeled their projects and marketing on similar groups in the Baltic 
States.  357
 Some Ukrainian NGOs are still working on establishing transparency among 
themselves in order to track flows of money. By law, all NGOs that receive public 
funds must register with the “eData” system (launched in 2015); roughly 50% of the 
NGOs have already done so.  Journalists frequently use the eData site to monitor 358
groups and ensure that NGOs receiving tax-payer money are non-profit and legiti-
mately acting in the public interest. Western countries contribute to such efforts in 
 Interview with Respondent 23, 1 November 2016.354
 Interview with Respondent 23, 1 November 2016.355
 Interview with Respondent 23, 1 November 2016.356
 Interview with Respondent 23, 1 November 2016.357
 Interview with Respondent 15, 21 September 2016.358
 !  117
multiple ways. The eData site is modeled after a similar EU program, “Open Europe.” 
The US sends trainers to educate NGOs on proper accounting, auditing and marketing 
practices.  359
Conclusion 
 The EuroMaidan Revolution breathed new life into democratic reforms that 
had stalled in Ukraine, buttressed by a robust civil society and Western support. Many 
challenges remain, given domestic obstacles like interference from oligarchs, who 
have amassed tremendous wealth and power over time; add to this their parochial in-
fighting, eroding elite consensus and a corrupt judiciary. One political consultant 
elaborated on the extent to which corruption infiltrates the highest offices in Kyiv. 
Dmytro Firtash, now in exile in Austria, has been the primary financial backer of 
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk. President Poroshenko, an oligarch himself, has forged an 
uneasy alliance with oligarch Arsen Avakov, Minister of Internal Affairs. My in-
terviewee contends that voters did not really decide the the 2014 election; instead oli-
garchs in Austria did.  360
 The judiciary, both judges and prosecutors, remain a bastion of rampant cor-
ruption. All oligarchs want to undermine NABU as it represents the greatest threat to 
their hold on power and money.  Judges are constantly facing pressure from oli361 -
garchs and other government officials in making their decisions.  Corruption is so 362
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blatant that court rulings often do not even match their opinions (“sledushchyi 
znachenie”).  Despite damning evidence against corrupt officials and organizations, 363
judges consistently fail to convict them. In one case the ruling of a judge, Artur 
Yemelianov, was so suspect that the Ukrainians High Council of Justice suspended 
him in 2017.  One way some government officials try to stop anti-corruption mea364 -
sures is by suppressing investigative journalism. Prosecutors threaten critical media 
outlets with charges of “anti-Ukrainian” speech or even government takeover.  365
There is also the added pressure of not criticizing the government during war. As one 
respondent observed, peer pressure to be “patriotic” prevents more open discussion 
about democratization.  366
 Western countries have devised a multi-pronged strategy for fostering reforms: 
they provide financial aid directly to NGOs and to the Ukrainian government but 
withholding those funds from Kyiv, if it does not abide by certain conditions. The US, 
EU and EU members states constantly communicate with CSOs to ensure that the 
politicians are responsive to their needs. This may require the government to create 
formal institutions like NABU or  to push Poroshenko to remove corrupt agents. The 
West’s soft power also influences the mission of many NGOs. Civil society in 
Ukraine wants the elected officials to adopt policies that mirror Western standards, 
especially in the areas of anti-corruption and human rights. NGOs are pushing the 
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Rada to endorse liberal values that lead to more transparency, less corruption, and 
more legal protections for citizens. 
 Russia has maintained a few effective channels of control. “Local elites, who 
support Russia, hide their loyalty,” but they “support Putin and unification.”  In such 367
locations in the east and south of the country, local officials discourage CSOs and 
their actions to mobilize democratic particpation. Moscow is catalyzing constant tur-
moil, inciting public dissatisfaction.  The Kremlin is pushing a “let’s wait and see” 368
approach, hoping that the reform movement will lose steam, providing an opportunity 
to reassert its power. 
 All the persons I interviewed agreed that Western financial and technical sup-
port to civil society groups was the most important tool for positively influencing de-
mocratic reforms in Ukraine. Many want Western governments to apply more pres-
sure in order to break up the oligarkhiya. Some CSOs want the West to support politi-
cal “outsiders” not connected to the oligarkhiya for the highest government offices, 
unlike how they did with Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk.  Diminishing the concentra369 -
tion of wealth and power provides a window of opportunity for establishing lasting 
change with new agents. NGOs in Ukraine moreover, recognize the importance of 
information as the greatest weapon against corruption. 
 One of my interview partners lamented that reforms after EuroMaidan were 
once again too slow to take root. He sees dissatisfaction growing and contends that 
the most critical period for engineering change occurred within six months after 
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Maidan.  Many of my respondents were optimistic but keenly aware of their democ370 -
racy’s fragility. In the words of one MP: “We don’t need another revolution, we need 
reform.”  As another MP of the Rada declared: “Ukraine cannot keep repeating the 371
first phase of reform.”   372
 Interview with Respondent 31, 7 November 2016.370
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Chapter Three - Ukrainian Policymaking and the Economy 
 Russia has long viewed Ukraine as an economic pawn operating within its 
wider economic system. The Kremlin’s new mercantilist approach, protecting con-
sumer and select industrial markets, is rooted in its zero-sum mentality towards eco-
nomics. Rather than embracing the concept of growing wealth for all parties in an 
economic relationship, Moscow insiders see the loss of Ukraine as a loss for their per-
sonal economic interests. The chief benefactors of Russia’s privileged economic posi-
tion, at least until 2014, were the two countries’ oligarchic classes. As a form of hard 
power, Moscow relied on existing business relationships and the Soviet legacy of a 
closed economic system.  
 Corruption has been the greatest obstacle to economic development in Ukraine 
since 1991.  As Anders Aslund noted, Ukraine is unique in the post-Soviet space as 373
the disparity between political freedom and corruption is acute. Despite rating rela-
tively well in terms of political freedoms (scoring 3 on the Freedom House Index), but 
still scored only 27 out of 100 in terms of corruption (according to Transparency In-
ternational’s Corruption Perceptions Index).   374
 Corrupt economic activity relies on the persistent use of informal networks. A 
historical legacy of the Soviet Union, citizens had no experience with institutions reg-
ulating free economic activity and weak rule of law. This lack of expertise benefited 
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Communist Party insiders as they took control of the country’s heavy industries with 
little competition.  As Andres Aslund posits, the “informal institutions” developed 375
by the oligarkhiya has led to “endemic corruption.”   376
 The extent of corruption and high level of inequality led to households using 
informal networks to survive. One study by John Round, Colin Williams, and Peter 
Rodgers concluded that average Ukrainians regularly conduct business through the 
black market as a necessity.  Economic activity in the home avoided government 377
regulation, taxation, and perpetuated the bribery culture. 
 The Ukrainian government did little to orchestrate a transition to a market 
economy by not building effective regulatory institutions and implementing inconsis-
tent policies. Leonid Grigoriev, Eugenia Buryak, and Alexander Golyashev claim that 
economic development in Ukraine has relied too heavily on election cycles, political 
upheavals, and the lack of consensus regarding policies among elites.  As formal 378
institutions failed to develop, informal networks filled the void. 
 Another core problem with Ukraine’s economic development regards a lack of 
diversification. Since 1991 the country has relied on on a few key industries for its 
export market: mining, metallurgy, and chemicals, which are controlled by oligarchs 
except for the agricultural sector.  These “heavy industries” were established during 379
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the Soviet period and became the primary target for former nomemklatura members to 
secure monopolies during privatization. Oligarchs have also controlled a large portion 
of the media sector, which has become vital to exercising influence over public opin-
ion. As I discuss later in this chapter, this instrument has pressured policymakers to 
resist economic reform. Agriculture, information technology, and retail sectors how-
ever, remain fairly competitive.   380
 The lack of foreign competition, except Russia, has led to an insulated market 
run by Ukrainian oligarchs and heavily influenced by Moscow. The mining, metallur-
gy and chemical sectors are critical to the the oligarkhiya’s power base, which long 
pushed Kyiv for lucrative energy deals with Moscow, as their industries rely on cheap 
petroleum products.  The concentration of heavy industries in Eastern Ukraine has 381
also led to the differing values between the Eastern and Western regions. Sarah Birch 
contends that Eastern Ukraine’s historical experience with intensive Soviet industrial-
ization and its continued reliance on these sectors, has led to residents there desiring 
closer economic ties with Russia.  382
 After the invasion of Crimea, Ukraine’s already fragile economy contracted 
severely. GDP stood at 0% growth in 2013, then decreased 16% from 2014 through 
2015.  The challenges of fighting a war in Donbas and pushing for reforms in Kyiv 383
added economic pressure to policymakers. Ukraine has been one of the most vulnera-
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ble countries to economic crises, both from the East and the West.  The political 384
elites in Kyiv have been charged with addressing such challenges while deciding their 
economic policy path: Their choices consisted of maintaining a strong relationship 
with Russia or move towards the West. 
 The oligarkhiya and foreign influence from Russia undermined reforms and 
ultimately pushed Ukrainians towards the West. From independence to the EuroMaid-
an protests in 2014, the ruling class pursued a “dual-track” foreign policy, sometimes 
by playing Russia against the West. However, by the time President Yanukovych dealt 
with this question at the Vilnius Summit, Ukraine could no longer placate both its de-
sire to develop economic ties with the EU and maintain relations with Moscow. At 
this juncture Kyiv needed to make a clear choice. 
 Western countries pushed for opening Ukraine’s market. Using the Association 
Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement 
as tools, the EU raised Kyiv’s economic prospects but with specific requirements, 
aiming to strengthen the weak institutional structures that had long plagued its econ-
omy. The agreements address three core areas of integration, along with correspond-
ing reforms: 1) strengthening institutions to enforce  economic regulations, 2) priva-
tizing industries in order to allow competition, and 3) adopting sustainable fiscal and 
monetary policies. The requirements in both of these areas imply the weakening of the 
oligarkhiya and its undue influence over the policy process.  
 The goal of the DCFTA was to reduce import and export duties between the 
two economic zones to almost zero. Certain agricultural and industrial products were 
 Anders Aslund in: Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West (Yale University 384
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to receive some protection, but Ukraine agreed to reduce import tariffs by 99.1%; the 
EU reduced its tariffs by 98.1%.  Chapters two through fifteen, except chapter sev385 -
en, of the agreement outline the requirements and enforcement of standards. By al-
lowing Ukraine greater access to the EU market, Brussels demanded that Kyiv dis-
mantle monopolies in the heavy industry and energy sectors, while abiding by Eu-
ropean business practices. Chapter seven establishes rules for the movement of capi-
tal.  
Table. DCFTA Provisions
Source: European Commission, “EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area,” Europa 
(2016), 2. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/tradoc_150981.pdf. 
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 The final area, education and science, saw the West’s use of soft power as an 
instrument for shaping Ukraine’s longterm investment in its own economy. Increased 
access to Western academic institutions for researchers and students would expose 
participants to more diverse perspectives and prospects for the future. This comes at a 
critical time as countries   across the globe are still transitioning from a manufacturing 
economy to an information one. Policymakers in Kyiv are increasingly adopting 
Western education standards voluntarily.  
 This chapter begins by outlining the development of the Ukrainian economy 
from 1991 to 2014. I highlight the highly integrated nature of Ukrainian and Russian 
economic relations, foreign trade, finance, media, science and education. Energy poli-
tics is treated separately in Chapter IV because it represents both an economic and 
security issue for Ukraine and therefore deserves more detailed analysis. 
From Exuberance to Reality: Building an Independent Ukrainian Economy, 1991 to 
2014 
 After independence Ukraine, like many fellow post-Soviet states, saw its 
economy collapse. Moscow officials could no longer maintain budget deficits, which 
started around 1980, ballooning to $59 billion in 1988.  An inflexible economic sys386 -
tem could not innovate nor borrow large amounts from foreign creditors. The sus-
tained deficits over a ten year period, coupled with the drop in petroleum and natural 
gas prices that had buttressed the socialist welfare state, broke the Soviet economy.   387
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 The centrally planned system, upon which producers and consumers relied 
upon daily to make economic decisions, ceased to exist. Former Communist Party 
insiders quickly filled the vacuum where institutions once stood to guide commercial 
activities. Ukraine followed the example of the Russian Federation in privatizing its 
industries through what Western advisers, the most prominent being Jefferey Sachs, 
termed “shock therapy.”  Advocates of “shock therapy” reasoned that rapid privati388 -
zation of state industries, through stock sales to average citizens, would equitably di-
vide up firms. Despite policymakers intentions to reform the economy, liberalization 
did not provide immediate benefits to a majority of Ukrainians. Neither Ukraine nor 
Russia had experience with a market system, complicating the process of privatiza-
tion. Former nomenklatura members used their privileged positions in the government 
to buy up cheap shares of the countries largest industries from desperate workers, who 
were looking to turn a quick profit to survive in a collapsing economy. Between 1990 
and 1995 GDP decreased from $81.4 billion to $48.2 billion.  The economic hard389 -
ships forced households to adapt by working outside formal economic networks. A 
shadow economy emerged where production and consumption evaded government 
regulations and taxes.  390
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Figure 1. GDP in constant 2010 dollars. 
Source: Worldbank, “Ukraine.” https://data.worldbank.org/country/ukraine. 
Figure 2. GDP per capita, purchasing power parity in constant 2011 dollars. 
 Source: Worldbank, “Ukraine.” https://data.worldbank.org/country/ukraine. 
 As Steven Burg notes, Russia and Ukraine were unique in post-Communist 
Europe as the two countries that had the least experience with capitalism.  Econom391 -
ic planners had tightly controlled the agricultural and arms manufacturing sectors. In 
particular this would later invite massive corruption as weak policies and institutions 
 Burg, 182.391
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could not regulate business activity. Like the “crony capitalism” witnessed in Russia, 
a handful of political insiders exploited their positions during the economic transition 
in order to seize control of the country’s largest industries in manufacturing, mining, 
telecommunications, and energy. 
 After the Soviet collapse in 1991 Boris Yeltsin and his allies maintained the 
center of political power in Russia for almost a decade. Ukraine experienced two dif-
ferent executive administrations, first managed by Leonid Kravchuk from 1991 until 
1994, the second by Leonid Kuchma.  From 1991 to 2000 both countries witnessed 392
rapidly deteriorating economic conditions. Russia’s GDP declined from $800 billion 
in 1991 to $567 billion by 2000, while the Ukrainian GDP dropped from $125 billion 
to $59 billion in the same period.  As aggregate demand dropped precipitously, in393 -
comes shrank and unemployment rose (Figure 2 & 3).  The onset of the 2000s 394
would witness the recovery of Russia’s economy, primarily due to rising petroleum 
prices, but not Ukraine’s. 
 Meanwhile Kyiv struggled with rampant inflation. After forming its own Cen-
tral Bank in 1991 and printing its own currency in 1992 (karbovenets), the inflation 
rate hit 10,000% by 1993. To address hyperinflation, the National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU) issued a new currency in 1996 (gryvnia). The NBU did not institute any major 
reform policies concerning finance; rather the gryvnia simply truncated decimal 
points. The introduction of a new currency paid off as inflation slowed to 10% by 
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1997.  The grynia helped to curb hyperinflation but it did not address the underlying 395
economic problem: the state’s practice of printing too much money to pay for public 
programs.  Monetary and fiscal policies did little to mitigate the continuing decline 396
in economic output. Between 1991 and 1997, GDP decreased by 68%, while industri-
al output decreased by 52% and capital investment decreased by 72%.  Ukraine's 397
economic deterioration mirrored many of the developments in Russia. 
 In 1994 Kyiv indicated its desire to move closer to the EU in hopes of stimu-
lating trade. That year EU officials and Ukrainians signed the Partnership and Coop-
eration Agreement (PCA), which established a framework for promoting “…trade and 
investment and harmonious economic relations…a basis for mutually advantageous 
economic, social, financial, civil scientific technological and cultural cooperation, and 
to support Ukrainian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy 
and to complete the transition into a market economy.”  Although Ukrainian busi398 -
nesses continued to rely heavily on networks and markets in Russia, the Rada sent 
signals to Moscow that it was willing to move towards the West. 
 Despite efforts by some reformers to liberalize markets, policymakers ran into 
persistent problems implementing laws. Ukrainian oligarchs and semi-monopolistic 
industries wanted to maintain their privileged position. President Kuchma attempted 
 James Dean, “Ukraine: Europe’s Forgotten Economy,” Challenge, 43, 6 (2000): 105.395
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reforms by bringing budget deficits under control in 1994, stabilizing the currency, 
and privatizing more industries, which met with immediate opposition in the Rada.  399
Oligarchs, along with Russian officials, blocked progress in order to maintain their 
privileged positions within Ukraine. 
 Correcting fiscal imbalances required reforms involving both public spending 
and revenue streams. To cut spending and reduce the influence of civil servants who 
blocked the implementation of reforms, Kuchma laid off 20% of government employ-
ees in 1996.  On the revenue side, the central government’s greatest challenge rested 400
with increasing the tax base. Marginal rates were relatively high, but households and 
firms alike took advantage of an extensive number of exemptions, along with outright 
tax evasion, keeping roughly half of the economy from being taxed.  The govern401 -
ment did the economy a greater disservice by not adopting counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies. When the economy contracted by 3.2% in 1997, Kuchma instituted further 
spending cuts, reducing the deficit to 2.5% of GDP.  402
 One way President Kuchma addressed inflation was to target unsustainable 
wage increases. Policymakers in Kyiv often instituted price and wage controls, a 
legacy of the Soviet system, rather than focus on the underlying causes of inflation. 
Before the introduction of the gryvnya in 1996, Kuchma had pushed legislation to cap 
wages in order to slow inflation. Instead of enacting such laws, the Rada did the op-
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posite, raising the minimum wage, injecting another 600 trillion karbovanets into cir-
culation.   403
 After a fierce debate over privatization, officials approved exemptions for 
6,147 firms, protecting existing monopolies.  Another government action that un404 -
dermined privatization was the creation of financial-industrial groups (FIGs), which 
were meant to integrate firms and potential creditors, by having them collaborate with 
the respective state ministries.  These entities reinforced the the control of the oli405 -
garkhiya over business, exacerbating conflicts of interest between ministers and busi-
ness owners, and opening channels of influence for Russia. By 1997 “…the World 
Economic Forum ranked Ukraine 52d out of 53 countries in terms of overall competi-
tiveness.”  Steps toward integration with the EU meant  that business leaders would 406
be forced to open key sectors of the economy, notably metallurgy, mining, energy, and 
banking. 
 The Ukrainian economy would eventually hit a new low point in 2000. As the 
1997 Financial Crisis spread throughout Eastern Europe, GDP dropped from $50 bil-
lion to $31 billion by 2000.  This was the Ukrainian economy’s lowest annual GDP 407
since independence. The financial crisis stemmed from a collapse of the Thai curren-
cy. Until 1997 the Thai government had pegged its currency (the baht) to the US dol-
lar. As its sovereign debt increased and payments to service its foreign debt increased, 
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its central bank floated its currency. Slowly the financial crisis spread to Eurasia; 
Ukrainian officials, which borrowed heavily from Asian countries, raised interest rates 
and reserve requirements to stabilize the exchange rate of the gryvnya.  This move 408
allowed Ukraine to continue making payments on foreign debt, protecting its credit.  
 Ukraine’s slow, three-year recovery brought efforts to diversify its markets, 
both at home and abroad. In 1997 it had conducted roughly half its trade with CIS 
countries; the largest EU trading partner, Germany, only accounted for 3.8% of the 
Ukrainian export market.  The EU and Ukraine conducted two consecutive summits 409
in Kyiv (1997) then Vienna (1998), to strengthen commitments to integration. 
Ukraine declared its desire to become an associate of the EU at the latter of the two 
summits.  One former official who became a private consultant on economic issues, 410
claimed that the post financial crisis period provided impetus to increase ties with the 
EU. By 1998, not only had the general crisis hit Ukraine, a country once considered 
the breadbasket of Europe became a net food importer.  “Since 1998 you see the 411
competing integration forces,” Russia versus the EU, at work in Ukraine.  412
 Western actors chose to use public channels for credit and investment, such as 
the World Bank and IMF, as opposed to the Russian approach, which favored infor-
mal and private networks. During the 1990s Ukraine received the third largest aid 
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package from the US, valued at $166 million, in exchange for continuing economic 
reforms.  The oligarkhiya held a strong interest in maintaining business ties to Rus413 -
sia, since its economic livelihood relied on mirroring the Russian economic system.  414
First, Vadym Hetman, then Viktor Yushchenko, headed the NBU during the 1990s. In 
addition to stabilizing the currency, both worked to attract foreign investment, particu-
larly from the West. Though the policies were successful at first, eventually Western 
banks lost interest in the Ukrainian market in so far as they were barred from estab-
lishing branch banks; Russian investors enjoyed an easier permit process.  Oligarchs 415
pushed such policies in order to discourage European influence. During the first 
decade of independence, the personal relationships forged between the US and NBU 
staff helped modernize the economy. In contrast to other ministries, the NBU was not 
dominated by former Soviet officials and, therefore, policymakers there approached 
monetary policy with a far more liberal orientation.   416
 Western and Russian agents leveraged the Ukrainian banking sector hoping to 
influence Kyiv’s politics. The two sides employed different approaches to providing 
credit to private groups as well as to the government. Western institutions and in-
ternational financial institutions (IFIs) contributed a much larger proportion of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) than did Russian groups. For example, by 1994 the US ac-
counted for 22% of inflows while while Russia accounted only for 7%.  Despite the 417
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 Interview with Respondent 2, September 16, 2016.415
 Interview with Respondent 6, October 12, 2016.416
 Barbara Peitsch, “Investment in Ukraine,” The OECD Observer, Organization for Economic Coop417 -
eration and Development, Paris 204 (February/March 1997): 30-32.
 !  135
significant trade flow between Russia and Ukraine, especially in relation to energy 
products, relatively little capital passed between the two countries. This relationship 
gradually changed when Russian oligarchs began to funnel money to Ukraine through 
banks in Cyprus, using it as a tax haven.  418
 Another component of the Ukrainian economy concerned the effectiveness of 
the public school system’s need to produce a skilled workforce. Educational funding 
posed a major challenge to policymakers as deficits mounted during the 1990s. Al-
though teachers earned on average $30 per month, the average Ukrainian student out-
performed the average American student in the fields of math and science.  With 419
such little emphasis placed on education funding, politicians jeopardized the future of 
the country’s economic prosperity. 
 By 2000, the two countries’ economies had started to deviate from one anoth-
er. Russia’s new president, Vladimir Putin, consolidated his power, partially reigning 
in businesses to serve the needs of the state. Ukrainian oligarchs continued to confront 
Kuchma, promoting fissures to ensure a weak state. From 2001 to the global financial 
crisis of 2008, Ukraine’s economy boomed but the chief benefactors were the oli-
garchs, as they leveraged cheap Russian petroleum products to fuel their energy-in-
tensive industries.  420
 Vladimir Putin was elected President in 2000, after a short stint as acting pres-
ident following Yeltsin’s surprise resignation in 1999. The Russian economy slowly 
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began to recover after years of stagnation. From 2000 to 2010 its GDP rose from $567 
billion to $909 billion.  Putin consolidated power in Moscow by curbing the influ421 -
ence of oligarchs. A famous case involved the government takeover of energy giant 
Yukos in 2003. Prosecutors in Moscow charged the company’s leaders with tax eva-
sion, an effective tool for legally undercutting unfriendly business elites. After con-
victing Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, Putin nationalized the company, 
sending a signal to other oligarchs who might try to challenge Putin.  In retrospect, 422
2000 served as a turning point for the Russian economy. Ukraine experienced some 
recovery during the same period, but it was not as rapid as that seen in Russia. 
Ukrainian GDP increased from $59 billion in 2000 to $90 billion in 2010.  Despite 423
recessions, triggered by the 2008 financial crisis, their respective economies finished 
the decade with significantly higher levels of output. 
 At the outset of the new millennium, Leoind Kuchma had indicated a desire 
for greater integration with EU but the Orange Revolution of 2004 unraveled those 
plans. Towards the end of Kuchma period, officials at the NBU looked for ways to 
stimulate economic growth and integrate into the global economy, calling in experts 
from various IFIs. Officials at the IMF provided many recommendations to the 
Kuchma regime, but they were consistently rejected for political reasons.  Oligarchs 424
lobbied against structural reforms to maintain the existing order, despite receptive civ-
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il servants who generally favored IMF proposals. The Orange Revolution and the 
election of Viktor Yushchenko reoriented the financial sector. Whereas before 2004 
the banking sector had been closed to foreign competition, President Yushchenko 
opened the financial sector to more competition and foreign investments, particularly 
vis-a-vis Europe and Russia. Officials at the NBU welcomed foreign investment, but 
observed that the participating Russian banks were still state or partially state-
owned.  This allowed the Kremlin to invest in various strategic initiatives, involving 425
defense contractors, infrastructure, and the energy sector.  
 Not all sectors were open for business, however. One civil servant, who had 
worked with EU members to find areas for growth, understood that certain markets, 
including energy, mining, metallurgy, and chemicals, were “off-limits” to foreign 
competition.  The high expectations among Western businesses regarding potential426 -
ly lucrative investments gradually declined once many firms ran into issues with bu-
reaucratic procedures and an unfamiliar environment. Kyiv struggled to enact reforms 
that mirrored Western standards for open competition. The greatest obstacle to attract-
ing new trade and investment was the weak rule of law. European companies feared 
that the government would institute ad hoc regulatory changes, diminishing the re-
turns on their business operations after firms had already invested capital.   427
 Yushchenko moved to intensify ties with Western governments more aggres-
sively than his predecessors had. On January 13, 2005, the European Parliament voted 
to recognize that Ukraine had made progress towards human rights and democratiza-
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 Interview with Respondent 8, October 25, 2016.426
 Interview with Respondent 8, October 25, 2016.427
 !  138
tion.  Though such pronouncements remained symbolic, the new President wel428 -
comed these EU overtures. Ukraine’s dual-track policy in the economic realm began 
to break-down, however, as Yushchenko pushed for closer ties with the West. 
 Once Yushchenko pushed for reforms in 2004, foreign investment increased 
rapidly. Net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP increased from 1.8 in 2003 to 5.2% 
in 2007.  Kyiv also pursued liberalizing policies to meet the requirements for WTO 429
accession in 2008.  Once the 2008 financial crisis hit the IMF began imposing new 430
“good standards,” but the financial industry resisted due to the “vested interests of 
oligarchs.”  The NBU’s reliance on fixed exchange rates since 1991 not only insu431 -
lated the economy but also invited corruption from the ruling politicians. Elected offi-
cials had no incentive to adopt liberal reforms that would allow the market to deter-
mine the price of the gryvnya. From 2009 to 2014 “the bank [NBU] behaved as a fi-
nancial agency of the family,”  referring to President Yanukovych and his clan. 432
NBU Governor Igor Sorkin was “a part of the family” and acted as a “personal fi-
nancier for the president.”  433
 Following Yushchenko’s friendly relations with the EU and US, President 
Yanukovych, advocating a pro-Russian foreign policy, reverted to closer ties with 
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Russia. The overall trade picture affirmed the strong link between the Ukrainian and 
Russian economies. As of 2011, Ukraine ranked fourth as an importer of Russian 
merchandise, primarily energy products; it was the third biggest exporter to Russia.  434
That same year the WTO reported that Russia was the largest importer and exporter of 
merchandise to Ukraine.  Reliance on Russia proved a serious obstacle to liberaliz435 -
ing and integrating with Western economies. 
Figure 4. Top Five Trading Partners by Market Share: 2000 - 2010. 
Source: “Ukraine Trade Statistics,” World Integrated Trade System (WITS). http://wits.worldbank.org/
CountryProfile/en/UKR. 
 Russian investors captured more of the financial market through intermedi-
aries, especially banks based in Cyprus. By the end of 2011, capital flows from 
Cyprus accounted for $14.5 billion in investment, 28% of all inflows to Ukraine dat-
2000 2005 2010
Country Exports 
(% share)
Imports 
(% share)
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Russia 23.96 41.65 21.88 35.55 26.12 36.55
Turkey 5.96 — 5.92 — 5.88 —
US 4.92 — — — — —
Germany 4.87 7.66 3.75 9.36 — 7.58
Italy 4.42 — 5.54 — 4.69 —
Turmenist
an
— 6.78 — 7.41 — —
Belarus — 4.31 — — 3.69 4.23
France — 3.56 — — — —
Poland — — 2.95 3.89 3.48 4.59
China — — — 5.01 — 7.74
 World Trade Organization, “Trade Profile: Russian Federation.” 434
 World Trade Organization, “Trade Profile: Ukraine.” 435
 !  140
ing back to 1991; many analysts acknowledge that Cypriot banks acted as middlemen 
for foreign investors.  Many were likely Russian, but prior to 2013 there were no 436
accurate data for the Cypriot banking sector. Direct Russian funding totaled $3.6 bil-
lion over the same period.  It is difficult to determine which sectors of the economy 437
Russian investors were targeting, in so far as the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 
by law, does not publish the official numbers. Officials also do not publish data on the 
agricultural, mining, chemical, and electricity sectors.   438
 In 2012, members of the Rada sought to regulate the banking sector along 
Western European lines. One MP (elected that year) who served on the Committee of 
Finance Policy and Banking helped to draft legislation to develop an e-commerce sys-
tem, similar to that of EU members.  Despite Russian business interests and 439
Yanukovych’s friendly attitude towards Moscow, the push against further Russian in-
tegration continued. MPs knew the future of Ukraine’s economy would lie in Western 
integration, motivating them to adopt European standards sooner rather than later. 
 President Yanukovych made it a point to hire many Russians citizens and 
business leaders with Russian ties for his administration.  Because oligarchs and 440
politicians on both sides of the border benefited from Moscow’s privileged position, 
they had less incentive to listen to growing discontent among the citizenry. Pursuing 
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contradictory approaches, Yanukovych proceeded with closer EU ties, attending the 
Vilnius Summit in summer 2013 to sign the AA. Oligarchs became nervous about the 
potential costs of the AA and DCFTA to their business interests.  Competition from 441
the West could threaten their quasi-monopolies.   
 As the date of signing approached, Putin threatened to halt trade with Ukraine 
if Yanukovych followed through with the EU agreement.  On August 14, 2013, 442
Russian Customs began stopping shipments from Ukraine, which unexpectedly re-
versed course and refused to sign the AA, catching policymakers off guard.  The 443
dual-track foreign policy approach could no longer work as the interests of citizens 
and oligarchs clashed, setting the stage for civil unrest and the demise of the 
Yanukovych regime. 
Ukrainian Economic Policymaking from 2014 to 2016 
 Heading the post-EuroMaidan government, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk signed 
the AA on 21 March 2014, then the newly elected President Poroshenko signed the 
DCFTA on 27 June 2014.  This shift set Kyiv on a clearer foreign policy path, to444 -
wards Western countries and away from Moscow. Closer association with the EU be-
came easier when policymakers were freed from the faulty assumption that Ukraine 
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could pursue closer ties with the West and Russia simultaneously.  Meeting the 445
terms of the agreements with the EU still proved difficult. The DCFTA required not 
only policy and institutional changes but also a “change in culture,” normalizing free 
market principles throughout the state bureaucracy.  The following sections address 446
three broad areas of economic policy—trade, finance, media, and education—examin-
ing the ways in which each is influenced by foreign actors. 
Shifting Trade Preferences 
 Russia relies on Ukraine as a large consumer market for its goods. The Krem-
lin knew  that the AA would mean “military and political influence would be lost for 
Russia,” through its economic lever.  After Poroshenko had signed the agreement, 447
Russia invaded Crimea, signaling to Kyiv that it would not concede its leading trading 
position easily. Despite its intervention and support for the separatists in Donbas, the 
ties between the two economies remained strong. In 2015 Russia was still Ukraine’s 
top trading partner, consuming 12.66% of its exported goods and providing 19.9% of 
its imports.  448
 Policymakers in Kyiv and Moscow also cut many personal ties. Ukrainian of-
ficials felt that Russia was acting like an “imperial” power, reminiscent of the Soviet 
past.  Once officials on both sides realized that they could not maintain their previ449 -
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ous arrangement, discussions over repairing trade relations ceased. The Kremlin be-
gan harassing Russian policymakers and academics representing a “pro-Ukrainian” 
viewpoint to pressure them into silence.  Despite its significant trade interests in 450
Ukraine, Moscow lost influence over the  actual trade arrangements. 
 Ukraine struggled to find new export markets for its goods. Despite closer re-
lations with the EU, Western Europe still had a limited demand for its goods, except 
agricultural products, in finished materials like metals and chemicals due to competi-
tion from higher quality brands.  In 2015 Italy was its largest EU import partner, but 451
the value of Ukrainian goods amounted to merely 5% of its entire export market.  452
EU requirements also weighed  heavily on policymakers. As one MP stated: “We 
want business partners, not parents.”  Until Ukraine enforced the DCFTA, policy453 -
makers and oligarchs had little reason to change their economic policies. Western in-
fluence not only promised another export market but a force for liberal reforms. 
 Liberalization remained a major obstacle to increasing trade with the EU after 
the DCFTA signing. The communist legacy and the slow pace of reform had compli-
cated cultural perceptions of basic market principles. One persistent problem was the 
concept of personal ownership.  When Western institutions pushed for privatization, 454
the rapid dismantling of the Soviet system and an immediate concentration of wealth 
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among a small group of oligarchs distorted public perceptions of capitalism. The EU 
attempted to further integrate Ukraine into a wider European economy while changing 
mass opinion on free market economics. 
Finance and Banking 
 The post-EuroMaidan era also ushered in a wave of finance reforms. Facing 
the prospect of sovereign debt default, complications from a fixed currency, and re-
cession, the NBU governor, Stepan Kubiv, became “a crisis manager.”  From 2013 455
to 2015 the debt to GDP ratio ballooned from 37% to 70% while the economy con-
tracted a further 16% from 2014 to 2016.  As the government struggled to pay its 456
bills, it moved to secure more loans from IFIs, to stimulate economic growth. With 
heavy backing from Western countries, the IMF offered a $300 billion loan but also 
set financial reform requirements, with the EU and US embassies monitoring en-
forcement.  One requirement creditors imposed was the adoption of a floating cur457 -
rency. The value of the gryvnia inflated, exchanging on foreign currency markets at 
8.2 per US dollar at the beginning of 2014, then spiking up to 28 per US dollar in 
February 2015.  Foreign currency reserves decreased rapidly but the NBU stopped 458
behaving as a “private bank for the treasury.”  Although the ensuing inflation 459
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strained an already weak economy, Kyiv had made an important move to integrate 
into the Western financial system. 
Figure 5.  Sovereign Asset Reserves: 2012 - 2016. 
Source: National Bank of Ukraine, “International Reserves,” https://bank.gov.ua/control/en/publish/
category?cat_id=7693073. 
 Western countries sent technical experts to advise the implementation of fi-
nancial reforms. Poland and Sweden, in particular, provided guidance to the NBU; 
officials had no further contact with Russian representatives.  This mode of Western 460
influence was to ensure proper enforcement of loan conditions through a form of soft 
power, i.e., establishing personal relations between officials. Policymakers in both the 
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Rada and the executive branch sought advice from the EU Commission and perma-
nent EU mission in Kyiv (EU Delegation).  461
 As of 2014 European private banks renewed their efforts to invest in the 
Ukrainian economy. Although Russian money funneled through Cyprus remained the 
largest source of FDI, accounting for 30%, the second largest contributor was Ger-
many, at 12%, followed by the Netherlands at 11%, and then Russia at 6%.  The 462
banking sector faced many challenges, but EU businesses saw potential for growth. 
Ukraine’s policies concerning the financial sector became more “friendly” towards 
the EU, turning away from Russian capital.  By forcing more transparency and re463 -
ducing the stake that other Russian industries had in Ukraine, regulators provided FDI 
incentives to the West. The NBU worked quickly in “cleaning up the banking system, 
especially better auditing and addressing solvency,” in order to implement “best prac-
tices” from Western institutions.  464
 Western countries gained major leverage in the financial realm, given its ca-
pacity to freeze the financial assets of individuals. American intelligence agencies and 
the US Treasury Department worked with their Ukrainian counterparts to freeze the 
offshore accounts of corrupt officials.  For example, Between 2014 and 2016 the US 465
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froze $820 million in assets from Ukraine’s richest oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov.  Oli466 -
garchs and politicians found it harder to embezzle funds or to commit fraud by hiding 
their assets abroad. This instrument also provides the US a potential way of influenc-
ing future officials who may seek to revert course on reforms.  467
The Media Sector 
 The Soviet collapse did not bring a definitive end to all ideological struggles; 
instead it introduced a new type of ideological struggle in Ukraine. People no longer 
debated the merits of communism versus capitalism but rather authoritarianism versus 
democracy. Once exposed to competitive elections, the Ukrainian Communist Party 
faded from existence; it attained 86 of 450 seats in the Rada in 1994 but held no seats 
by 2014.  The focus of political decision-making shifted to the oligarkhiya. 468
 As reformers in Ukraine struggled to build democratic institutions, elites used 
their control of the media to further their own interests. Television remains the prima-
ry source of news for Ukrainians: 82% reported watching within the last thirty days, 
much higher than any other source.  The five main television channels are all owned 469
by oligarchs, who hold major business interests in other sectors. These channels in-
clude 1+1, Inter, 5 Kanal, ICT and STB.  Domination of the media landscape by a 470
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small group allows for the possibility of distorted information based upon material 
interests. In particular, Moscow used this avenue to propagate its message. Although 
Russian produced media are now banned in Ukraine, some illegally watch it and 
Ukrainian television stations are sometimes used to broadcast a pro-Russian message. 
 The Kremlin utilizes the Russian language to exert soft power. Although the 
role of language was a matter of debate concerning policy, its use as an official lan-
guage and support for Russian in education, it is used as a path of influence in public 
discourse. Moscow taps into the shared Slavic history of the two countries to compete 
with the Western narrative. Though difficult to measure, Russia’s “public diplomacy” 
initiatives before 2014 were marginally effective, bolstering Moscow’s position in 
Eastern Ukraine.   471
 Russia targets diaspora populations like those in Donbas, promoting the Russ-
ian language and culture, but in ways that severely limits its appeal to outside 
groups.  Media outlets portray the EU and US interfering with Kyiv’s affairs, sug472 -
gesting that the EuroMaidan protests were actually an elaborate regime change opera-
tion engineered by Western capitals.  
 One key difference between the Russian and Western narratives is that West-
ern countries promote democratic and free market values that a growing number of 
Ukrainians embrace. As Anders Aslund contends, personal freedom and economic 
freedom share a positive relationship in post-Soviet countries, Ukraine being an out-
 Valentina Feklyunina. “Soft Power and Identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian world(s)’,” Eu471 -
ropean Journal of International Relations 22, 4 (2016).   
 Thomas Just, “Promoting Russia Abroad: Russia's Post-Cold War National Identity and Public 472
Diplomacy,” The Journal of International Communication 22, 1 (2016). 
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lier with relative political rights yet little market freedom.  Liberal values of the 473
West directly challenge the geopolitical history of the post-Soviet space. Encouraging 
the development of democratic institutions and privatizing the Ukrainian economy 
undermines the Kremlin’s privileged position in influencing the policy process. 
Adopting a “coercive” approach, which uses military force, Moscow hoped to force 
Ukrainians back into its sphere of influence.  At the heart of this debate lies the 474
question as to whether Ukraine’s future is headed towards economic and political lib-
eralism or stuck on its traditional path. Countries like the US also use soft power as a 
vehicle for promoting liberal values, not simply culture itself. 
 Not only do Russian media sources spread misinformation, they also influence 
public opinion in more subtle ways. They cast doubt on true events, equate the prob-
lems of the current government with those of past governments, and suggest that 
Ukraine’s future is not part of an expandable game but only a zero-sum.  One prom475 -
inent example of how Russian produced media distorted debate about the war itself 
entailed the initial denial that Russian troops had invaded Crimea. Eventually the 
Russian government admitted its involvement but Western countries and organiza-
tions hesitated to respond. Some Ukrainian policymakers criticized the West for its 
delayed reaction, but this was precisely due to information gathering and 
 Aslund, “The Three Regions of the Old Soviet Bloc,” 90. 473
 Victoria Hudson, “‘Forced to Friendship'? Russian (Mis-)Understandings of Soft Power and the 474
Implications for Audience Attraction in Ukraine,” Politics 35, 3-4 (2015): 330.
 Alexander Sergunin and Leonid Karabeshkin, “Understanding Russia’s Soft Power Strategy,” Poli475 -
tics 35 (2015): 347–363.  
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verification.   Because Western countries wanted to accurately understand the 476
events, their reaction was slow. 
 Russian language affects discourse as a medium of exchange, not necessarily 
as policy itself. One respondent noted, half of Ukrainian army speaks Russian, when 
“modern Ukraine is based on territory, not ethnicity.”  Ukrainians increasingly iden477 -
tify themselves as a multicultural society, with multiple languages. Post-EuroMaidan 
language policies are primarily concerned with the location of media production, not 
the language itself.  478
 The Russian government uses broadcast news outlets and the Internet as pri-
mary vehicles for shaping public opinion. In contrast to previous conflicts in the 
1990s, during which the Yeltsin regime allowed almost unfettered media coverage, 
Putin had tightened control over the press to manipulate war information by 2008.  479
During previous conflicts, military officials had difficulty filtering information to the 
media, but by the tome of the Russo-Georgian War agents had learned how to use 
media to convey Russian’s as heroes. Studies show that Russian citizens who watch 
state-controlled media, overwhelming support the party of Vladimir Putin, United 
 Interview with Respondent 27, 30 September 2016.476
 Oleksii Haran, “The political consequences of Euromaidan.” Panel Discussion at National Univer477 -
sity Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kyiv (20 October 2016).
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 Thomas, “The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five-Day War in South Osse479 -
tia,” 32.
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Russia.  During the Soviet period Russian television and music aided 480
Russification.   481
 The Kremlin hoped to recreate the propaganda machine in Ukraine during and 
after the EuroMaidan protests. Although the Ukrainian government has banned Russ-
ian produced media since 2014, Russian news sources still possess considerable influ-
ence. As one policy  analyst observed, Russian speaking media are still popular, 
chiefly due to the wealth of Russian entertainment.  Ukrainian audiences typically 482
relied on Russian movies and television series,  leaving Ukrainian-speaking media 
struggling to compete. Policymakers also suspect that Ukrainian oligarchs opposing 
Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk and later Groysman, used funds from Russia to undermine the 
post-Maidan governments.  
 Some of the largest media outlets produced in Ukraine are owned by oligarchs 
who propagate pro-Russian views.  funded by Russian agents. These include the 483
newspaper Today (Sevodnya), which has the largest circulation, and popular television 
channels like Vesti and Inter.  Vesti, for example, often labeled the EuroMaidan pro484 -
testers “rebels.”  Inter, which is partly owned by pro-Russian oligarch Dmytro Fir485 -
tash and some Russian citizens, typically promotes pro-Russian discourse and the 
 Regina Smyth and Sarah Oates, “Mind the Gaps: Media Use and Mass Action in Russia,” Europe-480
Asia Studies 67, 2 (2015).
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Opposition Bloc in the Rada.  A common strategy used by these news outlets is not 486
to overtly propagate Moscow’s agenda, but rather to distract the Ukrainian public with 
“scandals” concerning politicians and to equate the current government with past 
governments that were arguably more corrupt and more subject to foreign influence. 
One prominent example involves media outlets unfriendly to EuroOptimists revealing 
the luxury apartments of current members of the Rada or exposing how slowly the 
bureaucracy still operates.  Such scandals ignore larger corruption problems in the 487
country attributed to oligarchs, as well as the progress made by the new government. 
 Another avenue for influence includes the Internet. Reformers traditionally 
saw increased access to information as a tool to promote democratization. Putin real-
ized the utility of web-based news in furthering Russia’s agenda, regardless of any 
liberal ideals.  Although Kyiv blocked Russian produced broadcast media, Ukraini488 -
ans can still access Russian news sites via the Internet.  This is a growing problem 489
as Internet news becomes more popular. By 2014 roughly half of Ukrainians were re-
ceiving their news from websites, overtaking radio and print platforms.  Devoid of 490
journalistic ethics and editorial scrutiny, websites can easily publish misinformation 
with an agenda. A common tactic of pro-Russian sites includes using “bots” (ap-
plications that automatically produce web content without human direction) to dis-
 Interview with Respondent 9 on 27 October 2016, 27 on 30 September 2016, and 5 on 29 Sep486 -
tember 2016.
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seminate information, in order to embarrass pro-Ukrainian, pro-Western and pro-re-
form politicians.   491
 Russian media are particularly skillful at targeting specific groups already cyn-
ical about Ukraine’s current situation and anti-Western rhetoric. These groups include 
the older generation which identifies with the Soviet past, vulnerable groups like the 
disabled and elderly who have lost government benefits over time, and, finally, ethnic 
Russians who reside primarily in Donbas.  As long as media outlets pursue a narra492 -
tive stressing deteriorating conditions and Western support for a weaker, more corrupt 
Ukraine, then the Kremlin can continue to drive a wedge between a progressive and 
regressive-minded society, regardless of the metrics.  
 Another Kremlin strategy, typical of post-Soviet regimes, centers on terroriz-
ing journalists who are critical of the Kremlin. The most famous case after EuroMaid-
an occurred on July 20, 2016 with the assassination of Belarusian-Russian journalist 
Pavel Sheremet, in exile in Kyiv, who was critical of Putin and the ruling class in 
Russia.  After he fled to Ukraine, the Kremlin wanted to make an example of him, 493
not only murdering him but ensuring that he was executed on Kyiv’s busiest street, 
vulitsya Khreshchatik. As one journalist relayed to me, the Sheremet incident was a 
warning to Russian journalists who have moved to Ukraine, of whom she knows 
many.  494
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 The Kremlin manipulates discourse in other, more subtle ways. One example 
includes confusing the public about reform policies in order to fragment Ukrainian 
society. In an attempt to democratize the political system, Ukraine has implemented 
policies to decentralize power, giving more authority to oblast and local governments. 
Separatist sympathizers have misappropriated this concept to suggest that Donbas 
should receive more autonomy.  Moscow wants a more autonomous Donbas in the 495
hopes that it will continue to disrupt Ukraine’s political progress. 
 The injection of misinformation and manipulative frames has also infected 
personal relationships between Russians and Ukrainians. A key vehicle for distribut-
ing misinformation  includes social media, where anyone with access to the Internet 
can perpetuate false claims.  The narrative of Russian media has so greatly distorted 496
facts that once close friends and family on both sides of the border can no longer 
speak to one another. One of my interviewees reported having tried to have a conver-
sation with a close friend from Russia, who claimed with certainty that President 
Poroshenko was using US contractors like Blackwater to fight in Donbas, a complete-
ly unsubstantiated claim.  By spreading misinformation and specifically targeting 497
the US, Russian media hopes to strike fear into the Ukrainians public that Americans 
are actually invading the country, not Russian troops. Another respondent has family 
members from Russia, but they can no longer talk about politics, especially about 
 Interview with Respondent 28, 5 October 2016.495
 Ulises Mejias and Nikolai Vokuev, “Disinformation and the Media: The Case of Russia and 496
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President Putin. Typically their Russian counterparts end discussions with statements 
like: “but you don't understand Russia,” or “not everything you hear is true.”  Rus498 -
sians who often visited Ukraine before the war now rarely do. Ukrainians now have 
different perceptions of Russians.  499
 Another popular frame that Moscow uses is that “Ukraine is a nonexistent ac-
tor.”  Russian media engage in historical revisionism, claiming that Ukraine is not 500
really a country with its own history and culture. By delegitimizing Ukraine as a na-
tion-state, the Kremlin undermines Kyiv’s  contemporary territorial claims. 
 Russia’s assertion that Ukraine is not a real country also complicates the narra-
tive concerning Russo-Ukrainian relations. While the Kremlin exerts soft power pro-
moting their common cultural roots, it simultaneously dismisses Ukrainian culture as 
fake or weak.  This frame is effective but illogical in that it extolls the virtue of soli501 -
darity while insisting on Kyiv’s subservience to Moscow.   
 The information war’s most debilitating side effect is insurmountable cyni-
cism. Media outlets have spread so much misinformation that few people trust the 
news. Without the ability to agree on certain facts, public discourse deteriorates. Ana-
lysts studying political events do not get news from mainstream sources like televi-
 Interview with Respondent 17, 27 September 2016.498
 Interview with Respondent 17, 27 September 2016.499
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sion or newspapers, rather many turn to websites.  As one of my interviewees said, 502
“no one trusts any media.”  503
 The Russian Orthodox Church also manipulates debate by ostensibly promot-
ing peace, with a popular slogan used by the Opposition Bloc: “End the War, let’s 
have peace!”  The intention is to convince people that the costs of war are too great, 504
in order to extract a favorable resolution for Moscow. The Kremlin sees a prolonged 
frozen conflict as a victory because it weakens the popularity of pro-Western policy-
makers in Kyiv, slows further integration with the EU, and bars Ukraine from any 
possible NATO membership. 
 Kyiv immediately implemented measures to combat Moscow’s information 
war. After  EuroMaidan, the country shifted to building a nationalist, reform, anti-
Russian and pro-Western movement.  Although the Orange Revolution forced 505
Ukrainian policymakers to reconsider their close relationship to Russia, it did not fun-
damentally change Kyiv’s foreign policy approach. After the invasion of Crimea and 
Donbas, however, Ukrainians reevaluated the costs of Moscow’s influence. Consider-
ing Belarus’ close relationship to the Kremlin, along with Transnistria, Ukrainians 
suddenly felt themselves surrounded by a 6,000 kilometer threat-zone, radically alter-
ing public discourse.   506
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 To fight a war on the fake news front, Ukrainian policymakers created their 
own Ministry of Information.  Its mission is to expose unreliable sources and correct 507
misinformation. One tool the government uses is a post-Maidan law that can revoke 
permits for broadcast television and radio stations, for employing “anti-Ukrainian 
speech.” There are freedom of the press implications inherent in the law, but the gov-
ernment had not revoked any major permits by 2016.  Private organizations are do508 -
ing most of the heavy lifting, however.  
 Ukrainian media outlets, journalists and civil society groups are starting their 
own networks to combat misinformation. Ukrainian audio media are becoming more 
popular. One internet-based outlet, “The Public” (Gromadskye), began covering the 
events during and after Maidan in November 2013 with articles and livestream 
video.  The majority of its funds come from public and private donors in the 509
West.  Media outlets like this do not rely on the oligarchy or on the hidden agendas 510
of politicians who are allied with one of the powerful oligarchs. 
 One organization, StopFake, developed as a result of the overwhelming flood 
of false news stories. University students and faculty started StopFake to serve as a 
fact checking resources for media consumers.  Many journalists, both freelance and 511
those affiliated with new agencies, began contributing to StopFake articles. One orga-
nization member went to meetings with EU representatives to explain the importance 
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of the information war in Ukraine and to elaborate on how Russian media manipulate 
the news.  By countering false news reports and coordinating with Western organi512 -
zations, NGOs hoped to mitigate Russian soft power effects. In the words of one re-
spondent: “Media, civil society, and NGOs hold back rolling into a communist sys-
tem, and international funding helps.”  513
 The information war has produced positive results for the Ukrainian govern-
ment. In polls from 2016 measuring Ukrainians’ trust in the news, only 3% trust Russ-
ian media sources, while 62% trust Ukrainian outlets.  As a result, Ukrainians now 514
rely on Ukrainian produced media far more than on Russian news. By 2016 80% re-
ceived news from Ukrainian television, and 52% used Ukrainian websites, versus 5% 
and 10%, respectively, taken from Russian outlets.  Ukrainians also prefer to con515 -
sume Ukrainian language news. Lack of money still constrains organizations that de-
sire to produce Ukrainian language media.  Another factor includes organizations 516
not wanting to appear to suppress the Russian language. If outlets completely elimi-
nate Russian speaking programs, then critics might label them “Nazis,” a term with 
tremendous negative connotation in light of Ukraine’s WWII experiences.  517
 This is not to say that all Ukrainian media are accurate. As one experienced 
journalist relayed, there is pressure within Ukraine to report on current events more 
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positively. For example, officials blocked a journalist covering a story about prisons 
in Kharkiv, run by the Ministry of Defense, stating that her coverage was 
“unpatriotic.”  When her colleagues began covering President Poroshenko’s possi518 -
ble involvement in the now infamous “Panama Papers” scandal, government officials 
pressured journalists not to release the story in order to protect the war effort (“slava-
ukrainia”).  Other media outlets practice “self-regulation” not showing certain 519
shows or films that appear anti-Ukrainian.  520
 Sometimes the Ukrainian government uses media reports to further its own 
agenda. For example, officials strategically select certain information from OSCE 
monitoring reports to paint separatists as the ones always starting skirmishes in Don-
bas.  Though both sides initiate conflict in the cease-fire zone, Kyiv always blames 521
the Russian-supported rebels.  
 Another factor complicating the media landscape involves competing domes-
tic forces that vie for power, regardless of foreign influence. For example, people in 
President Poroshenko’s camp target members of other political parties. Surrogates of 
Poroshenko leak information to the media to discredit potential threats to his adminis-
tration.  The misinformation and competing interests produce a complex, confusing 522
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media environment. As one political consultant explained, he cannot rely on media for 
his analysis, but speaks directly to key players.  523
 The Western influence on the information war includes both direct interven-
tion as a source for countering misinformation and indirect, supporting Ukrainian me-
dia outlets. Before the EuroMaidan, protests Western media displayed very little in-
terest in Ukraine but by the Vilnius Summit many EU-based outlets started covering 
events in Kyiv.  The ensuing protests in Kyiv sparked attention from Western media. 524
One of my contacts helped Western journalists who were arriving daily to cover the 
rapidly escalating situation.  Western media outlets highlighted the Russian invasion 525
of Crimea.  
 After Moscow seized Crimea, American and European organizations shifted 
their focus to the Donbas conflict. The Kremlin could no longer steer a distorted nar-
rative in the face of competing Ukrainian and Western reporting. Traditional outlets 
like the New York Times and the Washington Post sent reporters, as did the growing 
internet-based outlets. While the traditional outlets sent only one reporter each, web-
sites like Buzzfeed and Mashable were sending four journalists.  Their reporting 526
provided critical information to policymakers and the public alike about the state of 
the war, while Ukrainian news organizations scrambled to cope with the unexpected 
invasion. 
Education and the Academy 
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 The EuroMaidan protests highlighted the ways in which the education and sci-
entific landscape needed reform. Anders Aslund sees the education of elites abroad, in 
liberal democracies, as an antidote to the slow pace of reforms.  Scholars, particular527 -
ly in the social sciences and humanities, began shifting their focus from economic to 
political issues, like the “occupation of Ukraine,” and strengthening “civil society.”  528
During the Yanukovych years, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concentrated 
on the “modernization” of the educational system and improving the economy, with 
little regard for social issues. Russian and Ukrainian businesses wanted a well-skilled 
workforce to power their respective industries, but they neglected the importance of 
research related to civics.  Under the influence of Soviet policies, academic institu529 -
tions had emphasized the natural sciences in education, to the detriment of social sci-
ence education. 
 A major obstacle to reform remains the slow pace at which senior academics 
adopt newer methods. After years of neglect during due to political upheaval, policy-
makers are realizing the importance of focusing resources on education for sustained 
economic growth.  Curricular and administrative decisions remain highly central530 -
ized; some older academics possess privileged positions, despite their lack of re-
search. The “current system benefits certain people but is not results-based.”  Many 531
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 Interview with Respondent 3, September 19, 2016.528
 Interview with Respondent 3, September 19, 2016.529
 Sutela, “The Underachiever: Ukraine's Economy Since 1991.” 530
 Interview with Respondent 3, September 19, 2016; Ararat L. Osipian, “Corruption and Reform in 531
Higher Education in Ukraine,” Canadian and International Education / Education canadienne et inter-
nationale, 38, 2, Article 8 (2009). 
 !  162
of the “old guard” remained in prominent positions without the desire to change poli-
cies. To institute reforms mirroring the EU educational system, the new government 
appointed a 97 year-old chemist, Boris Yegenovich Paton. Though a well-respected 
academic in his field, he was not considered a champion of progressive policies.  532
Strict labor law makes firing scholars difficult, leading one respondent to state: 
“There needs to be a revolution of management.”   533
 Ukrainian scholars, active collaboration with Russian academics has also dra-
matically decreased. Though not completely banned, the Ukrainian Ministry of Edu-
cation and Science discourages collaboration with Russia.  The war has forced many 534
scholars to reevaluate their relationships with their Russian counterparts. Some are 
worried about Russian institutions possibly manipulating research, or working with a 
former “boss,” alluding to Moscow’s attitude during and after the Soviet period.  535
 The academic community is slowly moving toward intensified relations with 
the West. Before 2014 the government had already sought a more “European” system 
based on Bologna criteria, but the events of that year accelerated closer relations.  536
Ukrainian scholars acknowledge that the higher level of corruption in Russia versus 
Western countries.  The number of students studying abroad has steadily increased, 537
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with the two largest recipient countries being Poland and Germany.  Educations in 538
the West are growing in popularity, and more scholars and students read academic lit-
erature in Western European languages, particularly English.  In addition to these 539
ties to many EU member states, the US remains an influential foreign actor due to its 
investments in “down-to-Earth” and “practical” research projects, like the Fulbright 
Program.  Ukrainian academics are gravitating towards more research collaboration 540
with Western institutions. President Poroshenko codified this by mandating that pro-
fessors pursue foreign research at Western institutions.  This is not to say that West541 -
ern influence is always welcome. Some older professors resent the new standards and 
“want to avoid scrutiny that comes with the Western system.”  542
 Policy think tanks have received a boost from Western support. One particular 
group, CEDOS, which analyzes educational issues and publishes policy reports, relies 
almost exclusively on EU and US donors, including the Charles Mott Foundation, the 
National Endowment for Democracy, and funding from the governments of Sweden, 
Latvia, the US and the Czech Republic.  Yanukovych’s staff often ignored the rec543 -
ommendations of such think tanks. After IFIs and Western states provided Ukraine 
much needed funding, the government was forced to take NGOs more seriously.  544
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Along with the hard power of aid to the Ukrainian government, Western soft power 
rests with encouraging more students and teachers to seek educational opportunities in 
Europe, rather than in the traditional post-Soviet countries. The number of Ukrainian 
students studying abroad jumped from 27,000 in 2009 to almost 60,000 in 2015, with 
almost all the growth attributed Western institutions.  545
 The greatest foreign influence on educational policy comes in the form of pol-
icymakers’ exposure to Western curricula. Many of my respondents had pursued edu-
cations abroad before taking on public policy roles. Ten of 31 had received degrees 
from Western institutions. Three MPs also reported working constantly with col-
leagues who attended universities in EU states or in North America. These degrees 
made them attractive for recruitment into politics.  The same group would have 546
been limited to fraternal-socialist countries during the Soviet period; expanded educa-
tional opportunities leads to more diverse perspectives within the decision-making 
process.  
Conclusion 
 Since 1991 Moscow has employed a mercantilist approach to economic for-
eign affairs, to leverage informal networks and business interests forged during the 
Soviet era. Russia has tried to steer Ukraine’s economy away from the rest of Europe, 
using instruments, which relied on outside “channels.”  547
 Slobodian and Stadny, “Ukrainian Students Abroad: How Many and Why?”545
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 Interview with Respondent 31, November 7, 2016, Interview with Respondent 20, October 5, 2016 547
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 The EU and US, by contrast, used explicit policies and institutional reforms to 
open Ukrainian markets by requiring liberalization and reforming the finance sector. 
Another area, not explicitly addressed in either the AA or DCFTA but vital to 
Ukraine’s longterm economic prosperity, concerns increased educational and scientif-
ic connections. Western hard instruments included requirements laid out in the AA 
and DCFTA and conditionality of loans to service sovereign debt. Influencing educa-
tional institutions entailed a soft power approach. For some policymakers, EU “pres-
sure” is welcome.  548
 Major reforms after 2014 provided hope for better economic conditions. Many 
obstacles remain, however: The oligarchs still resist liberalization and opening their 
respective industries to European competition.  The flip side of international compe549 -
tition is the need to stimulate demand for Ukrainian goods. Demand growth would 
likely boost employment prospects for Ukrainians.  Policymakers moreover have to 550
consider the increasing “demographic trap.” Currently there is no strategy for dealing 
with the growing number of pensioners and a decreasing number of workers.  551
 The post-Maidan government made decisive moves towards normalizing the 
finance sector, starting with Central Bank reforms in 2014. From this point on, the 
gryvnia became a floating currency, requiring officials to focus more on stabilizing its 
value. The NBU started adopting European standards and restricting the influence of 
Russian money, flowing primarily through Cypriot banks. The West influenced this 
 Interview with Respondent 14, September 16, 2016.548
 Interview with Respondent 14, September 16, 2016.549
 Interview with Respondent 14, September 16, 2016.550
 Interview with Respondent 2, September 16, 2016.551
 !  166
process by offering critical lines of credit, mandating requirements, and by advising 
bankers on European standards, to allow for better integration of the financial system. 
The US pushed for loans through the IMF with specific conditions, which acted as 
one prominent vehicle for these reforms.  552
 The largest, sustained effort for building a sustainable, independent economy 
lies with educational investment. Though often the least discussed sector, policymak-
ers must appreciate the value of education and research programs. The soft power 
wielded by Western institutions through exchange programs for students and faculty 
offers new development prospects for Ukrainians.  Many problems remain, such as 553
the resistance to reforms stemming from the older generation (stariya administrat-
siya) and the centralization of decision-making (poryadok gosudarstva). 
 Despite weakening Russian hegemony and support from Western institutions, 
Ukrainians are still struggling to rebuild their economy. With decreasing output, con-
tinued inflation, and mounting debts, many ask: “Where is the light at the end of the 
tunnel?”  Securing a prosperous economic future is the key to making political 554
progress. It is arguably the main reason for the dramatic shift in foreign policy, begin-
ning with the protests of 2013-2014. Average Ukrainians claim that they have not 
seen “much change since the Yanukovych period; “They do “not just  want rhetoric 
but real changes in the way of life.”  Kyiv’s greatest roadblock to attaining political 555
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 Interview with Respondent 8, October 25, 2016.554
 Interview with Respondent 31, November 7, 2016.555
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and economic sovereignty remains Ukraine’s energy independence, discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter IV - Ukraine’s Achilles Heel: The Energy Sector 
 Energy is an essential resource for any nation-state, preferably attained from 
domestic and a diverse array of sources. Since independence this has continued to be 
the most vulnerable element of Ukraine’s sovereignty. In 1987 the Ukrainian SSR had 
been the second largest producer of energy within the USSR, generating power from 
the three known sources of fossil fuels at the time: oil, natural gas, and coal. The 
country produced 192 million tons of coal, 3.56 billion cubic meters of natural gas, 
and 110,000 barrels of oil a day.  By 1991, however, Ukraine had become heavily 556
dependent on foreign energy sources, primarily in the form of oil and natural gas from 
Russia. Realizing its outsized stake in Ukraine’s energy sector,  Moscow leveraged its 
position by extracting political favors in exchange for lucrative contracts. 
 The Kremlin employed this position as a form of economic hard power, rooted 
in a  new mercantilist approach. Scholars such as Jefferey Mankoff and Adnan Vatan-
sever have postulated that Russia’s aggressive foreign policy is the result of a desire 
to protect core economic sectors, especially energy. Mankoff posits that the Kremlin 
has a major interest in protecting the energy sector from competition as Putin brought 
much of this industry under state control, during his his tenure as president.  Vatan557 -
sever contends that Russia’s desire to expand their energy exports to new markets is a 
major driver of their larger foreign policy strategy, which is to stimulate its economy 
 The Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Energy Data - Resource Handbook,” Washington DC 556
(May 1990): 5, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000292332.pdf. 
 Jefferey Mankoff, "Russian Foreign Policy and the United States After Putin,” Problems of Post-557
Communism 55, 4, (2008): 47.
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through energy profits.  The case of Ukraine is unique in some regards as the coun558 -
try is highly dependent on imports from Russia and the domestic energy sector is 
characterized as a monopoly run by oligarchs. Margarita Balmaceda observed the 
ways in which Ukraine’s dependency on Russian energy products has had a direct in-
fluence on domestic issues, such as the agreement over the Black Sea Fleet in Sev-
astopol.  Anders Aslund claims that energy, along with metallurgy and mining, is 559
one of the most closed markets in Ukraine, dominated by oligarchs with little compe-
tition.  560
 There is a fundamental difference, however, between the mercantilism criti-
cized by Adam Smith in 1776 and Russia’s post-socialist economic policies of today. 
Smith’s explanation of mercantilism in the eighteenth century described the harvest-
ing of natural resources from colonies to feed the emerging industries of Europe, 
while forcing colonies to buy manufactured products from the “homeland” by impos-
ing a ban on foreign trade.  The Kremlin attempted to impose a similar ban on for561 -
eign trade in Ukraine, without claiming direct control over the country through a new 
mercantilism.  
 By losing business ties to Ukraine’s energy firms, through loyal oligarchs, 
Moscow risks losing a major consumer market, a thorough fare to other markets in 
southern Europe, and a lever to influencing Ukrainian elites. For example, in 2007 
 Adnan Vatansever, “Russia’s Oil Exports: Economic Rationale versus Strategic Gains,”  Carnegie 558
Papers 116, (December 2012): 1.
 Margarita Balmaceda, “Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The 559
Case of Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 2 (March, 1998): 260.
 Aslund,“Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration,” 65.560
 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 481.561
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Russia provided the majority of natural gas needs of Slovakia (98%), Bulgaria (92%), 
the Czech Republic (77%), and Ukraine (66%).  Western countries are promoting 562
Ukrainian energy independence through efficiency and diversification, in order to re-
duce Russian influence and the prospect of deepening conflict on the continent, along 
with protecting their own energy security which relies heavily on Russia. 
 This chapter outlines the history of economic relations between Ukraine, the 
EU and Russia through two time periods: from independence to the Orange Revolu-
tion, then from the Orange Revolution to the EuroMaidan protests. After describing 
relevant events from 1991 to 2014, I focus on economic relationships, surrounding 
energy from 2014 to 2016. Finally I conclude with some thoughts about Ukraine’s 
future, regarding its economic situation and relations with the West. 
Maintaining the Soviet Networks: Ukrainian Energy Relations from 1991 - 2004 
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian elites set about the dif-
ficult task of restructuring the economy. As detailed in the previous chapter, citizens 
experienced the brunt of a hyper-inflating currency, high unemployment, laborers 
working without pay, budget shortfalls, and the loss of a protected market within the 
former USSR. Moscow continued to run the energy market in its Near Abroad to elicit 
favorable political and economic relations. 
 Infrastructure proved another major hurdle for developing Ukrainian energy 
independence. Under the Soviet system, the network of oil and natural gas pipelines, 
rail and truck routes had run from extraction sites in Russia to, and through Ukraine, 
 Commission of the European Communities, “Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 562
Council concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC,” 
Commission Staff Working Document (July 16, 2009): 63-76, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2009:0978:FIN:EN:PDF. 
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supplying fellow Soviet and Warsaw Pact states. The most extensive network of Russ-
ian owned pipelines runs through Ukraine. Downline countries include Moldova, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, Italy. and Germany (See 
Figure 1). To protect these vital markets, leaders in the Kremlin employed a mercan-
tilist approach to economic foreign affairs. 
Figure 1. Russian Oil Pipeline Routes in Europe 
!  
Source: BBC, “Russia: Key Facts,” British Broadcasting Corporation. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/
spl/hi/guides/456900/456974/html/nn4page1.stm. 
  
 Another lever the Kremlin used involves the nuclear energy industry. Ukraine 
is almost completely dependent on Russia for uranium.  In 2016 this sector account563 -
 Interview with Respondent 19, 7 October 2016.563
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ed for 23% of the nation’s energy consumption, operating 15 reactors.  These nu564 -
clear plants rely on foreign uranium deposits to maintain its operations.  
 Ukrainian leaders struggled to build an independent, market-based economy. 
The newly “independent” economy faced many challenges, beginning with the need 
to privatize  a former state-owned and operated system that controlled all means of 
production and distribution; they also had to address rampant corruption. The oli-
garkhiya undermined both sets of reforms. From 1991 to 2014 the ruling class pur-
sued a “dual-track” foreign policy, sometimes benefitting greatly from playing Russia 
against the West; by the time President Yanukovych dealt with this question at the 
Vilnius Summit, Ukraine could no longer maintain this approach. 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent economic decline, 
Yeltsin shifted Moscow’s policy focus away from maintaining its Cold War military 
dominance to seeking new economic opportunities. Writing in 1997, Nikolai Petro 
and Alvin Rubinstein posited that Russian officials began to realize the utility of oil in 
influencing Near Abroad states.   Since the military could no longer be relied upon 565
to influence foreign governments, natural resources had to be deployed to achieve 
such goals. Between 1998 and 2007, energy exports accounted for a growing share of 
total Russian exports, from 37% to 61%.  566
 Ukraine attempted to establish an independent energy strategy, by diversifying 
its sources and moving closer to the EU. In 1994 officials signed the Partnership and 
 U.S. Energy Information Agency, “Ukraine,” Analysis (January 1, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/beta/564
international/analysis.cfm?iso=UKR. 
 Petro and Rubinstein, Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State, 113.565
 Oliker,  Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications, 48.566
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Cooperation Agreement (PCA), establishing a more liberal trade regime between the 
two entities based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a 
timetable for establishing a free trade area.  However, officials in the Kremlin had 567
different plans for Ukraine. An economic analyst providing advice to the Ukrainian 
government at the time noted,  “It was understood that we [Ukraine] would not take 
unilateral steps” towards economic integration with the EU.  Russian policymakers 568
closely watched any move Ukraine made towards Western economies. 
 The Kuchma government worked to reform the energy sector by modernizing 
and privatizing the system. The government had long provided subsidies for coal min-
ing and coal  energy plants to oligarchs.  In 1996, on the recommendation of the 569
IMF and World Bank, his government began reforming the coal industry by cutting 
state subsidies, shutting down coal power plants mainly located in the East.  This 570
move put miners out of work and triggered resentment in the Donbas region for liber-
alization policies.  Ensuing unemployment in eastern Ukraine formed  one of the 571
main tenets of the platform for the Party of the Regions (Partiya Regionov), which 
promised to put miners back to work. 
 As Russian officials began reevaluating their strategy, Ukrainian domestic pol-
itics opened the government to Russian exploitation. In 1995 Kuchma oversaw the 
 “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus 567
and Central Asia,” EUR-Lex, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/october/tradoc_111612.pdf. 
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 Aslund, “Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration,” 65.569
 Vitalii Atanasov, “Undermined: how the state is selling out Ukraine’s coal workers,” openDemoc570 -
racy (December 19, 2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/vitalii-atanasov/faded-glory-
ukraines-miners. 
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selling of state-owned oil and gas industries, which granted a monopoly to a few 
firms, chief among them EuralTransGas (ETG), RusUkrEnergo, and OstChem, form-
ing what scholars called the “Gas Lobby.”  Ukraine’s lack of regulatory structure 572
encouraged massive corruption within the petroleum sector.  As Yuriy M. Shcherbak, 
Ukrainian Ambassador to the US under Kuchma, reported in 1997, the Rada voted 
against privatizing the energy sector, allowing only a few market actors to control the 
oil industry.  The oil and natural gas industries also derive rents from the govern573 -
ment in the form of subsidies, which Anders Aslund contends leads directly to corrup-
tion.  One prominent case of corruption involved the sitting Prime Minister in 1997, 574
Pavlo Lazarenko, who illegally secured a monopoly over gas-import firms, which led 
to a Rada investigation and his resignation that year.  575
 In 1997, Ukraine began the application process for admission to NATO. Poli-
cymakers saw Russia as a growing threat to its security and desired the benefits of 
closer military ties with the West. A permanent NATO liaison post opened in Kyiv.  576
This move sent a signal to the Kremlin that Ukrainian leaders were willing to 
strengthen their security interests with Western countries, to the detriment of Russia. 
 Whitmore, “Political Party Development in Ukraine,” 4; Pleines, “Oligarchs and Politics in 572
Ukraine,” 112.
 Newal Agnihotri, “Ukraine: Industry and Economy,”  Presidents and Prime Ministers, 6, 6 (1997): 573
14.
 Aslund, “Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration,” 64-65.574
 Balmaceda, “Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of 575
Ukraine,” 274.
 Gerald Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate: 1990-1997, The Center for Strategic and In576 -
ternational Studies (1998): 120.
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 By 1998 Ukraine enacted the PCA, implementing comprehensive reforms in-
tended to lead to closer economic relations with the EU. Such tighter relations repre-
sented a threat to Russian interests as Moscow shifted its focus to economic influence. 
From 1996 to 2000, fuel exports accounted for 39-50% of Russia’s exported mer-
chandise.  Putin recognized the significance of using energy exports as a lever 577
against countries that relied on these products. 
 The 1998 financial crisis proved to be a defining moment in Russia’s abrupt 
shift towards energy diplomacy. Maxime Larive and Roger Kanet contend that con-
temporary Russian foreign policy originated at this critical moment: Russia, realizing 
its marginalized position, reintroduced “hard power” into its foreign policy 
calculus.   An economic recession during a period of general economic decline, 578
forced Russian leaders to search for new material advantages. Their main resources 
were petroleum and natural gas. In November 1998, the Duma approved a new eco-
nomic initiative that granted Moscow almost complete discretion in intervening into 
the activities of firms, especially large corporations, deemed in the national interest.  579
This laid the foundation for the eventual re-nationalization of certain businesses, par-
ticularly in the energy sector. These policy developments coincided with a rise in oil 
prices (West Texas Intermediate, inflation adjusted) from a low of $17.62 in No-
vember 1998 to $48.06 in November 2000.  580
 The World Bank, “Russian Federation,” Data. https://data.worldbank.org/country/russian-federa577 -
tion. 
 Larive and Kanet, “The Return to Europe and the Rise of EU-Russian Ideological Differences,” 578
130.
 White, Russia’s New Politics, 139.579
 Macrotrends, “Crude Oil Prices: 70 Year Historical Chart,” http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/580
crude-oil-price-history-chart.  
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 An economic analyst who had advised Ukrainian policymakers recalled how 
his Russian counterparts espoused “going to Europe together.”  If Ukraine were go581 -
ing to build closer economic ties to the EU, then Moscow expected to join negotia-
tions as another party, moving towards Brussels at the same pace. Jefferey Mankoff 
echoes this sentiment as he contends Putin was fairly accommodating to Western 
countries during his first two terms as President, because he saw friendly relations 
with the US, EU and NATO as vital to Russia’s security.  The Kremlin, however, 582
would slowly see possible EU and NATO expansion as more of a threat. 
 Russia’s move to steer the Ukrainian economy for its own political purposes 
and economic growth coincided with the latter’s declining productivity during the 
1990s. American economist James Dean reports that from 1991 to 1999, Ukrainian 
GDP declined by 60%, amounting to only $600 per capita.  Lacking large crude oil 583
or natural gas reserves, Ukrainians found themselves at the mercy of Russian re-
sources to fuel their economy. By 1999 Ukraine was importing 40% of its petroleum, 
with Russia representing the largest supplier.   584
 Ukrainian oligarchs played a crucial role in sustaining Russian control. Dean 
notes that these oligarchs, much like those in Russia, exerted considerable influence 
and thwarted progressive efforts to modernizing the energy sector. One oligarch, Igor 
Bakai, summarized the path of elites to power in 2000: "All rich people in Ukraine 
 Interview with Respondent 31, 7 November 2016.581
 Mankoff, “Russian Foreign Policy and the United States After Putin,” 42-44.582
 Dean, “Ukraine: Europe’s Forgotten Economy,”  Challenge 43, 6 (2000), 93.583
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made their money on Russian gas."  The Kremlin’s strategy was to sell natural gas 585
at below market prices to Ukrainian firms, which had a monopoly, allowing oligarchs 
to derive vast profits.  Despite growing Russian influence and increasing demand 586
for natural gas by the close of 2000, Ukraine failed to ratify the CIS agreement it had 
originally signed in 1991, illustrating leaders’ conflicted approach.  Ukrainians de587 -
sired cheap energy sources but consistently rejected attempts to formally reintegrate 
with Russia in a political or economic pact. 
 The NATO accession process appeared stalled at the turn of the millennium. 
Despite President Kuchma’s appeals to NATO, little progress was made in negotia-
tions between 1997 and 2000. As Ukraine consistently failed to meet political and 
economic reform requirements, Western capitals hesitated to move forward with the 
membership process.   Membership talks would not be renewed until the President 588
Viktor Yuschenko took office in 2004.  
 Although it is difficult to provide evidence that private companies directly ex-
erted influence on Russian and Ukrainian officials, there is one clear instance stem-
ming from 2003: then chief executive of United Energy Systems, Anatoliy Chubais, 
urged Moscow to undertake an “economic occupation” of adjacent countries like 
Ukraine to exert influence.   This period coincided with President Putin’s consolida589 -
 Dean, “Ukraine: Europe’s Forgotten Economy,” 106.585
 Aslund,“Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration,” 64.586
 Remarks from Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Volodymyr Ohryzko, “Ukraine to Analyze Expediency 587
of Taking Part in CIS Projects,” (August 19, 2008),  http://www.unian.info/news/268085-ukraine-to-
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 D’Anieri, “Ukrainian Foreign Policy from Independence to Inertia,” 449.588
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tion of power, using the energy industry. Recalling the chaos that Russia had experi-
enced in the 1990s, Putin began taking over private companies for state use. In 2003 
he ordered the seizure of one of the largest petroleum companies, Yukos, while oil 
prices were booming.  Putin secured massive revenues for the state in taking over 590
private energy enterprises; he also diminished the influence of the oligarch class. Ed-
ward Lucas contends in his work on the rise of Vladimir Putin that the new President's 
background as an intelligence officer (Komitet Gosudarstvinoy Bezopastnosti - KGB) 
gave him the ability to consolidate power far more effectively than Boris Yeltsin had 
done.  The state now had a reliable form of revenue, as well as a leader who was 591
seen protecting the nation's interest from corrupt business elites. Oil prices continued 
to rise to $56.71 by December 2004, helping to boost Russian revenues.  592
 Russia gradually increased its production of natural gas after declining since 
the end of the Cold War.  Russia’s energy industry is not just one sector of the econ593 -
omy that the government would prefer to protect; it is also a sector that it ultimately 
wants to own, to use as a reliable source of revenue for state-building. By 2003 the 
value of fuel exports represented 55% of all exports for the Russian Federation.  
 Sakwa in Political Economy of Russia, 77.590
 Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West (Palgrave, MacMil591 -
lian, 2009): 17.
 Macrotrends, “Crude Oil Prices - 70 Year Historical Chart,” http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/592
crude-oil-price-history-chart. 
 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Statistics,” http://www.eia.gov/593
cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?
tid=3&pid=26&aid=1&cid=RS,&syid=1992&eyid=2012&unit=BCF 
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Figure 2. Portion of Fuel Exports of Total Exports 
Source: World Bank, “Russia Economic Report: The Long Journey Recovery,” 35 (April 2016), 55. 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/481881460390188506/rer35-ENG.pdf. 
  
 Meanwhile, Ukrainian policymakers took steps toward greater economic inte-
gration with Western Europe. The EU developed a basic policy framework to institu-
tionalize economic relations and promote integration, articulated in the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2003.  As Ukrainian officials dealt with an increas594 -
ingly complex foreign relations picture, a major presidential election neared, ending 
the Kuchma era and starting a new period in Ukraine’s politics. 
From Revolution to Revolution: 2004-2014 
 By 2004  Russia’s export petroleum trade was booming.  Crude oil production, 
for example, increased almost a third between 1995 and 2004 (Figure 3). Ukraine’s 
geographic position remained crucial to Russia’s export-led economy. Oil production 
had rapidly increased in Russia by 2004; major oil and natural gas pipelines running 
 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations,” (6 De594 -
cember 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview_en 
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through Ukraine allowed these resources to quickly enter the European market. As 
Figure 1 indicates, Russia relied on natural gas pipelines to link its production areas 
with Western Europe and the Balkans. Ukraine had done little since 1991 to change 
the energy infrastructure, in order to diversify its source portfolio as oligarchs derived 
profits from rents, providing no incentive to alter the sector.  595
Figure 3. Russia’s Crude Oil Production. 
Source: Energy Information Agency, “Russia is World’s Largest Producer of Crude Oil and Lease 
Condensate,” Washington DC (August 6, 2015). https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?
id=22392.  
 As Ukrainian reliance on Russia continued, President Yushchenko laid the 
foundation for an energy infrastructure integration with the EU. As a corollary to the 
Eastern Partnership, the two sides signed the Energy Strategy in 2005 to mirror EU 
energy regulations, especially to promote a competitive market and efficiency.  This 596
“business plan” supplied the groundwork for closer energy relations with the EU but 
also contained projections like building 20 more nuclear reactors, which never mate-
 Aslund,“Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration.”; Balmaceda, “Gas, Oil and the Link595 -
ages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine.” 
 European Commission, “Implementation of the EU-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding on 596
Energy Cooperation during 2012,” Seventh Joint EU-Ukraine Report (2012), https://ec.europa.eu/ener-
gy/sites/ener/files/documents/20130225_mou_progress_report7_en.pdf. 
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rialized in Ukraine.  Despite the efforts by Yushchenko, Ukraine could not wean it597 -
self off Russian oil and natural gas imports. 
 Meanwhile the EU took further steps to welcome Ukraine as a partner. On 
February 21, 2005 officials from both sides signed the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, fur-
thering steps to link the two economies by reducing barriers to trade and adopting Eu-
ropean regulations for competitiveness and transparency.  Ukrainians saw this 598
agreement as a step towards more concrete economic integration with Europe. The 
Action Plan states that implementing key provisions amounts to “…joint efforts to-
wards an EU-Ukraine Free Trade Area….”  In 2006 Russia temporarily shut off nat599 -
ural gas supplies to Ukraine, claiming that its decision to cut the flow of gas involved 
a disagreement over prices.  Not only did Russia provide the lion’s share of 600
Ukraine’s energy demands but it enticed politicians in Kyiv to pursue more favorable 
foreign relations by promising lower prices. By 2008 Ukrainians were paying less 
than half of the average Western European for natural gas.   601
 After resolving the various gas disputes and agreeing on a new gas import 
contract, Yushchenko moved again towards the EU. In 2009 the two sides, along with 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova, finalized the Eastern Partner-
ship (EaP) agreement, which specifically addressed transportation and mobility be-
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tween the EU and EaP members.  The initial enthusiasm for increasing indepen602 -
dence from Russia after the Orange Revolution faded once the Kremlin made increas-
ing use of its energy resources as a weapon against Yushchenko’s Western tilt. 
 Conflict with Moscow coincided with more political turmoil at home. 
Yushchenko consistently clashed with Prime Minister Yulia Tymosheko over policy 
differences and the pace of reforms. One respondent who had worked closely with the 
two leaders held that Yushchenko and Tymoshenko could never agree on how to inte-
grate with the EU. He contends that Putin used his connections with energy oligarchs, 
eventually cutting deals with Tymoshenko to extract greater profits from the Ukrain-
ian market.  By 2010 Tymoshenko eventually competed against Yushchenko’s party, 603
Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraiina), for Rada seats, increasing seats for her own party, Fa-
therland (Batkivschyna).  604
 Prime Minster Putin’s strategy called for maintaining control over the inter-
mediaries of the energy industry in Ukraine, specifically Naftogaz, a state-owned 
firm, and RosUkrEnergo, a private firm importing natural gas. The Kremlin pushed 
for a domestic middle-man in Ukraine, namely Dymtro Firtash who owned RosUkr-
Energo; he threatened to cut supplies if Ukraine cut Putin out of the energy sector 
(post-skhema robota).  President Yushchenko sought assurances from the US and 605
the EU of an emergency meeting if Russia were to cut supplies. When one of my in-
 European Commission, “Mobility and Transport: Eastern Partnership,” (16 March 2016), http://602
ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/international/european_neighbourhood_policy/eastern_partnership_en  
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terviewees met with the US Ambassador to work on a contingency plan, the American 
official simply said: “Welcome to the corruption club.”  Russian officials chose Fir606 -
tash to act as an intermediary agent, to control policy decisions regarding energy.  607
Another discussion partner noted, “Firtash was a nobody before taking control of 
RosNeftGaz,” but rose to prominence with the help of Russian agents.  Such agents 608
played important role for the Kremlin’s agenda in Ukraine by protecting their energy 
interests. 
 Meanwhile Russia’s growing stranglehold on petroleum and natural gas in the 
Ukrainian energy sector prevented political dissent. As the price of oil and natural gas 
recovered after the 2008 financial crisis, Russia saw increasing gains in revenue. As 
Figure 4 illustrates, by 2011 the value of oil recovered to $20 per British Thermal 
Units (BTU). As money flooded the energy market, oligarchs in both countries bene-
fitted greatly and sought to maintain their respective monopolies. 
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Figure 4. Global Energy Prices in USD per BTU. 
Source: World Bank, “Russia Economic Report: The Long Journey to Recovery,” 35 (April 2016), 14. 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/481881460390188506/rer35-ENG.pdf. 
 Throughout the 2000s, petroleum continued to provide a large portion of Mos-
cow’s state revenues. Figure 5 shows that from 2008 to 2013, revenues from oil sales 
consisted of roughly half of total receipts. Losing the dependence of other countries 
posed a threat to the Kremlin’s fiscal policy. 
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Figure 5. Russian Sources of State Revenue as a Percent of GDP. 
  
Source: World Bank, “Russia Economic Report: The Long Journey to Recovery,” 35 (April 2016), 26. 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/481881460390188506/rer35-ENG.pdf. 
  
 Eventually, the truce between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko collapsed over 
disputes concerning reform in the energy sector. By 2010 Ukrainian confidence in 
Yushchenko waned and another presidential election pushed the country back towards 
Russian influence. This time Viktor Yanukovych won the 2010 election with his new 
ally, Yulia Tymoshenko.  One of the President’s first orders of business concerned 609
the Khakiv Accords. This agreement between Russia and Ukraine extended the lease 
of the Russian port at Sevastopol in Crimea, as long as Kyiv did not pursue NATO 
membership and finalized a new five-year gas contract for imported oil and gas.  610
 The uneasy alliance between the two leaders deteriorated as Putin again ap-
plied pressure to keep both from siding with the EU. Putin personally brokered a deal 
with Tymoshenko, skimming money from the oil and gas trade, then cutting-out 
 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Ukraine: Timeline.”609
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Yanukovych, driving a wedge into the policymaking process.  Putin used a “divide 611
and conquer” strategy against noncommittal Ukrainian officials who resisted his in-
fluence. When an official asked Putin to identify his best partner in Ukraine, he 
named Yulia Tymoshenko, not President Yanukovych.  612
 Under Yanukovych’s leadership, oligarchs continued to consolidate their 
wealth, as rewarded by the scandals surrounding former Energy Minister, Yuriy 
Boyko. Boyko was a member of the Gas Lobby and used the Party of the Regions, 
after 2014 the Opposition Bloc, to maintain influence in the Rada.  One journalist 613
who investigated his purchase of oil platforms in the Black Sea reported that he resold 
them for a profit of $250 million.  No prosecutor was willing to investigate this 614
deal; in 2014 Boyko became an MP in the Rada, untouched by the controversy. Be-
tween 2010 and 2013 Transperancy International consistently ranked Ukraine in the 
top quarter percentile of corrupt countries: its ranking fluctuated between 144th and 
134th of 183 countries ranked.  615
 Ongoing overtures towards Brussels coincided with Ukraine’s declining share 
of Russia’s export market. In 2004 Ukraine imported almost 6% of all exported mer-
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 Interview with Respondent 6, 12 October 2016.612
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chandise, but by 2013 that number shrunk to just under 3%.  The Ukrainian market 616
continued to slip away from Russia, representing a threat to its oil and gas revenues. 
 A lack of transparency in the Ukrainian energy market allowed large scale cor-
ruption and influence from Russia.  One founder of an energy think tank addressed 617
issues not discussed in the media, in hopes of helping the government to develop a 
more sustainable energy plan. He wanted to promote public dialogue as a more “open 
process and to make government accountable.”  Under Yanukovych, the govern618 -
ment refused to cooperate with his organization in gathering data and listening to con-
cerns from energy experts. His most effective tool in pressuring the government in-
volved public rhetoric trying “to become a beacon,” for average citizens and to raise 
awareness of complicated energy issues.  619
 President Yanukovuch generally ignored civil society groups and NGOs, 
though foreign institutions, Western embassies, and private individuals supported 
these associations.  For example, George Soros had helped to fund my respondent’s 
think tank, and foreign governments sought his personal advice in formulating 
Ukrainian energy policy.  Support from foreign individuals and governments some620 -
times hampered his group’s attempts at advocacy. Public officials became suspicious 
 World Trade Organization, “Trade Profile: Russian Federation,” World Integrated Trade Solution 616
(WITS), https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/RUS/StartYear/2004/EndYear/2013/
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2006), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepubli-
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 Interview with Respondent 22, 19 October 2016.618
 Interview with Respondent 22, 19 October 2016.619
 Interview with Respondent 22, 19 October 2016.620
 !  188
of his think tank’s activities, labeling progressive NGOs as “foreign agents,” further 
alienating them from the policymaking community.  621
 Russian institutions and agents likewise marginalized my respondent’s interac-
tions with the policymaking process. Before the EuroMaidan protests his organization 
had rarely interacted with Russian produced media or Russian officials.  This hin622 -
dered Ukrainian’s awareness of energy issues since many consumed their news from 
Russian sources. My interviewee described cases of “experts” trying to provide analy-
sis to his organization and “representatives” offering to buy his organization. He sus-
pects they were funded by the Kremlin and Russian energy companies.  623
Yanukovuch’s energy policies raised red flags in the lead up to the EuroMaidan 
protests. He maintained a corrupt energy market, lacking transparency and likely 
skimmed money directly from the energy trade.  According to this individual: 624
“Yanukovych was completely corrupt.”  625
 Another NGO representative discussed the difficulties his group had in inter-
acting with the government, especially regarding renewable energy sources. His civil 
society group promotes environmentally conscious energy policies. He recalled how 
in 2010 Ukraine joined with the EU and a group of other post-communist countries to 
develop an “Energy Community,” establishing common regulations and a better 
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transport system.  The group’s key focus centered on price and consumption stabi626 -
lization until the protests in 2013 stalled talks.  After 2014 their focus shifted to de627 -
veloping more diverse import sources, to render Europe less reliant on Russian 
sources. 
 Under President Yanukovych, oligarchs with stakes in the energy field settled 
into an informal power sharing agreement with the government. Yanukovych and Ri-
nat Akhmetov controlled coal supplies, while Dmytro Firtash acquired a large portion 
of the natural gas market; Igor Kolomoisky moreover captured the oil sector.  With 628
the lion’s share of the energy industry in the hands of a few people, the Rada lacked 
the ability to shape policy effectively on its own. While oligarchs consolidated their 
power in Ukraine, President Yanukovych began signaling his willingness to open 
markets towards Europe and the US. Kremlin officials had reason for alarm when he 
began negotiating Western energy deals. Yanukovych established fracking agreements 
with Shell and Chevron in 2013.  These agreements directly challenged Moscow’s 629
privileged position in Ukraine’s natural gas market.  
 Ukrainian-Russian relations came to a head at the end of 2013 again, over EU 
affiliation. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), negotiated from 
2007 to 2011 came up for ratification in Ukraine. On November 21, 2013, 
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Yanukovych and his party decided to postpone signing the trade agreement.  Months 630
of protest followed, resulting in the eventual overthrow of Yanukovych and a tempo-
rary government committed to advancing EU integration. Acting President Oleksandr 
Turchynov declared that the new government intended to continue along the path to-
wards EU partnership.  Fearful of losing its economic hold on Ukraine and a wider 631
consumer market for its petroleum products, Russia invaded Crimea on 28 February 
2014, then supported a separatist movement in Donbas. 
Addressing the Achille’s Heel: 2014 - 2016 
 After the invasion of Ukraine, policymakers in Kyiv abruptly reversed course 
again. In March 2014 the Yatsenyuk government signed the AA; in June newly elect-
ed President Poroshenko signed the DCFTA. These policies dealt a severe blow to 
Moscow’s foreign policy strategy by forcing transparency and competitiveness in the 
Ukrainian market. Russian business networks formed a critical pathway of influence 
by using legacy contacts from the Soviet period and benefiting from opaque decision-
making processes.  The Kremlin’s break with Kyiv came at the worst time just as 632
petroleum prices soared, cutting into potential Russian oil revenues. In February 2014 
oil stood at $100.12 per barrel, leaving Russia with a missed opportunity to secure 
profits from high fuel prices.  Fuel exports are important for the Russian economy 633
 The Guardian, “Ukraine suspends talks on EU trade pact as Putin wins tug of war,” (21 November 630
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact 
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in that they not only represent a large portion of its total export market, but also be-
cause the oil and gas industry provides revenues directly to the Kremlin. In 2014 oil 
revenues as a portion of total revenues represented over half of the state budget, 14 
trillion rubles, of which 7.4 trillion came from oil.  Losing export markets for its 634
petroleum products poses a direct threat to Moscow’s fiscal policies. 
 Ukrainian policymakers in the energy arena took advantage of another win-
dow of opportunity. As one political consultant noted, “If you don’t solve the energy 
problem, then there is no reform.”  Ukrainian officials acknowledged the lack of 635
institutional capacity within the civil service and, with the urging of Western govern-
ments, began relying more heavily on NGOs to work around an inflexible bureaucra-
cy.  Whereas the Yanukovych administration had identified such groups as “hostile 636
elements,” the new government welcomed outside advice, even if various think tanks 
were receiving funds from foreign donors like the United States Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID) and the European Commission.  Western institu637 -
tions began to provide technical expertise to NGOs and encouraged organizations to 
coordinate among stakeholders in order to ensure that policies “abided by the norms 
of European legislation.”  The EU and various private actors helped to develop en638 -
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ergy independence in Ukraine by using civil society organizations as a tool to monitor 
reform measures. 
 The way in which Ukrainian think tanks influence policy is similar to interest 
group methods in Western democratic countries. As non-profits, they publicly advo-
cate for certain policies to achieve transparency. One representative noted that his or-
ganization is a member of a public working group with the Ministry of Energy, which 
would have been inconceivable during the Yanukovych years; they discuss issues 
items like publishing accurate data and gas tariffs.  If the Ukrainian government ig639 -
nores certain conditions required by either the AA or DCFTA, working group mem-
bers frequently address such deficiencies to the EU, threatening to defund aid pro-
grams and withholding loan tranches. 
 Another respondent who deals with environmental issues described his group 
has access to the policy process after EuroMaidan. He had communicated with gov-
ernment officials, particularly at media events.  Ukrainian policymakers recognized 640
the need to ensure accountability, not only to the public but also to Western institu-
tions that had funded initiatives under the AA and DCFTA. This interviewee’s organi-
zation receives money from various organizations to include the EU Commission and 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).  The EU not only funds civil 641
society groups such as his but also applies pressure directly, by threatening to with-
hold aid. The AA and DCFTA require the state to ensure competitive markets in ener-
gy as well as “unbundling” the production, distribution, and sale of energy 
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products.  After Yanukovych left power, Western institutions increased support for 642
Ukrainian NGOs to enforce liberalization. 
 Speaking to an MP, I learned more about other ways in which foreign institu-
tions and agents influence elected officials. This parliamentarian, who served on the 
energy committee in the Rada, was a member of President Poroshenko’s Party (Blok 
Petra Poroshenka).  One of her primary goals in the legislature was to restructure 643
the energy industry in order to incentivize domestic production. She reported that 
Ukrainian companies had built two large oil platforms in the Black Sea, but the Russ-
ian navy had seized them shortly after taking the Crimean Peninsula.  Another po644 -
tential source of energy is fracking. However, the largest fossil fuel reserves lie un-
derground within the boundaries of Donyetsk, Kharkiv and Dnipro, areas currently 
under separatist control.  By directly occupying of key areas, the Kremlin  cut-off 645
strategic areas for development. 
 Another major obstacle to fracking, beyond the lack of control over Donbas, is 
public opinion. Many of her constituents were skeptical regarding domestic sources of 
energy. A primary reason was the “hidden influence of Russia through politicians and 
‘experts.’”  These representatives effectively used news outlets to drive their agen646 -
da. Oligarchs and Kremlin insiders hired “experts” to appear on news programs to 
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persuade people that domestic extraction is “bad,” especially fracking, and that Russ-
ian petroleum products offer “cheaper” sources for consumers.  In her words, “Rus647 -
sia has a distractive influence, changing peoples’ perceptions away from domestic 
production.”  Using its superior navy, support for separatists in Donbas and a media 648
campaign built on misinformation, Moscow undercuts Ukraine’s energy indepen-
dence. 
 When our conversation shifted to Western actors’ efforts to shape energy poli-
cy, she highlighted attempts to reform the Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining; she 
emphasized that many new laws mirrored EU standards for extraction, essential for 
Ukraine’s European integration.  The IMF pressured the Rada to undertake anti-cor649 -
ruption reforms. One specific provision required the government to eliminate subsi-
dies for oil and natural gas, a practice that had been the main tool politicians and oli-
garchs used to garner loyalty from voters.  She views such pressures as positive in650 -
fluences and sees from Western institutions as allies, particularly given the symbolic 
support they offered during the EuroMaidan protests.   651
 The Ukrainian government modeled many of its new energy regulations on 
Western standards. The US and the EU provided most of the technical expertise on 
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extraction methods and regulation. The MP who worked closely with extracting in-
dustries had gone to Washington DC, starting in 2014, to pressure the US government 
to set requirements for energy regulation in Ukraine.  Standards have included but 652
are not limited to collecting and publishing data, devising an efficiency action plan, 
mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating policies, and modernizing 
infrastructure.  By leveraging US government conditions and prerequisites, mem653 -
bers of the Rada aided their own legislative agenda on energy policy. 
Conclusion 
 The competing uses of hard power vis-a-vis Ukraine’s energy sector illustrate 
the vastly different approaches of Western states and Russia. Based upon interviews 
with elites involved in energy policymaking, supplemented by historical data, I sketch 
a rough  illustration for how two main foreign actors influence energy politics. The 
US and EU fund civil society groups, sending technical experts and requiring institu-
tional reforms, to foster specific policy outcomes. Russia exploits Ukraine’s energy 
reliance, utilizes its post-Soviet infrastructure and leverages Ukrainian oligarchs to 
secure beneficial policies. 
 Russian energy resources are the most effective instrument for influencing 
Ukraine but this strategy is starting to fail as Ukraine develops alternative energy 
sources, both foreign and domestic. Reverse flows of natural gas from EU members, 
fracking and increased energy efficiency have combined to make Ukrainians far less 
reliant on Russia. In 2015 total fuel consumption decreased in by 16%, imports of 
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Russian natural gas decreased by 33%, and crude oil imports came almost exclusively 
from Kazakhstan.  Policymakers’ new focus on energy efficiency and alternate 654
sources has reduced foreign dependence.  655
 Moscow’s new mercantilist approach may die as the economic situation within 
energy markets does not bode well for Russian politicians, as petroleum prices plum-
met to unexpected lows. By January 2015 the price  of oil per barrel had dropped to 
$44.80, less than half its value one-year earlier.  Since the national budget relies 656
heavily upon energy markets, any loss in demand quickly changes the fortunes of 
those in power. 
 As these hard power instruments lose effectiveness, Moscow has refocused its 
sights on soft power. Russia’s “…soft power is strongly associated with discourses of 
a shared past and with the common values, culture and history that arise from it.”  657
This soft power approach contrasts starkly with the EU and US efforts to promote 
values like democracy and liberalization, carving a potential future path for Ukraine. 
 Another obstacle to energy independence remains: attracting a more diverse 
group of foreign investors. The frozen conflict and climate of corruption scare most 
investors because no one knows the cost of doing business.  Energy extraction re658 -
quires large amounts of capital as a result securing consistent funds from wealthier 
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countries, preferably with better rule of law, will prove vital to Ukraine’s energy inde-
pendence.  659
 Adam Stulberg,“Out of Gas: Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the Changing Geopolitics of Natural 659
Gas,” Problems of Post-Communism, 62 (2015): 125.
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Chapter Five - Security and Defense Policy in a New Ukraine  
 While the Russian Federation has gradually reasserted itself in international 
politics, the EU and NATO continue to proposition states like Ukraine, driving deeper 
into the former Soviet sphere. Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, political 
leaders in Kyiv have struggled to maintain autonomy from Moscow while trying to 
improve their domestic institutions and economy domestically. Putin, for his part, has 
reclaimed some of Russia’s former influence internationally through such actions as 
the intervention in Georgia in 2008, and in Syria’s civil war. Russian troops air-
dropped into Crimea during February 2014 demonstrates Moscow’s resolve in re-
asserting its former dominance over former Soviet states. 
 The Putin regime is using a “hybrid” approach (Russian military officers use 
the phrase “new-type” warfare), which consists of employing irregular forces in 
Crimea and Donbas, executing cyberattacks, and saying public opinion through in-
formation campaigns, mainly targeting Russian-speaking populations.  Though 660
Russian troops seized Crimea, they did not launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 
Instead Putin directed “volunteers” and other agents of the state to incite a separatist 
movement in Donbas, engaging Ukrainian troops, supplying rebels with arms and co-
ordinating intelligence.  The main thrust of Putin’s soft power strategy is to paint 661
Ukrainian nationalism as the “negative other.”  662
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Adopting an innovative strategy to undermine Ukraine’s independence, Russian offi-
cials masterminded cyberattacks and waged an information war against Kyiv, and lat-
er Western powers. 
 Putin values tactics over strategy, using his skills as a former Soviet security 
services agent and employing his former colleagues, now members of the siloviki.  663
The invasion offered a short-term opportunity to gain power in eastern Europe: 
Ukraine experienced chaos, and Western governments had not anticipated Russian 
aggression. Putin’s strategy seems to lack any long-term objective other than destabi-
lizing Ukraine, cultivating war weariness and forcing capitulation to protect the Russ-
ian sphere of influence in post-Soviet Europe.  As one respondent put it, President 664
Putin uses his charisma as a leader, but he possesses no ideology.  He is a realist, 665
furthering the power of his state against what he sees as encroachment from the West. 
 Brussels and Washington D.C. have adopted very different strategies regarding 
Ukraine, working in tandem from different angles. EU members states is more active 
in promoting a political solution to the conflict through diplomatic efforts, such as the 
Minsk II agreement and economic pressures via sanctions. The EU pushes Russia but 
also accommodates it when necessary, while the US acts more aggressively towards 
the Kremlin.  Western governments have pressured Ukrainian officials to reform 666
their defense industry as a condition for aid. James Sherr asserts that by the end of the 
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1990s Ukrainian policymakers pushed the defense sector to start adopting EU stan-
dards for procurement and border security.  Ukraine’s need for security assistance 667
has hastened the reform process. Officials on both sides of the Atlantic have mastered 
the “good cop, bad cop” relationship. As an EU Delegation official stated, the EU and 
US are quite comfortable playing these roles.   668
 Western countries has also played a growing role in countering Russia’s disin-
formation campaign within Ukraine. At first Western powers were slow to react but 
have gradually provided more responses to false Russian media reports and disinfor-
mation coming directly from Vladimir Putin.  Western experts have aided Ukrainian 669
journalists and news organizations in combating the invasion of false information 
from Russia. 
 A defining feature of Ukrainian security policy after the Russian invasion in-
volves the abrupt shift in its foreign policy towards strengthening ties with Western 
countries and further defining Ukrainian identity as separate from Russian. As Paul 
D’Anieri contends, until 2012 Ukrainian foreign policy had stalled in making a deci-
sive move towards either Russia or Western capitals, heal the division between East-
ern and Western Ukraine, and democratize.  The invasion of Crimea and the out670 -
break of hostilities in Donbas pushed policymakers to adopt a Western-friendly for-
eign policy. The most important aspect of defense policy ha been the power of 
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Ukrainian identity. Paul Goble contends that Russian attempts to use Russian identity 
to garner support for its intervention has not met expectations.  671
 The following two sections provide an overview of Ukrainian security policy 
from 1991 to 2004, then from 2004 to 2014. I emphasize the privileged position of 
Russian security officials in Ukraine during the first two periods and the ways in 
which Russo-Ukrainian relations have shaped Ukraine’s security policies. Moscow 
aimed to form an alliance with Ukraine, maintaining many of its military forces on 
Ukrainian soil, along with close business ties, in order to keep a multinational, mili-
tary-industrial complex. Russian officials also wanted Ukraine to retain many former 
Soviet agents, particularly in the military and security services ranks. 
 The third section focuses on Ukraine’s defense policy after 2014. I discuss 
Russia’s use of hard power through military intervention, the loss of its defense indus-
try connections, the evolving cyber war and information war in Ukraine. I highlight 
the new interest of Western powers in Ukraine’s defense capability and the ways in 
which the EU and US have aided this effort. The last period illustrates a shift in 
Ukraine’s security policy from one that is Russian-centric to a Western-centric ap-
proach as a result of the Crimean invasion. 
“Dissolving the Russian Empire”: Security Relations from 1991 - 2004 
 When the Ukrainian state declared independence in 1991, Moscow and Kyiv 
began the complicated task of untangling their military and security services, tightly 
woven into a physical network as a result of seven decades under Soviet dominance. 
At the time 780,000 Soviet troops were stationed in Ukraine, with 12,000 officers 
 Paul Goble, “Russian National Identity and the Ukraine Crisis,” Communist and Post-Communist 671
Studies, 49 (2016): 37.
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leaving the country and 33,000 repatriating in the aftermath of the collapse.  Soviet 672
planners positioned these troops and equipment in the event of a Western invasion, 
which never came. The three main security issues between the two countries centered 
on the ownership of nuclear weapons, the status of Crimea within the newly formed 
Ukraine, and control of the former Soviet fleet stationed in Sevastopol. 
 “Dissolving the Russian Empire,” is a term used by one of my respondents 
who serves as a senior defense policymaker in Kyiv under President Poroshenko. He 
referred to the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia but recognized the current 
conflict as part of a longer struggle for Ukrainian independence.  Separation is a 673
process, and the February 2014 invasion of Crimea was a critical departure. 
 Almost immediately after the Soviet Union collapsed, Western countries 
moved to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons in former Soviet states but hesitated to 
give security assurances against potential Russian interference. President George 
H.W. Bush gave a lukewarm speech to Ukrainians in 1991, later dubbed his “Chicken 
Speech,” cautioning the new country about the negative implications of hyper-nation-
alism.  Many in the international community interpreted his words as a sign of 674
Washington’s reluctance to recognize Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. In 
1994 the US, the UK, the Russian Federation and Ukraine signed the Budapest Mem-
orandum, agreeing to remove all nuclear weapons from Ukraine in exchange for Rus-
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sia’s respect for current territorial boundaries.  The agreement satisfied a chief con675 -
cern in Washington but there were no mechanisms to guarantee the territorial integrity 
aspects of the memorandum. 
 President Yeltsin coveted Ukraine’s strategic position in Europe, particularly 
the port of Sevastopol, which lies on the Crimean peninsula, which housed a large 
portion of the former Soviet navy.  Russian political officials had historically covet676 -
ed this port which provides access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. Under 
the Budapest Memorandum, Russia lost its claim to Crimea. The focus then shifted to 
maintaining control of the fleet in Sevastopol. 
 After six years of contentious negotiations, Kyiv and Moscow finalized a leas-
ing agreement over Sevastopol’s port access in 1997.  The two sides divided the 677
Black Sea Fleet, and Ukraine allowed Russia to possess part of the port. This settle-
ment signaled an important milestone in Russo-Ukrainian relations. As James Sherr 
contends, the 1997 bilateral treaty on the Black Sea Fleet was the most significant de-
velopment in Ukrainian foreign policy because officials resolved the last border dis-
pute with its former Soviet ally.  678
 Because this resolution ended an important international dispute, Kuchma and 
Rada members signaled their willingness to leave Russia’s sphere of influence and 
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began courting NATO for membership.  A member of the Partnership for Peace pro679 -
gram since 1994, Ukraine signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO 
in 1997, with its last territorial dispute settled. Although Ukraine’s addmision to 
NATO would remain remote, the prospect of membership jeopardized the strategic 
position of the Russian fleet stationed there.  
 During the immediate post-Soviet period Ukrainian officials also had to deal 
with a heavy infiltration of Russian security service agents operating within the coun-
try.  Under President Yeltsin, Russian security services had been very active in 680
Ukraine.  Although no credible documents from the 1990s state the number of Russ681 -
ian agents working for either government, the events of 2014 give some indication of 
the degree to which the Kremlin had influence. After EuroMaidan, Ukrainian officials 
arrested 235 suspected Russian agents.  682
 Intelligence operations not only maintained the Kremlin’s direct hold over the 
military and security services but also held Ukrainian politicians hostage to Russian 
demands. The most famous example was a scandal involving former president Leonid 
Kuchma. In 2002 Ukrainian media released leaked audio recordings of Kuchma, later 
called “Kuchmagate,” calling for the assassination of dissident journalists and negoti-
ating the sale of military equipment to Iraq among other corrupt dealings.  This 683
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scandal ended Kuchma’s political career and severely damaged relations with the 
West. The source of the audio recordings was a former bodyguard, but some suspect-
ed the Russian intelligence services of playing a role in undermining Kuchma’s sup-
port.  Ironically, Kuchma’s resignation as President led to friendlier relations with 684
the West after the Orange Revolution, the opposite of what the Kremlin had desired. 
President Putin adopted a strategy of targeting specific foreign policymakers, embroil-
ing them in scandals in order to extract desired political outcomes. 
 From independence until 2004, officials in capitals across Europe, Eurasia, 
and the US took for granted Russia’s privileged position in Ukrainian security policy. 
Although the Budapest Memo stands as an example of Western diplomatic interven-
tion into Moscow’s “Near Abroad,” it remained an exceptional case for this period. 
Beyond nuclear arms control, Western governments were not very interested in 
Ukrainian affairs due to the lack of economic and political reforms.  According to 685
one respondent the US, in particular, had conceded this sphere of influence to Russia, 
starting with President George H.W. Bush’s “Chicken Kyiv" speech and continuing 
through the Obama administration.  686
The Road to a Proxy War between the West and Russia: 2004 - 2014 
 As Kuchma’s support collapsed, new candidates emerged to face-off in the 
2004 presidential  elections, which offered voters had a more distinct choice between 
pro-Russian and pro-Western candidates. As discussed earlier, the run-off election 
 Interview with Respondent 12, 9 November 2016; Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace: Russia’s New Im684 -
perialism, (Greenwood Publishing Group: Santa Barbara, California, 2004): 93
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presented two candidates with clearly different visions for Ukraine. Viktor 
Yushchenko favored closer relations with the West, while Viktor Yanukovych wanted 
to maintain close ties to Russia. 
 The Orange Revolution of 2004 presented another opportunity for Ukraine to 
distance itself from Russia and allow for Western influence. The core security issues 
included Ukraine’s renewed interest in NATO membership and the growing friction 
between Russian and Ukrainian officials. Were Ukraine to join NATO, Russian offi-
cials feared they might lose their basing rights in Sevastopol. As Yushchenko more 
seriously considered NATO membership, political officials worried about the loyalty 
of military and security service members, which had been an issue since 1991.  Mil687 -
itary officers worried that the Ukrainian military lacked proper readiness for any po-
tential conflict. 
 Russia continued to leverage its military assets inside Ukraine, particularly the 
Black Sea Fleet, its integrated military-industrial complex and personal connections 
within the bureaucracy to influence security policy. Russia remained the third biggest 
importer of Ukrainian defense products from 2009 to 2013, exclusively buying parts 
from Ukraine for its missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missile parts 
(ICBM), and helicopters.  This became all the more important as Russia nearly dou688 -
bled its defense spending between 2007 and 2014.   689
 Sherr, “Ukraine’s Defence Reform: An Update,” 1.687
 Alexsandra McLees and Eugene Rumer, “Saving Ukraine’s Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endow688 -
ment for International Peace (July 30, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/30/saving-
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 Moscow also started to exert more soft power through the Russian Orthodox 
Church and mainstream media for promoting anti-Western ideas.  These influence 690
channels began compensating for the eroding personal connections among elites in 
both countries. Many respondents claimed that during this period, they started dis-
tancing themselves from Kremlin counterparts. One official who serves on the 
Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council starting cutting personal ties with 
Russian officials in mid-2000s, rarely traveling to Russia.  691
 2004 also coincided with an important transformation in Russian domestic 
politics that held many implications for foreign affairs. That year Vladimir Putin won 
a second election as President of Russia consolidating his power and popularity. Elec-
tion monitors called the results into question, suspecting voter manipulation and 
fraud.  This came on the heels of Putin's party, United Russia, having won a plurali692 -
ty in the Duma a year earlier.  
 Yushchenko’s election in 2004, deemed a reformer, renewed Western interest 
in Ukrainian politics.  The US, under President Bush, sought to strengthen the secu693 -
rity relationship with Ukraine, hoping to expand NATO and thwart further Russian 
interference in the post-Soviet space.  Though Western states lacked formal, histori694 -
cal security cooperation treaties with Ukraine, Yushchenko’s path diverged from that 
of his predecessors. The media landscape also started to change, with both European 
 Goble, “Russian National Identity and the Ukraine Crisis,” 40.690
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and American news outlets covering the events of 2004, thus competing with the 
Russian narrative of Ukraine’s security interests.  Western media began countering 695
false new reports and reframing Ukraine’s foreign policy as a choice between continu-
ing Russian hegemony versus an independent, pro-European path. 
 Despite Russia’s regional dominance, Yushchenko resuscitated plans to join 
NATO.  In 2005 NATO representatives and Ukraine began new talks on a possible 
accession plan.    Yushchenko’s move to renew dialogue with NATO alarmed poli696 -
cy-makers in Moscow. Dmitri Trenin contends that an abrupt shift away from concili-
ation towards the US and heightened suspicion of Russia occurred in 2005, due to 
Ukraine’s appeal to the West.  Domestic elites supported membership at times, but 697
mass attitudes generally did not. Between 2002 and 2005, polling data showed that 
the majority of Ukrainians would have voted against joining NATO, reaching 60% by 
2005.  The accession plan gradually unraveled, much to Moscow’s relief, as Ukraine 698
slipped back into political turmoil.  
 President Yushchenko was so determined to redirect Ukraine’s foreign policy 
course away from Russia that tensions between the two countries escalated. Due to 
the deeply integrated nature of their respective security complexes, any move away 
from Moscow caused friction among civil servants, testing the loyalties of Ukrainians. 
 Ivan Katchanovski and Alicen R. Morley, “The Politics of U.S. Television Coverage of Post-Com695 -
munist Countries,” Problems of Post-Communism, 59, 1 (January/February 2012): 16-18.
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One interviewee lamented that policymakers had discussed potential war with Russia 
in 2005.  Although war did not come immediately, many Ukrainian elites foresaw a 699
collision course between the two countries. 
 The prospect of expanding NATO’s border along Russia’s territory elicited 
sharp criticism from the Kremlin. Although Ukraine ultimately rejected membership 
in 2008 at the Bucharest Summit, Western powers recognized Moscow’s determina-
tion to prevent Ukraine from leaving its sphere of influence.  Russian President 700
Vladimir Putin declared at a news conference: “It is horrible to say and even horrible 
to think that, in response to the deployment of such facilities in Ukrainian territory, 
which cannot theoretically be ruled out, Russia could target its missile systems at 
Ukraine.”  In short, Putin directly threatened Ukraine and NATO members.   701
 Correspondingly, Russia sent a message to NATO about another potential 
member. In 2008 Russian forces intervened militarily in Georgia due to growing ten-
sions over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Tbilisi had nominal con-
trol but allowed a great deal of autonomy to the local authorities. Abkhazians and Os-
setians looked to Moscow for protection whenever they felt threatened by the Geor-
gian government. Convening at the Bucharest Summit,  NATO members decided to 
postpone Ukraine’s admission.  Though not a direct use of hard power, Russia’s mil702 -
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itary action towards Georgia sent a message to the West about Moscow’s sphere of 
influence, and also tested Western resolve. Despite harsh criticism from officials in 
Washington D.C. and Brussels, Western leaders did not respond with military action. 
The Russo-Georgian conflict was a prelude to later Russian intervention in Ukraine, 
involving a highly limited but effective use of force in the Kremlin’s Near Abroad. 
Western capitals halted plans to expand strategic alliances with former Soviet states 
when such actions alarmed Russia. 
 Writing in 2009, Rand Corporation researcher Olga Oliker claimed that elites 
sought to alarm Russian citizens about the threat of NATO expansion.  Media out703 -
lets played into the hands of oligarchs who saw NATO as a threat to their economic 
sphere of influence. Politicians and business oligarchs, who sometimes battled over 
domestic politics, reached consensus over foreign policy, recognizing their mutual 
interests. 
Sergei Markedonov, surmised in 2009: 
Russia has its regional interests, resources to defend them, and a legitimate 
motivation to protect them.  Acknowledging these interests could basically 
make the process of “resetting” [relations with the US] indeed something 
meaningful. However, for this NATO (and its main engine), the United States 
need to seriously change their assessments of post-Soviet realities, and Russia 
needs to substantially moderate its global ambitions (especially when it is im-
possible to pay for them).  704
 Russia’s ability to pay for such ambitions had increased thanks to fossil fuel 
production and exportation. In 2009 Russia became the world’s largest oil producer, 
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solidifying this source of power and leverage across Eastern Europe.  In 2010 presi705 -
dents Yanukovych and Putin held a secret meeting in Kharkiv on the fate of basing 
rights in Sevastopol.  Soon after the two countries agreed to a lease extension for the 706
Black Sea Fleet, maintaining those rights until at least 2042, which included more fa-
vorable energy contracts for Ukraine, promising to reduce the price of imported nat-
ural gas by 30%.  Moscow leveraged its energy resources to influence the defense 707
policy decisions of Ukrainian elites. 
 Putin voiced concern over NATO’s direct threat to Russian interests. At a press 
conference in 2011, he stated that “The expansion of NATO infrastructure towards our 
borders is causing us concern…NATO is not simply a political bloc, it is a military 
bloc.”  If the US chose to expand its main military alliance, then it would be per708 -
ceived as expansion into Russia’s geopolitical turf.  
 Another channel allowing Russian leaders to exert control over Ukrainian of-
ficials involves the continued use of clandestine operations. According to Stephen 
Blank, the Russian Federation operated an extensive spy network in Ukraine that in-
fluenced and sabotaged public policy.  Though not as visible as conventional uses of 709
force employed by Russia during the Soviet period, covert military actions have sup-
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plemented pressures that Russian and Ukrainian business elites place on public offi-
cials.  
 Russian agents acted in official capacities within the Ukrainian government, 
directly undermining national security. Tymoshenko and Yanukovuch appointed Russ-
ian officials to the military and intelligence services, a common practice since Ukrain-
ian law did not bar foreigners from serving in these offices.  One interviewee 710
claimed that Yanukovych even demoted ethnic Ukrainians in order to make space for 
Russian agents.  Some suspected Kremlin officials of colluding with the Ukrainian 711
government in selecting pro-Russian operatives to high-ranking positions.  Ukrain712 -
ian officials also pledged to reduce the size of the military in the name of modernizing 
the armed forces. In 2012 the Ukrainian military staff pledged to reduce the active 
personnel force from 192,000 to 1000,000 by 2017.  Such measures led to a gradual 713
deterioration of the defense apparatus. 
 President Yankukovych eventually appointed two Russian nationals, Minister 
of Intelligence Vitaliy Zakharchenko in 2011, and Minister of Defense, Pavlo 
Lebedyev in 2012.  Both orchestrated a gradual reduction of troops in Crimea and 714
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allowed readiness to decline.  National security officials consistently undersold their 715
own budget requests during the Kuchma and Yanukovych regimes. One respondent 
recalled how the Minister of Defense under Yanukovych had been afraid to ask for 
money.  Often trapped between two competing spheres of influence, Ukrainian offi716 -
cials accepted aid from Russia or the West depending on the current administration in 
power.  717
 The focus abruptly shifted from strategic issues to economic issues in 2010 
when Ukraine moved towards signing the DCFTA. After Yanukovych rejected the 
deal, the political winds shifted, at which point Putin targeted EU power as the single 
greatest threat to Russia and acted with military force to break the spread of its eco-
nomic influence.  To sway public opinion during the lead-up to the Vilnius Summit, 718
the Kremlin engaged in an information war throughout Ukraine. During the DCFTA 
negotiations, Russian media outlets in Ukraine manipulated many responses from 
Ukrainian officials through editing, misconstruing the treaty to elicit criticism.  Rus719 -
sia’s information war took both the form of soft and hard power.  
 Ukrainian security services moved against many media outlets, like Kanal 5 
and RTVI critical of the Yanukovych presidency.  A press officer within the Ukrain720 -
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ian government recalled how in 2013 the police confiscated servers at Express and 
Kanal 5.  Both news agencies frequently questioned government policies and pub721 -
lished damaging information about the administration.  
 Moscow also employed the Russian Orthodox Church to further its agenda. 
Clergy often emphasized the shared cultural connection between the two countries, 
denouncing Western liberal values.  Russian officials wanted to frighten average 722
Ukrainians concerning European values concerning rule of law and economic liberal-
ization. Orthodox clerics later supported the separatists movement in Donbas.  The 723
Kremlin used religion as a tool, engaging in its information war. 
 Before EuroMaidan most Western media outlets had covered Ukraine as a 
Russian subsidiary. Western journalists typically reported on Ukrainian events out of 
offices in Moscow, often adopting a Russian narrative.  When protests began on 724
Maidan Square in late 2013, however, news outlets shifted their reporting operations 
to Kyiv. As the protests intensified, Western media began to cover “system change” 
and renewed investigations of Russia’s alleged involvement in killings of 
protesters.  725
 Eventually the competing interests of Ukraine, Russia and Western countries 
reached a clashed. Still accepting both a “Russian brotherhood” and “NATO Protec-
tion” under the Budapest Memo, many Ukrainians did not realize their security policy 
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had become untenable.  Russian troops secured the Crimean peninsula and aided 726
separatists in Donbas as of February 2014; as a result Ukraine broke-off security co-
operation with Moscow. Public opinion towards Russia deteriorated: In one public 
opinion poll conducted in 2014, 31% of respondents stated they had a “Warm” atti-
tude towards Russia, versus 45% which held a “Cold” view.  The new government 727
voted in after Yanukovych fled, set security policy on a different path, towards more 
independence and cooperation with the EU and US. 
Invasion, Occupation and Support for the Frozen Conflict, 2014 to 2016 
 The clearest example of Russia’s use of hard power involves the invasion of 
Crimea and its ongoing support for separatists in Donbas.  A Ukrainian soldier from 728
Donbas who served on the front remembers Russian nationals arriving by bus in 
Donyetsk in 2014. First they acted as EuroMaidan counter protesters but eventually 
started violent riots to oppose the regime change in Kyiv.  At that point the situation 729
in Donbas changed radically. Chaos ensued, as a battlefront formed to confront the 
incoming Ukrainian army. Many young Ukrainians who had only known an indepen-
dent Ukraine and wanted closer relations with Europe joined the military effort, de-
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spite the resources of the Kremlin.  One poll by Pew Research, conducted before 730
hostilities in July 2013, found that 58% of 18-29 year olds identified as “Ukrainian” 
first, versus 46% of those aged 55 and older.  731
 Russia’s hard power strategy involves many layers of rationality: The first is 
to send a clear signal of resolve against regime change; The second is to slowly bleed 
the resources of a smaller neighbor through destabilizing Donbas; Third is to test the 
resolve of the West.  A respondent claimed that to Russian officials “only under732 -
stand power.” He added that “They have values but only special values,” and that, 
“Putin has a very specific rationality.”   733
 Russia has created a destabilizing force in Ukraine, occupying Crimea and 
sending personnel and supplies to Donbas. Ukrainian leaders made no serious at-
tempts to recover Crimea, yet the conflict in Donbas has continued to flare. In a sense, 
it has become a “home rule, demilitarized zone like Ulster.”  Putin hopes that pro734 -
longed occupation will break Poroshenko’s resolve and force a peace settlement, 
which would lead to another frozen conflict like the disputed territories of Georgia 
and Transnistria. By focusing on Russians in Donbas, who have a stronger economic 
and cultural connection to Russia, Moscow hopes to mobilize the world of ethnic 
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Panel Discussion at National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kyiv (20 October 2016).
 Michael Birnbaum and Fredrick Kunkle, “Ahead of Ukraine elections, a generational split on na731 -
tionalism,” The Washington Post (May 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ahead-of-
ukraine-elections-a-generational-split-on-nationalism/2014/05/24/3072c82f-8c34-475a-b26d-
e19032f7d485_story.html?utm_term=.0c8e07925e62. 
 Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, Jenny 732
Oberholtzer, “Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,” Report, Rand Corpo-
ration (2017). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html. 
 Interview with Respondent 11, 2 November 2016.733
 Interview with Respondent 2, 16 September 2016.734
 !  217
Russians (russki mir) to undermine Ukrainian security.  Putin wants to “infect 735
Ukraine with poisonous territory and target government support in order to amend the 
constitution.”  736
 Along with its limited but effective military intervention, Moscow has been 
somewhat successful in its cyber and information war.  A cost-effective alternative 737
to physical conflict, the Kremlin is using soft power through mass media and propa-
ganda to win over the Ukrainian public to its agenda.  By combining hard and soft 738
power, Putin hopes to undermine Ukraine’s resolve to extricate itself from Russian 
domination. As one interviewee lamented, the price of the war has diminished support 
for reunification with Crimea and Donbas as the costs of war mount.  Moscow’s use 739
of multiple, subtle tools illustrate its new hybrid warfare approach to international 
influence. The mix of instruments includes conventional military, media and cyber 
operations, intended to exploit a “gray zone” in international relations.   740
 The Kremlin has lost a great deal of influence on Ukrainian policymakers, 
however, especially within the military-industrial complex. In 2015 President 
Poroshenko banned the defense industry from cooperating with Russian officials.  741
Ukrainian military elites want stronger ties to the US and “see themselves becoming 
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Israel,” receiving large amounts of security aid.  Influential oligarchs have also lost 742
leverage, although Russia still uses oligarchs to support opposition political parties in 
Ukraine. 
 Most importantly, Russia’s invasion galvanized the Ukrainian public: A survey 
measuring mass attitudes of Ukrainians conducted in 2017 found that only 18% of 
respondents held “Warm” or “Very Warm” attitudes towards Russia.  One in743 -
terviewee stated that “Now we [Ukrainians] have a clear goal…Now we have an en-
emy and it is clear.”  Before the invasion, Russia could rely on obscure means for 744
controlling policymaking in Kyiv. Prior Ukrainian governments tolerated this influ-
ence in playing Russia against the West. The EuroMaidan protests and the subsequent 
Russian intervention abruptly pushed public opinion to favor closer ties with the EU 
and US.  Though Russia achieved its immediate goal, the long-term mission of forc745 -
ing Ukraine back into its orbit appears difficult. As a respondent observed: “This con-
flict is about an historical connection to Russia,” which is now permanently eroded.  746
 Western governments have adopted a different strategy in countering Russian 
aggression. The EU and US provided financial aid to the Ukrainian military, primarily 
through NATO. In 2014 the US allocated $23 million specifically for Ukrainian mili-
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tary equipment.  They have monitored the conflict in Donbas, using international 747
organizations like the OSCE and have aided cybersecurity efforts, to counter Russian 
attacks on the power grids and other critical infrastructure.  The EU and US ap748 -
proaches Ukrainian security come in different but complementary forms: the US is 
more aggressive in confronting Russia, while the EU is more committed to building 
long-term stability.  The EU also uses its proximity to engage Ukrainian citizens at 749
public events. For example, the Polish ambassador frequently makes public appear-
ances with Ukrainian leaders, while the EU delegation uses “carrots” like the visa-free 
regime to counter Russian influence.  750
The Military-Industrial Complex 
 Another policy domain experiencing transformation is the defense sector. Rus-
sia has long influenced Ukraine’s military-industrial complex (voyeno-promiyshlyenyi 
kompleks), but since the invasion of Crimea, this relationship has dramatically 
changed.  One reason why Russia could easily influence this sector was the legacy 751
of Soviet military-industrial integration and the lack of decentralization following 
Ukrainian independence. As the chairman of the Rada’s Security and Defense Com-
mittee, Sergei Pashinskyi stated, a lack of competition among arms manufacturers is 
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one of the leading problems in defending Ukraine.  The oligarchic system that de752 -
veloped after independence impeded the evolution of an autonomous, functioning de-
fense industry.  The best way to be more effective in providing capabilities for the 753
current conflict is to promote competition within the industry, which is primamrily 
controlled by one state-owned company: UkrOboronProm (UOP).  754
 Past attempts to diversify the control of the defense industry usually involved 
attracting investment from Asian countries, due to the fact that China and India be-
came the largest import markets after cutting ties with Russia.  This strategy helped 755
to move the industry away from Russian domination but still did not promote an in-
dependent system. As the director of a major defense company stated, two of 
Ukraine’s top four priorities are centered on developing more international networks, 
particularly in Western markets, and adopting the US procurement standards.  De756 -
fense industry elites want to fully break away from Soviet networks and standards.  
 Although Russia has gained control over some physical territory in Eastern 
Ukraine, its influence over policymakers by way of personal contacts diminished 
greatly after the invasion. Many former colleagues among the defense communities in 
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both countries have cut personal ties. An official with the Ukrainian Security Council 
remarked, “all personal contacts [with Russians] were cut after 2014,” noting that the 
division between the two nations is “deeper than in 1991.”  Severing their ties with 757
Russia and seeking support from West ern countries pushed Ukrainian security offi-
cials to work with the EU and NATO. This discussant deals directly with NATO offi-
cials, sharing military and intelligence information, far more actively than before 
2014.  Having spent many years working in the national security apparatus, he has 758
come to rely far more heavily on Western organizations for technical assistance and 
ideas for enhancing Ukrainian security. In his words, “We have more trust in the 
West…in my job, trust is the key basis.”  759
 Another vehicle for Russia’s influence drew on agents working for the nation-
al defense bureaucracy. Although many civil servants were not necessarily working 
directly for Russia, their identification with the Soviet past impeded their ability to 
foresee a potential war.  When asked about barriers to Ukraine’s military readiness, 760
he mentioned problems with an old bureaucracy: “The same people have been work-
ing for 20 years and the way they work is the same.”  761
 Russian influence still infiltrates the Ukrainian national security bureaucracy, 
albeit in  more subtle ways. One NGO representative who works on military and vet-
erans’ issues spoke about the Soviet legacy, contending that many former Soviet offi-
 Interview with Respondent 11, 2 November 2016.757
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cers still hold positions that impede the war effort. Many cannot speak Ukrainian and 
have declared “I’m not a patriot of Ukraine,” or “I’m just doing my job” or, “I’m do-
ing my duty to protect the country I work for.”  Both military officers and civil ser762 -
vants remember the Soviet Union with nostalgia. They often mention “how great the 
Soviet Union was;” others who disagree fear whistle-blowing due to memories of the 
KGB period.  Another core problem is that Kyiv needs to, “…clear out the pro-So763 -
viet, not pro-Russian staff.”  764
 Despite inertia, many younger policymakers are forging ahead with reforms in 
the national security apparatus. One chief initiative focuses on meeting NATO mili-
tary standards. Although the Ministry of Defense made concerted efforts to conform 
to NATO standards in the past, for example in 2005 after the Orange Revolution and 
through the Partnership for Peace Program, this generally conflicts with the Internal 
Ministry aims, leery of closer ties to the West.  After 2014, Ukrainian military offi765 -
cials turned abruptly towards the West, seeking cooperation. This interviewee claimed 
that the US held the most influence over defense policymaking, having provided $350 
million in financial assistance under the Ukraine Freedom Act, supplying roughly 
three-fourths of Ukraine’s military budget.  Despite attempts to steer the military 766
towards Western integration, there is little need to buy new weapons systems from 
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Western countries as Ukraine’s defense industry produces a surplus of weapons.  767
This greatly restricts the capacity to integrate. 
 Western countries have also proven essential in stabilizing the conflict in 
Donbas, by mediating a ceasefire and using the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE) to monitor deescalation. One source possessed intimate 
knowledge of how the OSCE is helping to mitigate conflict. After the Minsk II 
agreement, negotiated via the “Normandy process” involving France, Germany, 
Ukraine, and Russia, the OSCE began monitoring the Donbas conflict zone.  768
France, Germany, the US and EU took the lead in OSCE operations to remove ar-
tillery and to enforce the cease fire.  Stabilizing the conflict provided Ukraine  with 769
an opportunity to refocus its resources on other pressing issues. The monitoring oper-
ations did not totally stop the skirmishes but were influential in stopping conflict dur-
ing daylight hours and in specific patrol zones.  770
 OSCE monitoring mechanisms include using human investigators to patrol the 
area,  as well as satellite imagery. The EU supplies most satellite imagery that pro-
vides indisputable proof of violations and mitigates skirmishes.  The US offers 771
technical advice on disengagement zones.  By acting as an intermediary and dissem772 -
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inating information about cease fire enforcement, EU nations are using soft power to 
influence military operations. 
 Russia is an OSCE member but lost influence over the organization when its 
credibility waned after its military intervention in Ukraine. Some within the organiza-
tion suspect the Russian representatives of being members of the siloviki; thus other 
member states withheld information from those operatives.  Though Russian agents 773
secure information within Ukraine, their influence over international organizations 
like the OSCE remains minimal. As one respondent recalls, the OSCE fired one Russ-
ian representative over confidential comments made to the Ukrainian media that ex-
posed his partiality.  774
 The US and EU tended to adopt different approaches, the US more willing to 
use military force while European countries favored diplomatic and economic instru-
ments, typical of joint military actions in the post-Cold War Era; what Richard Haas 
termed “cross purposes.”  A political analyst working at an institute that advises pol775 -
icymakers summed up the general approaches of the West to stopping the conflict. He 
had helped the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs develop a conflict mitigation 
algorithm for Minsk II and advised officials on how best to articulate desired out-
comes to Western powers. In his estimation the EU, specifically Germany, takes the 
lead in diplomatic negotiations over conflict resolution, building on frequent personal 
 Interview with Respondent 10, 28 October 2016.773
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contacts between Chancellor Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin.  The US, alterna776 -
tively, directly supports the Ukrainian military.  The Western powers utilized their 777
diverse, complementary strengths to affect a tense but sustainable cease fire. 
The Virtual Warfront  
 In the mid-1990s, the Kremlin started developing cyberwar capabilities. Glas-
nost opened Russian society to more advanced information technologies from the 
West and triggered a revolution in Russian military thought. Leaders in Moscow 
quickly realized the utility of waging a virtual war against potential enemies, not only 
as an effective tool for sabotage but also as a more cost effective way to influence ri-
vals and to undermine power without a direct conflict.  The precise source of cyber 778
attacks from Russia (whether attackers are private citizens, civil servants or uni-
formed military members) remains difficult to determine. Intelligence agencies pub-
lish little information on specific hackers. By 2008 Russian cyber-warriors had suc-
ceeded in neutralizing many parts of Georgia’s network during their invasion.  This 779
was Russia’s first test in opening up a virtual front against an enemy, a precursor to 
the cyberwar in Ukraine. 
 The cyberwar between Ukraine and Russia began almost immediately after 
Viktor Yanukovych fled the country in 2014. Following the first post-EuroMaidan 
elections, Ukrainian election officials detected a cyberattack, attempting to tamper 
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with election results to favor the Right Sector candidate, Dmytro Yarosh.  Hackers 780
were unable to influence the outcome but their target, the leader of an ultra-nationalist 
group, was not a coincidence. As discussed below, one Kremlin strategy is to delegit-
imize the current government by claiming that it is “fascist” or related to Nazism. 
Along with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against government and me-
dia organizations on an almost weekly basis, hackers targeted critical infrastructure. 
In 2015 Agents conducted a major attack against a power grid in Kyiv leaving 
230,000 residents without power.  Western countries quickly came to Ukraine’s aid, 781
to assist in damage control and investigate the potential threats to their own security. 
A few weeks after the attack, the US sent technical experts, both public and private, 
to assess the damage and conduct a forensic analysis of the attack.   782
 Russian agents repeated this type of massive attack with a major outage in De-
cember 2016, disabling the Kyiv power grid.  In the same month the Ukrainian gov783 -
ernment claimed that, “…there had been 6,500 cyberattacks on 36 Ukrainian targets 
in just the previous two months.”  These constant attacks consume vital resources 784
and are difficult to investigate, in so far as the Internet offers a fertile environment for 
secrecy and masking identities. Outside experts could not confirm the number of at-
tacks with absolute certainty, nor that Russian agents had conducted the attack, adding 
to the complexity of cyber warfare.  
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 My respondents could not speak in detail about whether Russian cyberattacks 
had affected their organizations directly, with one exception. One anti-corruption ini-
tiative in Kyiv includes the creation of an eData site which tracks the Ukrainian bud-
get. An interviewee who had collected information on government expenses and 
maintained the database stated that the site is frequently attacked.  Though she is not 785
sure of the source, she suspects that Russian hackers are behind the disruptions. Mos-
cow hoped to undermine the public’s faith in the new government by attacking civil 
society institutions in Ukraine. 
Media and War Memories  
 Pro-Russian media outlets are highly effective in pursuing their agenda using 
provocative terminology and skillfully framing issues. The Kremlin likes to frame the 
current struggle in Ukraine as a battle against the resurgence of fascism.  By em786 -
ploying the term “fascism” Moscow hopes to evoke the memory of WWII and the 
struggle against Nazi Germany. Other phrases refer to Ukraine as a “failed state,” im-
plying that the current conflict was a “US masterminded” coup.  787
 Although some ultranationalist groups emerged after the EuroMaidan protests, 
their influence on mainstream politics has been limited. The most well-known reac-
tionary group, Right Sector, enjoys only 5.4% support, according to polling data, and 
holds only one seat in the Rada.  While Russian media are correct in stating that ul788 -
tranationalist movements exist, they exaggerate  their power in Ukraine. 
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 In another example, one respondent experienced difficulty working with coun-
terparts from Russia and Moldova on the Transnistria border issue, due to media at-
tention on the purported  fascist ties of the post-Maidan government in Kyiv. A work-
ing group established among the three countries to monitor the frozen conflict on 
Ukraine’s border came to an abrupt halt after Russian and Moldovan representatives 
accused Ukrainian officials of supporting a “fascist” regime.  By convincing its oth789 -
er neighbors that the Poroshenko government promoted fascism and was illegitimate, 
Moscow alienated countries like Moldova. 
 Some Western news agencies provided critical reporting on the front, which 
countered Russian media reports similar to competing narratives during the Orange 
Revolution.  The Guardian tracked Russian troop movements in Donbas to give 790
military leaders necessary intelligence.  Western media outlets also provided techni791 -
cal advice to their Ukrainian colleagues. Many Ukrainian broadcasters had previous 
experience with war coverage, but few resources, especially multi-media.   792
 The West’s relationship with Russian media outlets also changed dramatically 
after the Crimean invasion. One EU delegation press official had regularly interacted 
with Russian state-run television and radio agencies at press conferences. Beginning 
in 2014 his professional and personal relationship with many Russian colleagues 
quickly deteriorated. Russian reporters became far more combative and skillfully 
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worded questions to trap EU press officials.  A common occurrence before 2014, the 793
tendency to meet with Russian journalists outside of work, almost completely 
stopped.  By 2016 the EU delegation in Kyiv began regularly briefing EU officials in 
Moscow to fend off misinformation from RIA News (RIA Novosti) and Channel 5 (5 
Kanal) at press conferences.  By 2016 his interactions with Russian news media 794
only included a few independent journalists and Kremlin officials acting through the 
OSCE.  795
 The fatal flaw of the Russian media system is its top-down nature, which Putin 
engineered during his first term as president.  Politicians set the narrative, then pub796 -
lication is determined by political leaders.  Journalists do not properly vet events 797
and ideas. Due to greater Western diligence in investigating and disseminating evi-
dence, Moscow eventually had to “react” to the West by conceding certain facts, like 
the use of regular Russian troops in Crimea.  Some Russian journalists quit; those 798
who stayed “trolled” EU representatives for particular words and responses that could 
be easily edited to serve Moscow’s agenda.  Russians and Ukrainians socialized in 799
such a media environment simply dismiss Western media as a mirror system of Rus-
sia’s, whereby governments set the news agenda. 
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 The EU also combats misinformation by leading investigations into Moscow’s 
intervention in the conflict. The EU’s helped to expose Russian involvement in the 
MH17 incident. On July  17, 2014 Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, carrying almost 
300 passengers primarily from the Netherlands, crashed in Ukraine. After an exhaus-
tive investigation, the Dutch Safety Board announced on October 13, 2015, that a 
Russian-made “BUK” missile had struck the plane, killing all passengers and crew on 
board.  The Kremlin continued to deny any involvement in the incident. After the 800
Dutch Safety Board issued the report, my respondent had to answer many questions 
about the incident, while Russian reporters raised questions about alternative scenar-
ios, to cast doubts on the final report.  Again, Moscow’s agents equated the possibil801 -
ity of a different scenario with the probability of what occurred based upon sound ev-
idence. 
 Though the West provides direct financial and technical support, many 
Ukrainians see its indirect influences as more important. As one policymaker opined, 
the most influential aspects of Western influence occurs when European and Ameri-
can leaders speak publicly on behalf of Ukraine, or when Ukrainians watch Western 
media, or form personal contacts with Europeans.  After decades of exposure to 802
Russian culture, Western soft power is finally making inroads into Ukrainian life. 
Slowly the information war has reshaped how Ukrainians view their relationship with 
 Dutch Safety Board, “Investigation Crash MH17,” (13 October 2015), https://www.onderzoek800 -
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Moscow and their own independence as the West helps to provide an alternative nar-
rative.  
Conclusion 
 The invasion of Crimea proved a defining moment in Russo-Ukrainian rela-
tions. Based upon longitudinal surveys of Ukrainians since 1991, the desire for more 
distance from Moscow spiked after tense incidents with Russia, chief among them the 
Crimean invasion. Despite these strained periods in relations, Ukrainians generally 
appreciated their closeness to the Russian people. Crimea, however, changed this 
affinity leading Ukrainians, for the first time, to resent their Slavic neighbors.  803
Armed intervention became a reason to make a serious break with a foreign power.   
 Summarizing the situation in 2014, from the climax of the EuroMaidan 
protests to the separatist movement in Donbas, one respondent held that “the current 
revolution is the most effective in breaking away…Russia does not understand how 
things have changed.”  The inconvenient truth remained that the fight against the 804
military intervention had stalled. As one Ukrainian put it, there was a “window of op-
portunity” after Maidan, but resources were diverted to the war effort in eastern 
Ukraine, particularly in the form of people volunteering.  By 2016 security and de805 -
fense policy had come to rely on the realization that citizens could not plan a victory 
parade, and that combating Russian interference would require a sustained effort. 
 Volodymyr Paniotto, “The social situation in Ukraine after Euromaidan,” Panel Discussion at Na803 -
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 Russian influence has greatly decreased since the undeclared war began in 
2014.  According to one policy consultant, Russia has much less influence now than 806
two year ago because they relied on direct military involvement.  Without its inva807 -
sion of Crimea and, to a lesser degree, its support for separatists, Moscow might have 
retained greater influence in Kyiv. For decades the Kremlin pursued a “compatriot 
policy” towards Ukraine, which ended with the invasion.  Embracing a Slavic 808
brotherhood became untenable after 2014. In simple terms: “Despite the current skep-
ticism, even people who are critical of the current government do not want to restore 
former ties with Russia.”  809
 Ukrainians still face tremendous challenges to their sovereignty and their im-
age. A member of the Rada explained: “Ukrainians are humiliated by the war…
Ukrainians have accepted Western retreat.”  The feeling among policymakers that 810
Western support has waned, cut through many of my interviews. A journalism expert 
lamented that within a one year of war in the East, interest plateaued and many news 
reporters left.  Another respondent expressed cynicism about EU integration, lead811 -
ing many Ukrainians to think that they are alone.   812
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 Caught between the West and Eurasia, its divided identity lies at the heart of 
Ukraine’s pessimism about foreign influence, whether its aggression or lack of sup-
port. A common perception among my respondents was that Ukraine is merely “an 
object, not a subject,” in the eyes of Moscow and Western capitals.  Rather than 813
serving as a principal partner in the region, Ukrainians felt they have not been able to 
shake their role as a pawn in a larger political game. As another MP maintained that 
Europe is too occupied with Russia and “thinks about Russia first, not Ukraine.”  814
Addressing the conflict with her EU counterparts, she often feels that officials in 
Brussels are subtly telling her, “don’t mess with Russia.”  For Ukraine national se815 -
curity policy is a matter of life and death, but for the EU the conflict is about conti-
nental stability. 
 Ukrainians now fear they will be “traded” for other issues like Syria, closely 
watching sanctions negotiations as the main indicator of where their fate lies.  One 816
interviewee even went so far as to accuse Western countries of wanting to keep up the 
“internal conflict” in Ukraine as a bargaining chip with Moscow.  One reasonable 817
criticism of Western influence, however, entails the lack of support. The same MP felt 
that the West was less sincere and that its attempts at promoting democracy and peace 
centers more on talking points than on genuine pledges.  After more than two years 818
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of protracted conflict along the frozen border, constant cyberattacks, an information 
war bombarding viewers daily with misinformation, Ukrainians have grown tired of 
Western soft support and want more concrete aid in the fighting.  
 Moscow’s most effective instrument in claiming a partial victory included its 
promotion of an alternative pole to the West.  Though policymakers worked hard to 819
pull Ukraine away, war fatigue began to supplant the high-minded ideals of Western 
openness. Growing populist passions have challenged the “liberal-democratic 
system,” for which young Maidan protesters first began fighting.  For some elites, 820
Russia presents an alternative to the post-modern order when their dissatisfaction for 
the EU and the US grows to critical mass. 
 The ways in which Moscow has influenced Ukraine’s policymaking calculus 
are clear: use unconventional means to disrupt Ukraine, drain its resources and sap the 
Ukrainian peoples’ will to fight. Ukrainian leaders’ first step towards defense included 
rapidly build a military and other security forces to counter Russian aggression. As a 
civil servant working in the Groysman government relayed to me, there is a direct 
correlation to the number of incidents along the conflict zone and the capabilities of 
the Ukrainian military.  A strong defense remains the greatest deterrent to Russian 821
aggression.   
 The West could also contribute more to this effort to deter Russian aggression. 
At least one interviewee thought that Moscow has been emboldened by the West’s 
inaction in other “grey zones” like Transnistria in Moldova and South Ossetia in 
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Georgia.  The Kremlin supports these separatists movements, with few resources 822
and at great cost to European stability. The frozen conflict in Donbas became a natural 
expansion of Moscow’s proxy war against the West. 
 To mitigate other, more subtle forms of influence in defense policy, the same 
respondent suggested increase sanctions against Russia. Her main point was that the 
West and Kyiv should target the flows of money from Russia, funneled to politicians 
in Ukraine, wittingly or unwittingly, furthering Putin’s agenda.  As financial ex823 -
changes occur more frequently electronically, she hopes that using cyber tools to con-
trol capital flows can reduce Russian influence. 
 The other strategies for combating Russian influence, however, are less obvi-
ous. One civil servant lamented the lack of an overall strategy for combating Russian 
soft power, with concrete plans and reasonable objectives.  Due to the 2014 invasion 824
however, Ukraine should devise better strategy against Russian cultural and religious 
influence.  One of the central problems with mitigating Russian cultural influence 825
includes the unwillingness for some Ukrainians to see Russia, a longtime ally, as the 
enemy. In the words of one of my respondents: “The real problem is Russian aggres-
sion, not a Ukrainian conflict.”  826
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Conclusion 
 This study examined the ways in which foreign powers have attempted to in-
fluence policymaking in Ukraine. My primary questions addressed: 1) how do West-
ern and Russian   governments influence reform initiatives, 2) economic policies, 3) 
regional energy politics, and 4) security and defense policies. Western and Russian 
influence on Ukrainian political decisions depends greatly on the policy sphere. The 
core difference between Western and Russian approaches concerns their respective 
applications of hard versus soft power. Russian hard power relies on financial as-
sistance to elites, both elected officials and oligarchs, legacy infrastructure from the 
Soviet period, using energy as a weapon, new mercantilism based on foreign con-
sumer markets. Moscow fears that the loss of its markets in Ukraine and downline 
consumer markets will threaten its state revenues. By 2000 government and business 
leaders alike recognized the utility of this national resource and the increasing role it 
played in foreign affairs. Vladimir Putin has harnessed its value for the needs of the 
state. Ukraine’s further integration with the EU threatened this new approach.  
 Russian foreign policy also employs the military but with a slightly different 
twist than seen in previous decades. Rather than conduct a full-scale invasion of 
Ukraine, Moscow opted for a limited intervention, which annexed Crimea, and incited 
separatism in Donbas, and conducting a cyber war against power grids and other criti-
cal infrastructure. Although the Russian military deteriorated rapidly after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Putin’s modern hybrid warfare has been adept at maximizing its 
capabilities. 
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 As Moscow’s instruments of hard power dull, it is forced to refocus its sights 
on soft power relying on its deep cultural ties and familiar personal connections 
among oligarchs to Ukraine in exercising influence. Centuries of political association 
between Russia and the Ukrainian people have allowed Moscow an avenue for pursu-
ing its interests. The formation of a powerful oligarkhiya in both countries filled the 
void of collapsed political structures after 1991. Russia considers a democratic 
Ukraine as a threat to its influence in the region.  As Ukraine lacked strong institu827 -
tions and weak rule of law, an informal network of well-connected elites emerged, 
allowing the Kremlin a path of control.  
 Western governments and NGOs have targeted institutions and aids anti-cor-
ruption initiatives by donating to NGOs, threatening to withhold aid to the govern-
ment if certain democratizing conditions are not met, and furthering economic ties 
with the EU. Western countries want to decentralize decision-making, weaken oli-
garchs and Russia’s privileged position in the Ukrainian economy, while developing a 
regional energy plan for post-Soviet Europe, which can reduce dependency on Russ-
ian sources. Western countries earmark aid and provide technical advice for the 
Ukrainian military, to stabilize the situation in Lugansk and Donyetsk, and combat the 
information war against Moscow. Western soft power takes the form of advising civil 
servants and NGO workers to promote democratization, while increasing academic 
and scientific cooperation. The goal for Washington and Brussels is to help socialize a 
new generation of policymakers and educators, who can push for liberal norms. As 
 Rachel Vanderhill et. al., International Dimensions of Authoritarian Persistence: Lessons from 827
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the Kremlin officials try to pull Ukraine back into past patterns of decision-making, 
the West hopes to offer an alternative path for the policy process. 
 I interviewed Ukrainian policymakers, experts and activists, and provide ex-
tensive data concerning a wide range of policy areas. My conclusions reflect the cur-
rent political situation in Ukraine, as a result of developments since independence in 
1991. The events of 2014 produced “the growth of Ukrainian and Russian-speaking 
Ukrainian patriotism, indeed, Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and military and 
covert intervention have unintentionally spread Ukrainian patriotism into Russian-
speaking Eastern and Southern Ukraine because those who previously held ambiva-
lent, passive, and mixed identities had to chose sides during a crisis.”   828
 Civil society plays a vital role in channeling this nationalism to building state 
capacity. According to  Svitlana Krasynska and Eric Martin, based upon their field-
work in Ukraine during EuroMaidan, that “It appears that the capacity for formaliza-
tion within civil society existed in a latent form and was able to manifest itself when 
the need arose, resulting in significant changes in the country.”   A key element to 829
strengthening the state requires continuing anti-corruption efforts, particularly against 
the oligarkhiya. Heiko Pleines contends that “While the current Ukrainian leadership 
speaks of ‘de-oligarchization,’ what is visible so far seems to be more an informaliza-
tion of the political role of oligarchs.”  Breaking the power of the oligarchs will 830
prove to be the greatest challenge for policymakers.  
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 The efforts of state-building and rooting out corruption directly affect econom-
ic development. As one article stated, “a radical improvement in governance, reduc-
tion of corruption, and establishment of a new system of relations between its regions 
(at least in terms of taxes). In general, restructuring (possibly decentralizing) the gov-
ernment, updating economic institutions, reducing corruption, renewing the invest-
ment climate, and improving governance are all steps necessary for the second start of 
Ukraine’s transition.”  While Ukrainian energy markets require more competition 831
and transparency, ultimately the greatest obstacle to ensuring stable supplies is diver-
sification. Adam Stulberg contends that “New network nodes are emerging across Eu-
ropean sub-regions to reduce the non-commercial dimensions to Russia’s market 
power.”   832
 Ukraine’s most pressing issue, however, concerns its security policies. Accord-
ing to a RAND report “Russian leaders sought to pay the lowest price possible for 
destabilizing Ukraine,” but “underestimated the costs and instigated a chaotic cam-
paign of warfare with the intention of staying below the conventional threshold.”  833
As Ukrainian policymakers attempt to resolve the frozen conflict in Donbas, they 
must also address gaps in non-conventional capabilities like cyber defenses. One 
point of leverage for Ukraine includes the continuous cyber war between Russia and 
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NATO members, which can unite Ukrainian cybersecurity interests with Western 
countries.   834
 The conflict within Ukraine and the subsequent tensions between the EU, US 
and Russia threaten not only to bring a potentially wider war to the continent of Eu-
rope, but also to erode the relative peace among nation-states since the end of the 
Cold War. Clothed in a false sense of security about the future, modern societies once 
again doubt the potential of another war among major powers, similar to WWI and 
WWII. People rarely predict conflicts, especially the most destructive ones. Few pre-
dicted the carnage caused by either world war. It is often the smallest conflicts that 
ignite the greatest ones. The fact that the US and USSR avoided a direct conflict, de-
spite numerous proxy wars, marks an historical exception, not the rule. 
 The conflict in Ukraine as of 2018 has become frozen but the only guarantee 
of this fragile stalemate is ensured by the constant negotiations between Ukrainian, 
Russian, EU, and US officials, operating within an environment of nuclear deterrence 
among the three latter actors. The path to sustainability and security requires consis-
tence maintenance of structures, oftentimes with little fanfare and by unknown partic-
ipants. The chief obstacle to democratic reform is the Ukrainian oligarkhiya. Political 
and economic elites must unify against regressive Russian influence, while continuing 
to draw clearer lines between agents of public interest and those of business. The next 
generation of policymakers needs to complete the state-building that started in the late 
1980s.  835
 Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar.”834
 Interview with Respondent 11, 2 November 2016.835
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 The current conflict has pried Ukrainians away from their ethnic compatriots 
to the east in exchange for embracing the ideals of the West. As one respondent ob-
served, “Ukrainian society is separating from Russian society.”  As Russia adopts an 836
approach to foreign policy which promotes cultural ties with Ukraine and criticizes 
the virtues of democracy, Western powers are luring Ukrainians with promises of a 
freer and more prosperous future. The choice is now up to Ukrainians: build their 
state upon cultural connections to Eurasia or embrace democratic ideals. Putin claims 
to protect Ukraine from Western infiltration while inciting ethnic conflict between 
Ukrainians and Russians. While Moscow professes its symbolic unity with the 
Ukrainian people, in reality it supports an occupation of Crimea and frozen conflict in 
Donbas. The ironic relationship between these Slavic ‘brothers’ exhibits the inconsis-
tencies of Russian foreign policy towards its ‘Near Abroad.’ 
 This is not to say the post-EuroMaidan government, with its focus on closer 
ties to the West, is fulfilling all its promises. The current political environment is frag-
ile. The economy, a huge predictor of political volatility, is even more fragile. In 2014 
Ukraine’s economy contracted 6.6% then another 9.8% in 2015.  However, in 2016 837
GDP increased 2.3%, indicating that economic conditions were improving.  As of 838
the year 2018 a new political movement is afoot under the leadership of many disillu-
sioned political activists. One prominent group, the Wave party led by former Geor-
 Interview with Respondent 11, 2 November 2016.836
 The World Bank, “Ukraine Economic Update - April 2017,” IBRD/IDA (April 2017), http://www.837 -
worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/publication/economic-update-spring-2017. 
 The World Bank, “Ukraine Economic Update - April 2017.”838
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gian President Mikhail Saakashlivi, prepares for the next general election or revolu-
tion, whichever comes first.  839
 A better understanding of energy issues can suggest ways in which countries 
heavily dependent on foreign sources of energy might better manage their security 
and sovereignty issues. Ukraine’s break with Russia has forced Ukrainians to reevalu-
ate their energy sector. To avoid undue Russian influence and weaken the power of 
oligarchs, policymakers must consider a more diverse energy portfolio. Reorienting to 
a regional consortium of producers, many countries in the EU, provides a more stable 
near future. The longer term goal should involve a large mix of renewable sources, 
relying more heavily on domestic sources, creating jobs for Ukrainians, and reducing 
the country’s carbon footprint. 
 The EU is well-positioned to provide the technical advice, helping to develop 
green energy in Ukraine. The EU’s 2020 Energy Strategy calls for 20% of consump-
tion to come from renewable sources, a goal Ukraine should hope to achieve voluntar-
ily.  As the EU members states attempt to move away from their dependence on 840
Russian petroleum products, Ukraine can emulate their policies and programs. Tech-
nical experts have been advising Ukrainians and should continue to develop closer 
ties to advance their mutual aims. 
 One avenue forward for research may involve investigating four policy areas, 
reform, the economy, energy, and security more intensively. The preceding discussion 
attempted to describe how foreign actors influence different policy areas. However, 
 Nolan Peterson, “Is Ukraine headed for Another Revolution,” Newsweek (November 21, 2017), 839
http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-headed-another-revolution-522399. 
 European Commission, “2020 Energy Strategy,” The European Union, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/840
en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/2020-energy-strategy. 
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this is only cursory and should lead to more intensive study of specific spheres and 
the ways in which Western versus Russian influences those spheres. Such studies will 
provide a more precise comparative analysis. Also, further studies require more inter-
views with officials of the Yanukovych regime. One problem it seems, concerns the 
hesitation of many former civil servants and politicians to speak publicly in the cur-
rent environment. Interviews have serious limitations in that many respondents may 
have agendas or forget details of past events they have experienced. Therefore, any 
further analysis requires other types of data corroborating the claims of interviewees. 
 An important and enduring question raised by the conflict in Ukraine, con-
cerns the nature of cooperation. Can Ukrainians and Russians embrace their prospects 
as an expandable game, as opposed to a zero-sum one? Cooperation can improve the 
benefits for all actors in the region. Rather than cater to oligarchs, can policymakers 
in both capitals pursue closer economic ties to the EU, benefitting all groups? 
 As in many instances throughout history, citizens are forced to choose be-
tween mutually exclusive options. Ukrainians will have to choose between trading 
their freedom for security and their stability for prosperity. As enthusiasm for reform 
fades, institutions and agents must continue to sustain the effort. The people of 
Ukraine are currently choosing between adopting Western and Eurasian values. The 
key difference between these paths includes the universal embrace, at least in rhetoric 
of the former, and the universal rejection of the latter. Though critics consistently 
point to shortcomings of the current Ukrainian government, the slow progress of re-
form and democratization, the failings of Western institutions to provide adequate 
support, or even exposing scandals of certain policymakers, few want a return to the 
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Soviet policymaking processes of the past. The path forward will not be easy, but re-
gardless of the EuroMaidan government’s shortcomings its direction cannot turn back 
towards Moscow. 
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Appendix 
Interview Questions: 
1) Intro Questions: Name, current position and title at what organization. How does 
your organization play a role in public policy? Do you or does your organization 
advocate for particular issues, take a particular position or lobby the govern-
ment? What past positions did you hold in the past that were related to public 
policy in Ukraine?       
2) General Ways Foreign Influence is Exerted: Who are the 3-5 most important ex-
ternal/foreign actors regarding influencing the policy process? Who are the 3-5 
most important domestic actors being influenced by foreign actors? What/who 
are the specific offices, agencies, organizations, people, etc., official and unoffi-
cial? What three policy areas are most immune to foreign influence?  
3) Policy-Making Actors being Influenced: Are there clear pro-Russian versus pro-
West blocs in the government, to include parties, certain ministries, etc.? Do 
they also operate through proxy groups or organisations? Are their 1-3 consen-
sus issues that most policy makers agree upon? What are the 1-3 most divisive 
issues? How have these issues changed over time?  
4) Specific Policy Areas: 
 A-Culture/Ethnicity: How has Russia’s foreign policy approach influenced 
ethnic Russians versus ethnic Ukrainians? How does Russia use culture to influence 
political decisions in Ukraine? How does the West influence the two ethnic groups 
differently? How does the EU or US use culture? Has there been a significant change 
in the relationship between Russian and Ukrainian identities since the Maidan? Which 
side, the West or Russia, is having more influence? How? Has this changed overtime? 
 B-Security/Defense: What are the top three security priorities for Ukrainian 
officials? Can you provide examples? Is Ukraine pursuing a multi-vector foreign poli-
cy? How has the overall approach changed? 
 C-Is the Ukrainian government’s current approach to foreign policy more ide-
ological or practical? What about past periods or governments? How does Russia’s 
ideological approach to foreign policy influence Ukrainian policy making? 
 D-What are the top three economic priorities for Ukraine (energy, investment, 
credit, trade, employment, inflation, etc.)? How does Russia influence these economic 
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issues? How has this influence changed over time? How does the West influence 
these economic issues? How has this changed over time?  
5) Conclusion: What are the one to three most effective ways Russia influences policy 
decisions in Ukraine? What are the one to three most effective ways the West influ-
ences Ukraine? Anything else to add? What did I not address that is relevant to for-
eign influences? How public policy is made?  
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